NATIONAL ROLES AND ROLE CONCEPTIONS

All independent units in an international system (we have excluded colonies, satrapies, and highly penetrated states from the discussion) reveal one of the three traditional orientations. These orientations themselves reflect such factors as the structure of the system, perception of threats, levels of involvement, radical-conservative attitudes, and the like. However, national roles are foreign-policy outputs associated only with states that are involved in systemwide and regional affairs. Many of today's microstates, such as the Maldive Islands or Lesotho, although proclaiming or displaying some interests in other states, do not see themselves as playing any distinct role in the world. We can consider a national-role conception as the policy makers' definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state and of the functions their state should perform in a variety of geographic and issue settings. iTypical national roles are "regional defender," the role of protecting other \states in a denned area, or "mediator," the role of assisting in international (conflict resolution. Some people ascribed to the United States in the 1960s the role of "world policeman," even though there is little evidence that American policy makers thought in these terms. The Soviet Union's traditional role in relation to East Europe, as consistently enunciated in Soviet speeches, has been • that of "regional defender" or "protector of the faith" (against the machinations of imperialism).

National role conceptions are closely related to orientations. Roles, too, reflect basic predispositions, fears, and attitudes toward the outside world as well as systemic, geographic, and economic variables. But they are more specific than orientations, because they suggest or lead to more discrete acts. For in­stance, we could predict with reasonable probability that a government that consistently portrays itself as a "mediator" would, when confronted with a re­gional or world conflict, offer to intervene in various conflict-resolving ways. If a state declares itself nonaligned, all we know is that, in relation to the two blocs, it will avoid military commitments. Other than that, we know or can predict little about its other foreign-policy activities or day-to-day decisions.

Types of Role

A study based on content analysis of speeches by high-level policy makers in seventy-one countries over the period 1965-1967 revealed that there are at least sixteen types of national roles that are components of the foreign policies

117 Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles

of states.¹⁰ The list below is arranged in order of the level of activity implied by the role conception. Those at the top reflect, generally, high involvement, usually of an active, radical, and strong character; those at the bottom refer to states whose orientations tend to reflect noninvolvement, few foreign-policy actions, conservatism, passiveness, and weakness.

1. Bastion of the Revolution, Liberator. Some governments hold that they have a duty to organize or lead various types of revolutionary move­ments abroad. One task of their state, as they see it, is to liberate others or to act as the bastion of foreign revolutionary movements—that is, to provide an area that foreign revolutionary leaders can regard as a source of physical and moral support, as well as an ideological inspirer. Chinese foreign-policy pro­nouncements in the 1950s and 1960s were rich in allusions to the international role. Such allusions are also found in the statements of many leaders of newly independent nations.

2. Regional Leader. The themes in this role conception refer to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in relation to states in a region with which it identifies. These themes are prominent in Libyan statements on its position in the Middle East and occasionally in American con­ceptions of its international tasks.

3. Regional Protector. This role conception, although it perhaps implies special leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis, places emphasis on providing protection for adjacent regions. Such role conceptions are routine in foreign-policy statements emanating from Australia, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.

4. Active Independent. Most government statements supporting the strategy of nonalignment are little more than affirmations of an "independent" role in foreign policy. Some states, however, say that independence should not imply isolation or noninvolvement. The themes in the role conception emphasize the necessity to increase involvement through establishing diplomatic relations with as many states as possible and, occasionally, to become involved as media­tors in bloc conflicts. Active independent role conceptions are often found in the foreign-policy statements of high officials in Yugoslavia, India, Malaysia, and Rumania.

5. Liberation Supporter. Unlike the bastion-of-the-revolution role conception, the role of liberation supporter does not indicate formal responsibili­ties for organizing, leading, or physically supporting liberation movements

¹⁰ The full study is reported in KJ. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,"International StudiesQuarterly, 14 (1970), 233-309.

118 Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles

abroad. Most developing nations see themselves as simple supporters of national liberation or anticolonial movements. They are, in brief, sympathizers of these movements. Therefore, we can predict, for example, that on colonial issues in the United Nations, these governments would always vote in an anticolonial manner.

