Major Cleavages in the Global System

The most pervasive and persistent conflict in the global system has been the competition, struggle, and occasional crisis between the socialist regimes of the East and the private enterprise, constitutional democracies of the West. The sources of the conflict go far back into history and involve fundamentally differing views about the nature of history, the relationship of person to labor, the normative value placed on investment capital, the role of individual rights,

79 The European and Contemporary State Systems

and many other problems. Basically, each type of regime perceives the other to be the exact negative of its own aspirations and values. While territorial issues and other similar problems exacerbate the conflict, the major sources of tension, hostility, and fear are philosophical and moral.

In terms of the characteristics of behavior in the cold-war system, the following are prominent:

1. A gain by one side represents a loss, and therefore a direct threat, to the other;

2. The stakes involved are the future of the world—whether it will be composed of independent states each pursuing its values and objectives unrestrained by ideological dogma and the brute military power of a hegemon; or whether there will develop a community of socialist states, all bound by an international division of labor, and each more or less arranging its domestic economies and foreign policies according to a Marxist-Leninist blueprint;

3. One's own behavior is always directed toward establishing stability and peace; the other side's initiatives, whether in diplomacy or arms deployment, are di­rected toward gaining unilateral advantages and, ultimately, some sort of victory. The Cold War is a constant struggle in many dimensions—propaganda, ideology, armaments, economic output, sports, and culture.

Other characteristics could be listed, but these are sufficient to point out that more than a conflict over some minor piece of territory is involved. The conflict, fundamentally, conditions the way policy makers (and publics) view the world, themselves, and their adversaries. Hence, to settle a single prob­lem, such as Berlin, may help build a modicum of trust, but is insufficient to change well-established stereotypes and habits of diplomatic behavior.

Some progress in lessening East-West conflict levels has been made in recent years. Using the terms detente or peaceful co-existence, the adversaries have publicly claimed that their first obligation is to avoid nuclear war. Some steps to diminish the possibility of world holocaust have been taken, such as the Washington-Moscow hot line, limited arms control measures on strategic missiles, and agreements to consult in crisis situations. Levels of transactions between the two blocs have grown dramatically in the 1970s, thus increasing contacts in a variety of arenas. While these have helped to build up a common stake in ensuring mutual progress, they have not yet had an impact on the growing arms race between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In its military and ideological dimensions, the Cold War runs unabated, with little hope that significant departures from customary ways of seeing each other will take place in the coming decade.

In addition to the well-known East-West cleavage in the international system, there is another source of system-wide conflict today: the fundamental disagreement between the industrialized West and many of the developing na­tions on how international inequality should be redressed in the future. The fact of inequality can hardly be disputed, whether it is defined in terms of the distribution of wealth in the world, the degree of dependence and vulnerability

80 The European and Contemporary State Systems

of states, or even, according to some, the vastly differing degrees of exploitation in the international economy. In the "radical" view, the poverty of most nations is the direct consequence of colonialism and its legacy, perpetuated through unequal trade; private investment, which extracts enormous profits from the developing countries; and the inherently unequal benefits accruing to trade part­ners, where one sells manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials.¹⁷ The argument, which has become an accepted truth among leading figures in the developing countries, is that the terms of trade have steadily worsened over the past decades: today it takes more units of rubber, tin, hemp, or coffee beans to purchase one simple tractor than it did twenty years ago. In other words, the developing countries have to export more in order to buy the same amount. Adding to this problem is the propensity of the industrial countries to maintain high tariffs against manufactured imports from the Third World. While on the one hand most Western governments are committed to free trade and constantly exhort the developing countries to industrialize, on the other, according to the argument, they systematically restrict trade against the LDC's manufactured exports to protect domestic jobs. Foreign-aid programs, while ostensibly de­signed to assist in the development process, are in fact tied to the economic interests of the donors. Finally, there are numerous arguments against the activi­ties of multinational corporations, as we have summarized earlier. There are, of course, other than economic dimensions of inequality, as the discussion of transaction flows indicates. But being easy to quantify, economic indicators are often particularly telling.

Arguments about the true state of inequality abound. To those who believe that any economic transactions within the capitalist system are inherently exploitative, the only answer to the problem is either total isolation and autarchy or socialist revolution and integration into the socialist international trade sys­tem. To those who argue that trade is inherently unequal only so long as the rules of the game are loaded in favor of the strong, the solution is drastic reform of the international trade system and regulation of foreign private invest­ment. Measures such as preferential tariff treatment, cartels, and commodity agreements to stabilize prices and supplies are required. Most leading industrial countries have agreed to ad hoc measures such as food banks and some preferen­tial tariff treatment; but, in the opinion of most LDCs, they have not gone nearly far enough.

