Foreign-Policy Orientations and National Roles

The international system is the environment in which the units of international politics operate. Their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitude of choice, and actions are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power in the system, by its scope, and by its prevailing rules. This section will shift the focus of analysis from systems to the units that constitute them. In order to explain what conditions make states behave as they do, we need first to describe what, typically, they do. Using the nation-as-actor approach for the time being, our concern will be to explore the components of foreign policy.

What is foreign policy? How do we make sense of all the phenomena that transcend national borders—sending a diplomatic note, enunciating a doc­trine, making an alliance, or formulating a long-range, but vague, objective such as "making the world safe for democracy"? These are all foreign-policy outputs: actions or ideas designed by policy makers to solve a problem or pro­mote some change in the environment—that is, in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states. But there is a vast difference in scope between sending a single diplomatic note to a friendly state (a specific action) and defining what a nation will seek throughout the world in the long run. We will divide the notion of foreign policy into four components, ranging in scope from the general to the specific: (1) foreign-policy orientations, (2) national roles, (3) objectives, and (4) actions. This and the next chapter will describe the first three types of outputs and present some preliminary, anecdotal evidence explain­ing why certain governments adopt certain orientations, roles, or objectives.

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Chapters 6 through 11 will describe various types of actions used to protect or achieve orientations, roles, and objectives. More formal attempts will be made in Chapters 12 through 14 to explain all these outputs.

Few states are at any given time concerned with direct threats to their security or "core" values. Some states are so weak in capabilities—the means by which they can influence the behavior of other states—that even if they were vitally interested in a problem, there would be little they could do directly to affect its outcome. The government of Malawi may have well-formulated views on Sino-Soviet relations; but, aside from occasional diplomatic statements, there is little its government can do by itself to influence the state of these relations. Moreover, some states are so geographically remote from the major scenes of international conflict or areas of collaboration that interest on the part of the government or the population as a whole may be difficult to generate. One would not expect the people of Iceland to be particularly interested in the prob­lems of the Central African Republic, and their government would probably not be directly involved in African affairs. Many Europeans and Americans, whose governments maintain extensive commitments around the world and whose foreign-policy objectives and aspirations impinge upon the interests and values of many other societies, often forget that not all countries are equally interested in the great collaborative ventures and conflicts of our era. Many governments have few international concerns outside of advancing or protecting the private interests of their own citizens through routine trade and cultural contacts. Degrees of involvement in affairs of the system thus may vary from the maximum levels attained by major powers to the low number of official international transactions in which Iceland, Gabon, Tonga, or Mauritania are involved. Even the level of involvement of the great powers varies with different issue areas. The Soviet Union is a prime actor in many issue subsystems, from disarmament to colonialism, but it has not been vigorously engaged in the de­bates on trade and aid between the North and South.

A country's level of involvement in various international issue areas is at least one expression of its general orientation toward the rest of the world. By orientation we mean a state's general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and for coping with persisting threats. A na­tion's general strategy or orientation is seldom revealed in any one decision, but results from a series of cumulative decisions made in an effort to adjust objectives, values, and interests to conditions and characteristics of the domestic and external environments.

By examining the structure of power and influence and the actions of , political units in diverse international systems, it is possible to identify at least three fundamental orientations that have been adopted recurrently, regardless of historical context. These are (1) isolation, (2) nonalignment, and (3) coalition making and alliance construction. Ministers in the ancient Chinese system under the Chou dynasty recommended these strategies to their leaders, choice depend-

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ing upon geographic location of the state and its position between other powers. Kautilya, the philosopher of interstate relations during the Chandragupta period in ancient India, also referred to these fundamental orientations as means of increasing power, gaining security, or conducting successful policies of imperial­ism. Even today, any state's general orientation and strategy toward the external environment can be described by one of these three terms.

In addition to describing the terms, we may ask: Under what circum­stances have governments adopted these orientations? What domestic and exter­nal conditions help make these strategies or orientations successful, and when do they fail? At least four conditions or variables can help account for the selection of any particular strategy. First is the structure of the international system. The patterns of dominance, subordination, and leadership of an interna­tional system establish some limits on the freedom of action of the component units. By definition, it would be impossible for a state in a truly polar system to seek its objectives or defend its interests by isolating itself, nor would a political unit in a hierarchical system attempt to build coalitions against the center. Second, a state's general foreign-policy strategy can be linked to the nature of its domestic attitudes and social and economic needs. Third, the degree to which policy makers perceive a persisting external threat to their own values and interests will have great bearing on their orientation toward the external environment. Finally, a state's geographic location, topographical characteristics, and endowment in natural resources can often be linked to its choice of orienta­tions.

ISOLATION

A strategy of political and military isolation is indicated by a low level of involve­ment in most issue areas of the system, a low number of diplomatic or commerical transactions with other political units and societies, and attempts to seal off the country against various forms of external penetration. Isolationist orienta­tions are often based on the assumption that the state can best gain security and independence by reducing transactions with other units in the system, or by maintaining diplomatic and commercial contacts abroad while handling all perceived or potential threats by building administrative walls around the home base. How are the four variables of system structure, domestic attitudes and needs, threats, and geographic features related to isolationist strategies?