6. Antiimperialist Agent. Where imperialism is perceived as a serious threat, many governments see themselves as agents of the "struggle" against this menace. The governments of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Libya, among others, are prominent antiimperialist agents.

7. Defender of the Faith. Some governments view their foreign-policy tasks in terms of defending values (rather than specified territories) from at­tack. President Kennedy, in his inaugural speech, for instance, claimed that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup­port any friend, or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of lib­erty." In a similar vein, Walter Ulbricht, the former government leader of East Germany, saw his state as having a major responsibility for "defending the hu­manitarian traditions of the Europeans against Americanism and ruthless Ger­man militarism."¹¹

8. Mediator-Integrator. A number of contemporary governments perceive themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special mediation tasks to reconcile other states or groups of states. They see themselves as either regional or global "fixers." Such themes were frequent in foreign-policy statements coming from Canada, France, Rumania, the United States, and Yugoslavia for the period on which the study was based.

9. Regional-Subsystem Collaborator. The themes in this role con­ception differ from those in the mediator-integrator category in that they do not merely envisage occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict; they indicate, rather, far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wide communities, to coalesce, cooperate, and integrate with other political units. These themes are strong in some European nations regard­ing the Common Market, in most Communist states concerning cooperation among their ruling parties, and among some newer states like Malaysia.

10. Developer. The themes in this role conception indicate a special duty or obligation to assist developing countries. References to special skills or advantages for undertaking such continuing tasks also appear frequently. Most of the industrialized countries, both East and West, see this as one of their international or regional roles.

¹¹ German Democratic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Oct. 30,1967), p. 243.

119 Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles

11. Bridge. This role conception usually appears in vague form, and it seems to stimulate no action. Whereas the mediator-integrator role implies various forms of diplomatic interposition into areas or issues of conflict, the bridge concept is much more ephemeral. Some states, such as Pakistan and Cyprus, merely mention that because of their unique geographic location or multiethnic culture, they are in a unique situation to create understanding among other states, or to act as a bridge in communications between other states.

12. Faithful Ally. Policy makers see most alliances today as one-way propositions. Many governments receive alliance guarantees from other states, but in no way commit themselves to support the foreign-policy objectives of the guaranteeing state. A faithful-ally role conception is one in which the policy makers declare that they will support, with all means possible, their fraternal allies. They are not so much concerned with receiving aid as with giving the appearance of committing aid to others. East Germany and Great Britain, among others, often emphasize their alliance commitments in this way.

13. Independent. This role conception is enunciated by the leaders of a large proportion of the world's contemporary states. The statements simply claim that on any given matter, the government will pursue its own best interests; otherwise, they do not imply any particular task or function in the system. Many of the small states that have few foreign-policy objectives and are involved very little in world or regional affairs describe themselves as independents.

14. Example. This role conception emphasizes the importance of pro­moting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies. For example, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia argued that his country could best contribute to the stability of Southeast Asia by undertaking internal development programs successfully and demonstrating to other states in the region that a multiethnic society can resolve its problems through democratic procedures.

15. Internal Development. This concept refers not to a given task or function within the international system but to the notion that most efforts of the government should be directed towards problems of internal development. It also suggests a desire to remain noninvolved in international political matters. Such statements often come from Burma and Pakistan.

16. Other Role Conceptions. Absent in this list is the notion of the balancer, a role that is traditional in diplomatic history. In the statements reviewed for this study, only the French government under former President de Gaulle alluded to a national task of balancing between great powers, or even lesser powers. Whatever the analytical utility of the concept of balance of power, it is clear that, today, most governments do not choose the balancer role. Finally,

120 Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles

some governments have their own version of the antiimperialist agent role. China and Albania see themselves also as antirevisionist agents. A few nations, especially Nationalist China, see themselves as performing tasks amounting to an anti-Communist agent role, and many of the Middle Eastern states portray themselves as special agents in the struggle against Zionism.