Assuming that no drastic changes in international economic arrange­ments are on the horizon, what can we say about international economic inequal­ity and its future? Table 3-1 allows us, however tentatively, to make some rough comments about the problem of the "gap" between nations. The table presents per capita income (pci) figures for a variety of countries, the percentage that each figure is of the American pci, and the average American income as a propor-

¹⁷ A classical statement of this position is Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperial­ism," Journal of Peace Research, 2 (1971), 81-117.

Table 3-1Per Capita Incomes, Selected Countries, as Proportion of U.S. Per Capita Income

Sources. United Nations Yearbook, 1962, 1972, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1979 World Bank Atlas (Washington, DC, 1979).

tion of the pcis of other nations. For example, the average Greek in 1960 earned only 16 percent of an average American's income. This means that the American's income was 6.1 times as great as the Greek's. Several conclusions appear from the figures. First, the United States is losing its income predomi­nance, but mostly as measured against the increased gains of other industrial countries (Canada, Sweden, and Japan) and some new "have" nations such as Greece and Spain. Second, when measured in terms of proportions of incomes, the developing countries are "catching up" only very slowly, if at all. The average Mexican, compared to an American counterpart, is really only marginally better off in 1978 than in 1960. The Nigerians and Brazilians have made impressive strides in closing the gap, but Indians and Indonesians have made little progress. An Indian, in fact, is worse off today, comparatively speaking, than two decades ago. Of course, these figures may be skewed by the presence of two populous developing countries which face particularly intractable problems, India and Indonesia. Had we listed other countries, particularly those with oil resources, much more optimistic impressions might result. If we were to aggregate the statistics for all countries in the table, we would find that while the absolute "gap" between incomes continues to increase (e.g., the average Swede earned, in 1978, $10,020 more than the average Indian; in 1960, the difference was only $1609), the relative distances are beginning to close. But the process is so slow that it appears hopeless to talk about any form of economic equality between the industrial and developing countries during the next half century. Trade figures support this conclusion. The proportion of the world's exports emanating from the developing countries—excluding OPEC oil ex­ports—is not growing dramatically, even though in dollar terms it is. To the extent that exports constitute an important source of domestic economic growth,

Table 3-2Value of Exports by Source and Destination, Billion Dollars

Key: IND = Industrial Countries LDC = Developing Countries SOC= Socialist Countries

Sources United Nations Yearbook, 1956, 1977, 1979, International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1972, 1980

it is still the industrial countries which benefit most from it. Nevertheless, there is some perceptible movement toward a more egalitarian trade structure. In 1977, the exports of the industrial countries accounted for 58 percent of total world exports, whereas in 1953 they accounted for 72 percent. But the decline has not been taken up by most LDCs; the dramatically growing relative share of the OPEC countries—from $18 billion in 1970 to $148 billion in 1977— accounts for the declining share of the industrial countries.

Figures on asymmetry in dependence allow for somewhat more optimis­tic conclusions. Most developing countries have successfully begun to diversify their trade and investment relationships and to break down colonial-type patterns of product concentration in exports (e.g., Nicaragua exported mostly bananas). Several examples make the point. In 1965, 70 percent of Algeria's imports came from France; by 1976, the figure had declined to 27 percent. France purchased 73 percent of Algeria's exports in 1965, but only 14 percent a decade later. Most economic dependencies of the United States, England, and other former colonial countries show similar, if somewhat less dramatic, change. Yet, in a few instances, developing countries are becoming more dependent and vulnera­ble. El Salvador's trade ties to the United States were more pronounced in 1977 than in 1965; Gabon, a former French colony, received a higher proportion of its imports from France (68 percent) in 1976 than it did a decade earlier. Nevertheless, these and other countries are exceptions; the trend is clearly toward

83 The European and Contemporary State Systems

declining vulnerability and greater diversification. Yet, there is still a long way to go before one can begin to talk about equality of dependence (interdepen­dence) or vulnerability. Indeed, in some senses, the situation has deteriorated; for the developing countries are not only bufFetted by the economic fortunes of the industrial states (over whose policies they have virtually no influence), but also by constantly increasing oil prices. The latter phenomenon has burdened many LDCs with immense debt payments, thus retarding their economic growth. The North-South cleavage, however measured, is likely to become a relatively permanent characteristic of the international system, with numerous consequences for the nature of contemporary international politics. Among these, for example, is the decreasing influence of the industrial countries in international fora, such as the United Nations (the United States can no longer command an automatic majority in either the Security Council or the General Assembly, as it could until the late 1960s); the agenda of international economic negotiations has to include the special problems of the developing countries; debates about international problems tend to focus increasingly around values such as equity and justice in addition to security and peace; and there are increas­ing strains within the Atlantic alliance, as some members, such as the Nether­lands, adopt sympathetic policies toward the LDC demands, while others, like Germany and the United States, hold out for slow and piecemeal reform in only some issue areas.

