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Contemporary Long-Range Objectives



Messianic plans for reorganization of continents or the entire world seldom succeed, because the threatened states coalesce, where otherwise their interests

12 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 371.

 

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might not coincide, to build a preponderance of military capacity and eventually destroy the revolutionary state in violent wars. Recent examples are the wars of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, Hitlers' defeat in Europe, and Japan's defeat in Asia after it had almost succeeded in building its "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." In the case of Soviet long-range goals, however, there is a new element in the vision. Although the Soviets conceive it their duty to promote and support revolution abroad, they are not required by their political doctrines to press too hard, for Marx claimed that the goal of world communism would be reached in any event through the inexorable laws of historical development. This element of determinism in Marxism allows Soviet policy makers a flexibility not found in other universalistic philosophies. They can either export revolution and support indigenous Communist movements through massive aid, or save their resources for economic development, secure in the knowledge that history will in any case develop according to the Marxist pattern. Napoleon, Hitler, and the Japanese imperialists did not believe that they had "history" on their side, and only through aggressive actions could they achieve their long-range objectives.

Even if Russian Communist leaders have perceived the possibility of choosing between giving historical processes a push or letting them take their course toward the predetermined end, they have attempted to draw pictures of the world as it would develop after the proletarian revolution had been com­pleted. Since the Russian revolution inaugurated the first enduring Socialist order, it was natural that Bolshevik theoreticians would use the organization of their own society as a model for the entire world. Thus, the new world would be organized, at least initially, on the principles of federalism for the constituent units, a socialist economy, and government (or "dictatorship of the proletariat") by Soviets (councils) of workers and peasants. But what was to be the position of nation-states in the new order—and particularly, what was to be the role of the first Socialist nation-state?

There is room for disagreement on the nature of the Soviet image of ultimate Communist world order. Some Western experts, citing Russia's rela­tions with the satellites through the 1950s, the propensity of the Russian Commu­nist party to define the goals, strategy, and tactics of the international Communist movement, and its domination of many revolutionary movements, argue that the vision is one of a communized world subservient to the interests of the Russian center—a Communist version of the Roman Empire.

Lenin's early pronouncements on the subject did not hint that the ulti­mate world federation of socialist states was to be dominated by Russians, but subsequent statements and actions by Communist leaders increasingly identified the Soviet Union as the nucleus of the new order. Progress toward the ultimate goals was thus closely linked to the aggrandizement and fortunes of the Russian state. Meanwhile, the original principle of voluntary accession of Socialist states into one great federation was increasingly belied by the Soviet interpretation of federalism within its own borders. Non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union

136 Foreign-Policy Objectives

were theoretically allowed autonomy in many political, social, and cultural affairs, but, in Stalin's era, the entire Union was ruled firmly from Moscow. Manifesta­tions of "bourgeois nationalism" in constituent units of the Union were met with purges, mass executions, incarcerations, and forced migration of "unreliable elements." Soviet policy toward its Eastern European neighbors after World War II also contradicted the idea of voluntary federalism, which was to be one of the underlying principles of the new order under communism.

According to some Soviet theorists, even the principle of federalism was to be transitory. Federation was only a method designed to allow diverse peoples and cultures to unite politically. The Comintern Theses of 1920 declared that it would be necessary to strive for an ever-closer federal union, but that federation would be only a transition form toward complete unity. Federation, it was hoped, would foster the tendency toward creation of a single world econ­omy regulated by the proletariat of all nations according to one common plan.13 The expectation was that Soviet Russia would be joined (by force, if necessary, according to Stalin) by other Soviet republics in a federation that would eventu­ally develop into a World Soviet Federation. This, in turn, would be transformed into a unitary, highly centralized world state.

Other observers of communism note a more egalitarian vision in Com­munist literature and philosophy.14 Emphasizing the concept of a Communist "Commonwealth of Nations" based on fraternal relations among sovereign and equal parties and states, they argue that aside from organizing and supporting the overthrow of bourgeois regimes, Moscow would not necessarily be the center of an empire. As the oldest Socialist state, it would simply provide leadership and act as an example to other revolutionary states. Hence the vision is one of ever-expanding revolution to build a world order of sovereign states—not so different from the present system, except that all states would adhere to a common socioeconomic system and political philosophy.