The first conclusion about national-role conceptions and foreign policy is that most governments, and all of those that have a reasonably high level of involvement in international affairs, see themselves as performing several roles, in different sets of relationships, simultaneously. In the sample of seventy-one nations, the average number of national roles per state referred to in speeches, press conferences, and the like, for the two-year period, was 4.6. Some of the most active states, like Egypt, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, saw themselves as playing seven or eight national roles in various international contexts. Smaller and less-involved states, such as Sri Lanka, Burma, Niger, or Portugal, had only one role conception. Most small states would have none. The study cited here generally displays that the more active a state is in international affairs, the more role conceptions it will develop. If this is true, then we would expect that national role conceptions accurately reflect different sets of relationships in which a state is involved.

In Chapters 6 through 11, we will discuss types of actions as components of foreign policy. Here, it might be useful to suggest the linkage between na­tional-role conceptions and these actions. The hypothesis is that, in most circum­stances, the specific foreign policy actions of a given state will be consistent with its national role conceptions. For example, if a government portrays itself as a bastion of the revolution, then we can predict that in any given revolutionary episode in the world, that state will take action, ranging from diplomatic and propaganda support to the provision of arms, and even active intervention, to promote that revolution. A faithful ally will support its protector's foreign-policy objectives and, in case of war, will probably meet its alliance commitments. And, in conflict situations, we would expect the self-styled mediators to make at least some diplomatic efforts or offers to resolve conflicts. There will be situations, of course, where knowledge of a nation's role conceptions will not enable us to predict actions or where actions will contradict the national-role conceptions. In certain situations (usually where there are rapid power shifts in the system, where aberrant personalities are concerned, or where a state is extremely weak), traditional national roles may be inconsistent with actions that are taken for short-run advantages. In the face of economic depression, for instance, we may expect that many governments will play down their developer roles in order to concentrate on saving their own resources. A faithful ally on the verge of civil war may be unable to meet its alliance obligations. Or, in the face of declining military strength, a government may drop a regional-protec­tor role or may quietly dismantle military bases abroad without formally denying its traditional role.

SUMMARY

The relationship of national units to the international system—to other states— cannot be understood sufficiently in terms of actions, such as sending a note or declaring war. Governments often contemplate their relationships to the envi­ronment or to regional subsystems in terms that are broader than those very specific considerations underlying specific decisions. The first two components of foreign policy that reflect these broader concerns have been called orientations and national roles. These outline—sometimes vaguely, sometimes in considera­ble detail—how a nation and its government will generally relate themselves over a period of time to the outer world. They reflect basic national attitudes and needs, as well as external conditions.

Three major orientations have been observed repeatedly throughout history: isolation, nonalignment, and coalition formation. There are, of course, varieties of each, but basically they are all strategies that involve the making or avoidance of commitments to other states. They are adopted—often only gradually—in light of many considerations; but geographic location, perceptions of threat, national needs, and systemic characteristics may be the most important.

National roles outline the functions and tasks to which states see them­selves committed within different international contexts. They thus provide guidelines for actions when specific situations arise in the environment. A govern­ment that defines itself as a bastion of the revolution, for example, will very probably provide diplomatic, military, and propaganda support (actions) to rebel groups operating in a neighboring country. National roles also reflect the general and specific objectives governments pursue within regions or in the world as a whole. We turn next to a third component of foreign policy, the goals govern­ments seek to achieve abroad.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anabtawai, Samir N., "Neutralists and Neutralism," Journal of Politics, 27 (1965),

351-61. Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment. New

York: Praeger, 1965. Dinerstein, Herbert S., "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American

Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 589-601. Fedder, Edwin H., "The Concept of Alliance," International Studies Quarterly,

12 (1968), 65-86. Friedman, Julian R., Christopher Bladen, and Stephen Rosen, eds., Alliance

in International Politics. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970. Haas, Ernst В., "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making," Journal

of Politics, 15 (1953), 370-98.

