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TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS



By comparing historical descriptions of international systems, it is possible to construct typologies of political orders at the international level. But which criteria should be used to differentiate among the systems? The nature of the units that interact provides one basis of differentiation, but evidence is insufficient to suggest that the forms of political organization—whether feudal units, city-states, agricultural states, or nation-states—determine the unique characteristics

89 The European and Contemporary State Systems

of international politics in a given era. International systems could also be classi­fied according to the types of issues that bring political units into conflict. Many of the Cold-War issues have been resolved, and today, resource depletion, eco­nomic inequality, and arms control are of paramount importance. But the most meaningful distinction may relate to the types of structures—the general patterns of power, dominance, and influence—that persist among units comprising the system. The significance of a system's structure lies in its influence on the general orientation of constituent units' external policies and on the restraints it can impose on the units' freedom of action.

If a system's structure is used as the differentiating criterion, we can| outline models, based on the historical descriptions, above, of at least five differ­ent kinds of international systems: (1) the "hierarchial," (2) the "diffuse," (3) the "diffuse-bloc," (4) the "polar," and (5) the "multipolar." China in the West­ern Chou period (from 1122 until approximately 771 B.C.) is the only example of a hierarchical structure discussed in these chapters, but further historical examination would uncover other systems with similar features.21 In this type of system, power and influence are concentrated in one unit, which has the authority to create lesser units and chastise errant units if they attempt to chal­lenge the central authority's leadership and domination. The central authority maintains order and stability by offering rewards and subsidies such as grants of land or honorific titles, making threats of punishment, and vigorously inculcat­ing official myths and ceremonies that emphasize the sanctity of superior-subor­dinate relationships. Interaction and communication within the system also fol­low the hierarchical principle. They are conducted primarily between the central authority and immediately subordinate units; units at the bottom of the hierarchy usually communicate with the central authority only through mediating states. Communication between the lesser units is, at best, sporadic and, in most cases, nonexistent. Alliances theoretically cannot exist, since all power flows from the top down. In the process of disintegration, however, ambitious subordinate units may secretly ally with each other to challenge the position of the central authority.

Power and influence in the diffuse system are distributed widely among the interacting units. There is an ill-defined hierarchy of status among states, established according to various criteria of stratification, but a comparatively large number of political units are of roughly equal size and military capability. None permanently dominates the others, although there may be some leaders of regional alliances. Diplomatic and military coalitions form frequently, are open-ended, and disintegrate rapidly once mutual objectives have been achieved. They do not form into stable blocs. These coalitions are unstable because the interests underlying them tend to shift quickly, members are not economically or ideologically dependent upon each other, and there are no fundamental ideo-

21 Some features analogous to those of the Chinese system in the Western Chou period would be found in the Moslem empire and in the Holy Roman Empire before the seventeenth century.

90 The European and Contemporary State Systems

logical issues dividing the alliances. Communication and interaction among the units is widespread, although geographic proximity and logistic factors undoub­tedly make some units more involved than others in the major issue areas. China in the Spring and Autumn period and occasionally in the period of Warring States, Greece between the ninth and fifth centureis B.C., the Italian city-states in the first half of the fifteenth century, and Europe during the eighteenth, most of the nineteenth, and part of the twentieth century would fit the model of the diffuse system.

The diffuse-bloc system existed in the Greek period when the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian League constituted powerful and relatively perma­nent blocs with surrounding allies or satellites, but many other city-states re­mained independent of bloc affiliations, pursuing their objectives with considera­ble freedom of action. The same general pattern was repeated in Europe in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and again in the four or five years preceding the outbreak of World War II; and it has reappeared, since 1955, when an increasing number of nonaligned states has successfully broken the military-diplomatic supremacy of the two bloc leaders. Patterns of communi­cation and interaction in the diffuse-bloc system are similar to those in the diffuse system—they go in all directions, except that bloc members tend to become dependent upon, or subservient to, bloc leaders and to conduct relatively few relations with opposing bloc members or noninvolved states.