Recent speeches containing evidence of Soviet long-range goals are am­biguous. At the 24th Party Congress in March 1971, for example, Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev alluded to a world monolithic in ideology, but somewhat "free" in terms of sovereignty. He pictured the Socialist states in terms of a "well-knit family of nations, building and defending the new society together, and . . . enriching each other with experience and knowledge." This family would be "strong and united," and the "people of the world would regard it as the prototype of the future world community of free nations."15

How long will Soviet policy makers continue to regard the Communist

13 See Elliott R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 233.

14 See William Welch, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct: A Note on Method," Background, 6 (1963), 17-28.

15 Documents of the 24th Congress of the Communist Parly of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1971), p. 19.

137 Foreign-Policy Objectives

world state or commonwealth as the long-range objective of their policies? What time limits and how many national resources are they willing to commit to its achievement? Lenin anticipated the universal victory of socialism in his own lifetime, believing that the German proletariat would gain power either in 1918 or 1919 and the collapse of bourgeois regimes in the rest of Europe would follow shortly thereafter. To him, world revolution was a "core" value, or at least a middle-range goal, to be achieved even at the expense of Russian territo­rial integrity. In 1919, for example, he declared that it would not be long before communism had become victorious in the entire world, before he would see the founding of a worldwide Federal Republic of Soviets.16 Later that year, he even predicted that by July 1920, all Communists would greet the victory of the "International Soviet Republic."17 Since Lenin believed these developments would occur inevitably as a result of contradictions within capitalism and collapse of public order in many nations following World War I, the Soviet government could confine its activities to exploiting "revolutionary situations" abroad through agitation and propaganda. Unlike Stalin, Lenin did not believe, with the important exception of the Soviet campaign against Poland in 1920, that the Soviet state should use its military capabilities to impose Communist regimes abroad.

Stalin recognized that the new order could not be achieved unless the Soviet state used its national power, influence, and resources to this end. Con­struction of the new order became the objective not only of communism, but" of Russian foreign policy as well. Stalin also did not hold to Lenin's optimistic predictions about imminent world revolution. Instead of anticipating the down­fall of capitalism in the next year, or even during the next decade, Stalin's theoreticians spoke of long "historical stages" to which they could arbitrarily attach almost any period of time. As the tenets of Marxism-Leninism became irrelevant to the problems of modern society, the ultimate objective receded even further into the future. In 1935, for example, one Communist veteran told the Seventh World Comintern Congress that it would take communism a shorter time to achieve world victory than it did for the bourgeoisie to replace feudalism with capitalism. His estimate would place the world victory of commu­nism somewhere around I960. In 1952, however, a Soviet economist predicted that capitalism was undergoing its second stage of crisis (the first had occurred between the world wars) and that during this stage there would be a "lengthy" period of coexistence between capitalism and communism. Coexistence would no longer be necessary by the end of the present century, because by then communism would be victorious throughout the world.18 To Lenin, the long-range goal was defined in terms of months; to Stalin, it was an objective that Soviet diplomats and the Red Army should pursue for two or more decades;

16 Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State, p. 32.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., pp. 188-89.

138 Foreign-Policy Objectives

to Khrushchev, the achievement of the mission was placed several generations ahead.19 Today, the subject is seldom discussed. As the time limit passes into the remote future, middle-range goals such as construction of communism within Soviet Russia and development of Soviet diplomatic prestige around the world seem to occupy an increasing portion of Soviet policy makers' time and Russia's resources.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's long-range goals had not been stated as explicitly as those of Lenin. Nevertheless, Kissinger often indicated that his policies were oriented beyond the pragmatic resolution of day-to-day problems, as important as the latter may have seemed. The establishment of relations with China, the various moves toward the Soviet Union, termed detente, and the arms-control measures in SALT I and SALT II were basically just means of reaching the objective where "the solution of [our] difficulties by war becomes less and less conceivable and, over time, should have become inconceivable."20 ^ Underlying this objective was the assumption that extensive relationships and the creation of interdependence make war less likely.