122 Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles

______, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" World

Politics, 5 (1953), 442-77. Hamblin, Robert L., "Group Integration During a Crisis," pp. 220-30 in Human

Behavior and International Politics, ed. J. David Singer. Skokie, 111.: Rand

McNally, 1965.

Holsti, K.J., "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," Interna­tional Studies Quarterly, 14 (1970), 233-309.

Holsti, Ole R., P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disinte­gration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies. New York: John Wiley,

1973. Keohane, Robert O., "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy, No.

2 (Spring 1971), 161-82. Liska, George, Alliances and the Third World. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1968. ______, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore, Md.: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1962.

Lyon, Peter, Neutralism. Leicester, Eng.: Leicester University Press, 1964. Neustadt, Richard E., Alliance Politics. New York: Columbia University Press,

1970. Osgood, Robert E., Alliances and American Foreign Policy. Baltimore, Md.: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1968. Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University

Press, 1968. Russett, Bruce M., "An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances,"

Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (1971). Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939," Journal

of Peace Research, No. 1 (1966), 1-32. Siverson, Randolph, and Joel King, "Alliances and the Expansion of War,"

pp. 37^9 in To Augur Well, eds. J. David Singer and Michael D. Wallace.

Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979. Wallace, Michael D., "Early Warning Indicators from the Correlates of War

Project," pp. 17-36 in To Augur Well, eds. J. David Singer and Michael

D. Wallace. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979. Willetts, Peter, The Non-Aligned Movement. New York: Nichols, 1979.

Foreign-Policy Objectives

Some aspects of international politics and foreign policy, such as general foreign-policy orientations and latitude of choice, can be accounted for by reference to systemic conditions. But political units do not just react or adjust to limitations imposed by the external environment. People grouped into nation-states and other types of political units have needs and purposes, many of which they can achieve or meet only by influencing the behavior of other states. A large portion of foreign-policy making is, to be sure, concerned with day-to-day problem solv­ing as issues arise at home and abroad. Diplomats and foreign-office officials are normally concerned with immediate, mundane matters of narrow scope. However, most governments also have some objectives that they are attempting to achieve through the ordering of various actions and that reflect needs and purposes. The objectives may be very specific, relating to a particular problem (say, promoting a peace proposal for the Arab-Israeli conflict), or general (such as creating a common market in a given region).

Sometimes the term "national interest" has been used (or abused) as a device for analyzing nations' objectives. There has developed, in fact, a pro­longed scholarly debate on the meaning of this concept, but little agreement has arisen. The vagueness of the concept is its main shortcoming. As Paul Seabury has noted:

The idea of national interests may refer to some ideal set of purposes which_a nation . . . should seek to realize in the conduct of its foreign relations. Wanting

V

124 Foreign-Policy Objectives

a better word, we might call this a normative, civic concept of national interest.

... A second meaning of equal importance might be called descriptive. In this

sense the national interest may be regarded as those purposes which the nation,

through its leadership, appears to pursue persistently through time. When we

speak of the national interest in this descriptive sense, we move out of the

metaphysical into the realms of facts. ... It might similarly be said that the

national interest is what foreign policy-makers say it is. A third definition might

make the meaning of national interest somewhat clearer. The American national

interest has often been an arena for conflict among individuals and groups

і whose conceptions of it . . . have differed widely. Disagreement about policy

¹ and action may arise even among men who are essentially in agreement about

; the general aims of their country in the world. But policy disagreements are

\ usually due to differences among policy-makers about conceptions both of what

the United States is and what its role in world politics, even its mission, should

be.¹

Even though there may be some immutable national interests such as self-preser­vation, to which everyone will agree, no one can claim with certainty that any other specific goal or set of goals is in the national interest.

Therefore, we will avoid the term and substitute the concept of objective, which is essentially an "image" of a future state of affairs and future set of conditions that governments through individual policy makers aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing or sustaining the behavior of other states.² The future state of affairs may refer to concrete conditions, such as passing a resolution in the General Assembly or annexing territory; or to values, such as the promotion and achievement of popularity, prestige,

'or democracy abroad; or to a combination of the two. Some objectives remain constant over centuries and directly involve the lives and welfare of all members of a national society. Others change almost daily and concern only a handful

I of government personnel and citizens, for example, to protect a small industry from foreign competition. These are the interests of private individuals and groups, promoted by governments for the welfare of a few citizens—private interests translated into public policy.