The Major Rules

Of the Modern System

Territoriality, "impermeability," and political independence, the major charac­teristics of the nation-state as it developed in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were also the bases upon which dynasts, diplomats, and lawyers of that period created the fundamental rules for conducting relations with each other. The three fundamental rules were, and continue to be, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legal equality of states. *

By the conclusion of the seventeenth century, most of the dynastic states of Europe were politically sovereign—the central governments and their cre­ations at lower levels of administration were the only rule-making and rule-applying bodies in defined territories. On the inside, political units such as duchies or walled cities were incapable of challenging the central authorities or making treaties with "outside" powers, and neither the Holy Roman Emperor nor the Church, as supranational institutions, could order kings and princes to undertake actions without their consent. The principle of sovereignty—that governments are the supreme lawmakers in their own territories—was little more than a legal doctrine expressing a situation that prevailed politically throughout large portions of Europe by the end of the seventeenth century. The principle was established firmly in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which held that only sovereign (impermeable and independent) states could enter into treaty relations with each other, and that the Holy Roman Empire could no longer command

84 The European and Contemporary State Systems

the allegiance of its parts. This implied that a political unit that was not sovereign (such as a duchy within France) could not become a legal unit in the system; it could not make treaties, enter international organizations, or claim any other rights or duties under international law. This rule is still the basis of all interaction today; for, without legal sovereignty, as recognized by other states, a political unit, be it colony, protectorate, or liberation movement, has no legal standing among other states.¹⁸ States are free, by virtue of their sovereignty, to govern as they wish within their own territory and to formulate their own external policies except where limited by self-approved treaty obligations.

The second major rule follows from the first. If a state is sovereign, it cannot allow, without its own consent, other political entities to make or apply their own rules on its territory; it has the corresponding obligation not to inter­vene in the internal affairs of other states or compromise their territorial integrity. In transactions between states, therefore, governments can attempt to influence each other's behavior only through established diplomatic channels. They cannot bypass relations with other governments and attempt to influence the domestic political processes of another country by establishing their physical presence (occupation) or laws on another's territory; nor can they attempt to persuade, cajole, or threaten its inhabitants by direct action against them on their own territory. In an age of subversion and extensive international propaganda, where states are "penetrated" and highly permeable to outside influences, this rule not only is violated systematically, but may be on the verge of obsolescence.

The third rule states simply that however they differ in size, population, location, or military capabilities, all states are equal with respect to legal rights and duties. All are, theoretically, sovereign and independent; all possess equally the rights of territorial integrity and self-defense; and all are equally obliged to avoid interfering in other states' internal affairs, to observe treaty obligations, and, since adoption of the United Nations Charter, to avoid the threat or use of force (except in self-defense) in relations with other states. From these three basic rules flow a number of more specific limitations on state action, as defined in treaties, international custom, and general principles of international law.

The three basic rules specify the accepted and expected forms of behav­ior in relations between states.¹⁹ Through their regular observance they also constitute characteristic norms of behavior. This is not to deny occasional excep­tions, particularly to the second rule of noninterference. But if these fundamental rules were not observed with reasonable consistency, the structure of the system and the nature of interstate relations would change radically. The Chinese states

¹⁸ There are exceptions, however. For example, two constituent republics of the Soviet Union, Belorussia and the Ukraine, have separate representatives in the United Nations and maintain their own foreign ministries. The policies of these "states" do not, of course, diverge from those of the Soviet government. Although not a state, the PLO has achieved observer status within the United Nations.

¹⁹ These rules are clearly outlined in the Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1933.

85 The European and Contemporary State Systems

did not place high value on sovereignty and independence, nor did they have a concept of permanent frontiers or territoriality. Since these rules did not constitute the assumptions behind all political action, there was a diminution in the number of politically independent states as the large and powerful engulfed the small and weak. In international history since the eighteenth century, how­ever, the number of independent states has increased, not decreased. In particu­lar, the number of very small and economically weak states has grown rapidly. It is significant that during the last two centuries, militarily aggressive states have seldom incorporated conquered states into their own territory; they have either temporarily occupied them, eventually restoring them to virtual indepen­dence, or have turned them into satellite states, political entities subservient in economic, defense, and foreign policies, but nevertheless maintaining some of the attributes of sovereignty. In several hundred wars or conflicts since the seventeenth century, states have not been commonly, as in the Chinese system, "removed" or "extinguished."²⁰

FACTORS OF STABILITY,

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