The polar model constitutes a generalization of the main features of power, influence, and patterns of communication and interaction found in China during portions of the period of Warring States (after the northern and southern leagues were formed), in Europe at the time of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, immediately prior to World War I, and again in the period following World War II until approximately 1955. In this type of system, military power and diplomatic authority center around two bloc leaders, which dominate or lead lesser units by combining rewards—such as providing security and eco­nomic assistance—with implicit or explicit threats of punishment against recalci­trant allies. Interaction and communication seem to be primarily between the two antagonistic bloc leaders and between each of the bloc leaders and its respec­tive client states. In the post-World War II period, however, interaction and communication among the lesser states of the Western bloc have been consistently high, while prior to 1956 it was largely absent within the Soviet bloc.

Conflicts and issues within the polar model seem to contain strong ideo­logical overtones, although territorial issues and questions of spheres of influence may be mixed in with the competition over values. Strong value incompatibilities between blocs thus sustain cohesiveness within blocs. In ancient China, it was the "legitimate" league of Chou states against the partly "barbarian" southern bloc; in the years between 1789 and 1815, it was conflict not only between France and the rest of Europe, but also between the universal principles of republicanism and royal legitimacy; in our day, the principles of Marxism-Lenin­ism conflict in many ways with democratic liberalism.

The European and Contemporary State Systems

The multipolar system, examples of which could be seen occasionally during the Warring States period and, perhaps, in our own day, combines charac­teristics of other types. For example, with the rise of China over the past twenty years and the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet Union has adopted some policies aimed at reducing East-West hostilities. We would hy­pothesize that in the multipolar system, there is more flexibility between the blocs (that is, not all conflicts are seen as involving a life-death struggle between the blocs), more opportunity for short-term alliances and coalition shifts, and possibly somewhat less bloc cohesion than in the polar system. In the multipolar system, then, we would argue that the latitude of choice of bloc members, both leaders and followers, is greater than in the polar system; domestic needs, person­ality characteristics of key leaders, public opinion, and traditional policies can probably account for as much of the nations' foreign-policy outputs in the multi-polar system as does system structure. In the polar system, on the other hand, foreign policy—at least for the smaller states—is determined essentially, if not exclusively, by the needs, ideologies, and aspirations of the bloc leaders.

These categories of international systems emphasize the recurrence of various power structures and interactions patterns in different historical contexts. Were there any other similarities between these systems? Each of the historical examples at some stage became transformed from the diffuse type to either the diffuse-bloc, multipolar, or polar type. Diverse conditions might be responsi­ble for this phenomenon, but the trend is unmistakable. No system originally comprising a large number of roughly equal units, with power diffused among them, retained that structure for a very long period, and the usual direction of development was toward a polar structure.

Even polar structures were not very stable. Starting with the anti-French coalition between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, polar structures have developed into diffuse structures, only to turn into polar or multipolar structures again. In China and Greece, however, once power and influence were distributed between two bloc leaders, the wars that followed led ultimately to complete destruction of the systems. The descriptions of the systems thus suggest no patterns as to the types of system most conducive to stability among independent political units. The scope of violence in the hierarchical and diffuse systems, as well as during the last forty years of the unique Italian system, was limited. But this may be attributed as much to a crude military technology, small territorial basis of political organizations, and absence of overriding ideological issues as to the structure of the system. Also, in most of the historical diffuse systems, there was ample unorganized territory into which the states could expand. In China and Greece, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, and, to a lesser extent, in the first half of the fifteenth century in Italy, the political units could increase their territorial holdings without necessarily depriving other politically organized centers of their own territory. Africa, the Middle East, and Asia served more than once as convenient outlets for imperialist pressures in Europe. On the other hand, in polar or multipolar systems, the amount of space available

92 The European and Contemporary State Systems

for political expansion was usually limited, so improvement of one state's territo­rial position could be secured only at the expense of others.22

An examination of these systems also suggests that processes that lead to changes in their structures are occurring much more rapidly in the Western cultural context. Almost four centuries elapsed between the establishment of the hierarchical Chou system and its transformation into a diffuse structure during the Spring and Autumn period. The main characteristics of the Greek system when it had a diffuse structure remained essentially unchanged for almost three centuries. Today, technological innovation, economic development, and the effects of total war create rapid and radical changes in the world's power structure. England's decline as a major power in international politics occurred in less than two decades, and the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States took place virtually within the period of time that they were involved in World War II. Communist China's rise to prominence and diplomatic influence has occurred in little more than a decade. Nuclear war, major scientific discoveries, or depletion or discovery of natural resources could bring about even more radical shifts in the structure of power and influence in the near future.

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