Logically, at least, an isolationist orientation would be adopted, or could succeed, only in a system with a reasonably diffuse structure of power, where military, economic, or ideological threats do not persist and where other states are regularly shifting alliances. A polar system is defined as an international structure in which all states, voluntarily or through compulsion, commit their military capabilities to the purposes of a bloc or bloc leader. In a hierarchical system, isolation might be possible only if the power of the central unit was

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so weak that it could not reach effectively to every vassal state. This was the case in China during the Western Chou period, when many of the smaller political units on the geographic periphery of the system were so physically isolated from the Chou capital that they were able to develop into powerful states with a minimum of interference from the emperor. They paid lip service to the "Son of Heaven"; but politically they remained independent while their strength grew to the point where they could effectively challenge not only other rising states, but the central monarchy itself. Throughout the Greek period, a number of city states and former colonies deliberately isolated themselves behind the barri­ers of the Mediterranean Sea as a way of escaping commitments to either side during the Peloponnesian Wars.

Political units that adopt an orientation of isolation are usually economi­cally and socially self-sufficient. In order to maintain a "way of life," including social values, political structures, and economic patterns, the political unit does not have to change the external environment in its favor. Nor, in many cases, does it depend upon others to fulfill its social and economic needs. This does not mean that an isolated state necessarily fails to conduct commercial or diplo­matic relations with other states. It may do so, but not to such an extent that conflicts in those relations could lead to unpleasant military consequences or military threats from abroad.

Isolation orientations can be linked directly to the presence of perceived threats, whether military, economic, or cultural. Some political units have re­mained isolated for centuries because geographic barriers prevented foreign incursions. But most have adopted isolation strategies as a means of coping with an actual or potential threat—not by meeting it in battle, but by withdrawing behind the frontiers and erecting defenses that would make the state imperme­able to military attack or cultural infiltration.

Geographic and topographic characteristics are related in many ways to a strategy of isolation. Surrounding high mountains, wide seas, or uninhabit­able plains or deserts will afford protection to political units, provided that other states in the system do not possess means for easily bypassing these fea­tures. Geographic remoteness reduces the number of potential threats; and pro­tective topographical features provide natural shields behind which to hide, reducing further the number of potential threats. Until the nineteenth century, • for instance, high mountain barriers and lack of access routes favored the sus­tained isolation of Nepal. Nepal was not far from the great centers of British military, economic, and political influence on the Indian subcontinent; but the natural barriers surrounding it were adequate to cope with most massive foreign intrusions. The British were diplomatically and commercially active in Nepal, but not to the extent that they were in other colonial or semicolonial areas. China invaded Tibet in 1950 and began building military roads in the Himalayan valleys, thus making Nepal's position much less secure. Because it is now much more accessible, it is more open to external influences, particularly to the effects of competition between Communist China and India. In other words, given the level of contemporary technology and military potential, Nepal's isolation

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strategy depends more on the state of Chinese-Indian relations than on geo­graphic features.

The deliberate isolation of Japan for several centuries after the first Japanese contacts with Europeans is one illustration of a state's adopting this strategy in response to a perceived threat and taking advantage of its insularity. In this case, the Japanese emperors sealed off the islands (although they tolerated a minimum of trade with some Europeans) to prevent "barbarian" infiltration, meaning either territorial conquest or the more subtle pollution of Japanese culture and values by alien practices. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, Western naval power in the Pacific had become so formidable that it could easily breach Japan's "impermeability." In 1854, Japan was isolated. Only five decades later it was making commercial and military coalitions with Great Britain, the United States, and several European countries; and it was acting as one of the important units in major conflicts of the Far East.

Examples of deliberate isolation as a foreign-policy orientation are not prominent in the second half of the twentieth century. For more than a decade, beginning in 1962, the Burmese government systematically reduced its contacts with the outside world and sealed itself off from foreign penetration. Foreign-aid missions (except some from international organizations) were expelled; tour­ism was proscribed by a rule limiting visitors to a stay of no more than forty-eight hours; the government refused to join regional alliances or even economic and cultural groupings; few Burmese students left to study abroad; foreign-owned private firms were nationalized; all incoming films and literature were censored; and new foreign capital investment was not invited. Burma remained a member of many international organizations, but even in those councils it remained silent and uninvolved. The reasons behind the isolationist orientation were many; but mostly they indicated a fear of becoming an object of great-power rivalry and of having Burmese economic activity dominated by foreigners or its society disrupted by alien cultural forces brought through foreign-aid officials, tourism, and Western-style advertising.

These examples indicate that there may be strong incentives for govern­ments to choose strategies of isolation. Those who support these strategies are not, as many have argued, indifferent to the world around them; on the contrary, they may be realistically assessing international conditions and potential threats. Political units remote from scenes of conflict in the system, relatively independent economically and militarily, and suspicious that involvement would only jeopardize their social, economic, and political values often find that they can best maintain their values and achieve their aspirations through isolationism.

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