The second major long-range objective, in Kissinger's view, was to get all governments—but particularly those in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan—to see that the facts of interdependence no longer allow countries to pursue national interests that are inimical to others. The world Kissinger attempted to promote is one where all governments recognize a "world interest," and shape their national programs and priorities to fit this greater interest. Kissinger saw that there are numerous forces creating a new "world structure." These forces, he implied, are beyond the power of any government to control. The function of foreign policy, then, is to adapt to these forces and to solve the problems they create without recourse to violence. Thus, while Kissinger had a vision of a different world order, he appeared less certain that foreign policy by itself can create such an order. But, in contrast to Lenin, there was no hint that the nation-state will cease to be the main actor in world politics.

Despite Kissinger's emphasis on the fact of interdependence, he did not believe that power can be distributed equally in the international system. I The basic power structure for maintaining a semblance of international order depends upon a rough balance among five centers: the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China. The essential thrust of his policies was to break down the cold-war barriers among these leading states and to build a network of economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties that might help reduce the likelihood of lethal conflict between them. Kissinger did not sanctify the idea of spheres of influence for each of these powers (for example, he was not overen-thusiastic about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which in a sense legitimized the territorial arrangements resulting from World War

\i 19 Khrushchev suggested that in North America, the present generation's grandchildren will live under socialism. This transformation, thus, could take place anytime between 1985 and 2020.

20 Interview printed in the New York Times, October 13, 1974, p. 34.

139 Foreign-Policy Objectives

II); but his actions in evacuating the United States from Southeast Asia and accepting covert interference in Chile suggest a recognition that each of the major powers has special interests in adjacent areas that must be respected. The pentagonal balance of power, then, would help provide stability not only in the mutual relations of the power centers, but in the developing world as well. Perhaps unfortunately, Kissinger's vision did not include a role for the greatly strengthened Arab states; he did not publicly recognize that interdepen­dence in most instances exists only between the industrialized states and that the dependence of the Third World countries will eventually decline. Indeed, American resistance to the Group of 77's proposals for a new "world economic order" suggests that neither Kissinger nor his major advisors thought carefully about the roles of developing nations in the new diplomatic constellation. South Asia, Africa, and Latin America did not appear to have an important place in Kissinger's long-range views.

Even though leaders of a state may define long-range objectives such as those discussed above, the objectives do not necessarily determine the actions that will be used to achieve them. One of the frequent mistakes of armchair analysts is to assume that the only American objective abroad is to promote its liberal and free-enterprise values or that every Russian diplomatic maneuver is part of a carefully formulated plan to communize the world. Certainly in many of its actions, the United States actively seeks to promote abroad its own domestic values. This is one American middle-range goal. It rewards states with liberal political institutions; it has on occasion withheld recognition of govern­ments—particularly in Latin America—that have not come into being through, or observed, constitutional processes; it has cut off foreign aid to governments that were constituted through violence; it has occasionally insisted that recipients of aid not use funds to build nationalized industries to compete against private entrepreneurs; and through its propaganda programs, it has emphasized the virtues of its own political and social values. On the other hand, where other interests and objectives have been more important, it has not attempted to promote its own "way of life" abroad. It has conducted transactions and formed alliances with all types of regimes; it has rewarded conservative groups, ignored the principle of self-determination, or remained officially indifferent to the values expressed in the economic and political life of other countries. It has intervened in the internal affairs of other states, sometimes to support conservative regimes against radical factions, sometimes to save liberal governments against plots on the right. The Soviet Union and China similarly pursue all ranges of foreign-policy objectives and commit varying resources to their realization. But these objectives, no matter how diverse, do not contain within them specific courses of action.

If a state wishes to secure more strategically advantageous frontiers at the expense of its neighbors, it can do so using almost any technique from persuasion to aggression. To persuade, it can offer a piece of its own territory as compensation, promise a friendship treaty, foreign aid, or a hundred other

140 Foreign-Policy Objectives

types of rewards. To coerce, it can build alliances or subvert the neighboring regimes and establish puppet governments that would then cede the desired territory. Certainly, the Soviet goal of a world Communist state, or a common­wealth of Socialist societies, does not prescribe any immutable strategic or tactical foreign-policy principles. With the exception of the Bolshevik war against Poland in 1920, Lenin did not believe that communism should be imposed abroad by the Red Army; but Stalin did appreciate the possibilities of using military power and succeeded in expanding communism by unleashing the Red Army. Each man held approximately the same long-range goal, but each sought to achieve it through different methods.

 




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