. Even if we use the term objective to describe a great variety of collective

" interests and values that operate in foreign policy, we should not assume that Foreign ministers and diplomats spend all their time carefully formulating logical and coherent sets of collective or private goals to pursue systematically through the rational ordering of means to ends. Some statesmen or governments have, of course, spent time and resources to define the ultimate goals of their actions. Charles de Gaulle formulated a set of goals for France that, even if described in fairly mystical terms, was carefully thought out in accordance with his interpre-

¹ Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United States of America (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 86.

² Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to International Politics," in Foreign Policy Decision-Making, eds. Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 82; see also George Modelski, A Theory o/ Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 8-11, 50.

125 Foreign-Policy Objectives

tations of historical development and France's "destiny" in that development. Not all his actions were compatible with achievement of the goals, but generally he persisted in his plans despite widespread criticism from France's major allies. If some governments operate to fulfill a series of logically consistent goals, many more do not seem to be working toward the achievement of any specific objective or, at best, seem to improvise policies to meet specific domestic or external crises or commitments. This is not surprising, for most transactions between governments are routine and unplanned, and serve primarily the inter­ests and needs of a few private citizens. The work of a foreign office frequently appears to develop in a completely random fashion, with no discernible relation­ship between decisions arrived at and policies conducive to the achievement of collective goals. As one British diplomat has claimed, "most important deci­sions are often made, not as part of a concerted and far-sighted policy, but under the urgent pressure of some immediate crisis."³ His comment is typical of criticisms aimed at the foreign policies of many countries—namely, that the governments have no real policies but only respond to the initiatives of others. They are concerned with solving problems as they arise, not with defining long-range objectives and formulating the means to achieve them. Some of the great foreign policies of the United States, such as the European Recovery Program, were products of planning, delineation of objectives, and assessment of costs. But, as Paul Seabury points out:

All too often policy is the product of random, haphazard, or even irrational | forces and events. Equally often it is the result of dead-locked judgements, an uneasy compromise formula. Often what appears on the surface as a nation's settled course of action may be due to indecision, unwillingness or inability to act. It may be no policy at all but simply a drift with events. Sometimes foreign policies are the product of statesmen's passive compliance with strong domestic political pressure—and thus products of contending political forces within the nation itself. Finally, policy may be due to statesmen's abdication of choice and rational judgement in the face of ruthless and strong external pressures.⁴

A second point we must remember when using the concept of objective is that governments often pursue incompatible objectivje^^multaneoujly. It is the task of policy makers to rank and choose among conflicting objectives and determine which are feasible within a specific set of circumstances. Disarmament, for example, has been conceived by many governments as both an end in itself and a means to achieve increased national security from foreign military threats. Yet, the implementation of any disarmament scheme would incur serious short-term risks to any nation's security. Many objectives of Soviet foreign policy seem to be similarly incompatible. Lenin often claimed that the interests of both the Russian nation and the Soviet state should be subordinated to the

³ Quoted in Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 311.

⁴ Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy, p. 5.

126 Foreign-Policy Objectives

goals of proletarian internationalism—that is, to the victory of world revolution. But Stalin reversed Lenin's thesis and followed policies that promoted Soviet strength, often at the expense of foreign Communist parties. More recently, the Soviet government has distributed economic and military assistance to re­gimes—as in Iraq and Egypt—that persecute Communists. There is almost con­stant conflict among Soviet policy makers, who must attempt to reconcile short-run political and diplomatic goals with an ideological commitment to support the "international proletarian movement." Americans, too, have had their share of difficulties in reconciling policy objectives. For over four decades, the United ⁴ States has publicly proclaimed its support for the principles of self-determination and national independence and its sympathy for anticolonial movements; but it has also supported allies that were attempting to retain their overseas territories by using American-supplied arms against native independence movements.

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