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MIDDLE-RANGE OBJECTIVES



Since there is such a variety of middle-range objectives, it would be useful to divide this category into three further types and illustrate each with contemporary examples. The first type would include the attempts of governments to meet economic-betterment demands and needs through international action. Social welfare and economic development—a primary goal of all governments in our era—cannot be achieved through self-help, as most states have only limited resources, administrative services, and technical skills. Interdependence means that to satisfy domestic needs and aspirations, states have to interact with others. Trade, foreign aid, access to communications facilities, sources of supply, and foreign markets are for most states necessary for increasing social welfare.

8 Lenin's priority on the "world revolution" is illustrated by comments he made shortly after the Bolshevik revolution to a group of his friends: "We are creating a socialist state. From now on Russia will be the first state in which a socialist regime has been established. Ah, you are shrugging your shoulders. Well, you have still more surprises coming! It isn't a question of Russia. No, gentlemen, I spit on Russia! That's only one stage we have to pass through on our way to world revolution!" Quoted in Robert S. Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1964), p. 418.

9 As, for example, when former premier Khrushchev, in reply to Chinese claims to certain Soviet territory, announced, "Our borders are sacred and inviolable and any attempt to change them by force means war." UP! release from Moscow, September 13, 1964.

132 Foreign-Policy Objectives

It can be argued, indeed, that with the very great demands people have placed on governments to provide them jobs, income, recreation, medical ser­vices, and general security, governments increasingly have to develop policies to satisfy expectations or face political defeat. In these circumstances, it may be difficult to gain much public support for other types of objectives, such as glory, territorial expansion, or power for its own sake.10 Hence, the primary commitment of many modern governments must be to pursue those courses of action that have the highest impact on domestic economic and welfare needs and expectations. Canada provides one illustration. Official statements on Cana-| da's external objectives indicate clearly that they are grounded in domestic needs | rather than in designs to change the external environment. Many of Canada's present foreign-policy activities—expanding trade with the Pacific rim countries, strong pressure on other countries in the Law of the Sea conference to accept the 200-mile control limit, and expansion of cultural and scientific exchanges, for example—are described as necessary to promote economic growth, cultural development, social justice, and a better natural environment, all within Canada.11 Directions to foreign-policy officials insist that all policy options should be measured against national gains in these dimensions. Similar uses of foreign policy to meet domestic welfare needs could be observed in countries such as Sweden, Belgium, Australia, Fiji, Ireland, and many others.

A variation of this type of objective occurs when governments commit themselves to promote private citizens' interests abroad, whether or not these relate to broad social needs. Instead of encouraging general expansion of trade or access to foreign markets, they might, under pressure from domestic groups or economic interests, undertake certain foreign-policy initiatives that have little connection with the interests of society in general. The American government in the early twentieth century, for instance, committed its power and resources to protect the foreign investments of private firms operating in Latin America. It intervened frequently, sometimes with force, in the internal affairs of Caribbean and Central American states essentially to guarantee the profits of these firms. It was thus translating private business interests into middle-range government objectives, even though the interests sometimes had little to do with the general level of social welfare in the United States.

A second type of middle-range objective is to increase a state's prestige in the system. In the past, as today, this was done primarily through diplomatic ceremonial and displays of military capabilities, but, increasingly in our era, prestige is measured by levels of industrial development and scientific and tech­nological skills. In addition to responding to domestic pressures for higher living standards, political elites of developing states who are acutely sensitive to their material poverty may undertake massive development programs primarily to raise international prestige. Development has become one of the great national

10 This thesis is developed in Edward L. Morse, Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaulbt France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), esp. Chap. 1.

11 The official statement of the Trudeau government's foreign policy is Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).

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goals of our times and is sought with almost as much commitment of resources as the securing of some "core" values and interests. This middle-range goal has no particular time element, but most of today's leaders in developing coun­tries hope that they can begin to catch up with more economically advanced countries within their own lifetimes.

Industrialized countries and major powers can increase their interna­tional prestige through a number of policies and actions, including expansion of military capabilities, distribution of foreign aid, diplomatic ceremonies—in­cluding reciprocal visits by heads of state, and industrial and scientific exhi­bitions—and particularly through development of nuclear weapons and the ca­pacity to explore outer space. An independent nuclear capability is probably the most important single indicator of a nation's military and diplomatic status today. The demands implied by the goal of increasing prestige are extensive, but they do not seem, at least in our age, to conflict with the "core" interests or values of other states.

A third category of middle-range objectives would include the many different forms of self-extension or imperialism. Some states make demands for neighboring territory even if that territory does not satisfy any important security requirements or ethnic unity. Territorial expansion becomes an end in itself, whether or not it fulfills any strategic, economic, or social needs. Others do not occupy foreign territory, but seek advantages, including access to raw materials, markets, and trade routes, that they cannot achieve through ordinary trade or diplomacy. Exclusive control and access may be obtained through estab­lishment of colonies, protectorates, "satellites," or "spheres of influence." Ideo­logical self-extension is also prevalent in many forms, where agents of a state undertake to promote its own socioeconomic-political values abroad or "con­vert" other peoples to a particular religious, cultural, or political faith.

European imperialism in Africa between 1870 and 1900 was a mixture of all these public and private, economic and ideological purposes. Often, private citizens journeyed to the "dark continent" to seek fortunes, put an end to the Arab slave trade, or convert "savages" to Christianity; later, they prevailed upon their governments to establish colonies and regular administrative services so that they could pursue their activities more easily and with greater security. Once a government had established such a colony to help its private citizens, it committed itself to maintain exclusive control over the area in question. In such cases, the interests of private citizens were converted to middle-range objec­tives of governments and, once the empires or colonies were established, devel­oped into collective "core" interests to be defended at all costs.

More recently, Stalin's Russia, Mussolini's Italy, and Communist China have served as examples of states practicing regional self-extension for economic or strategic purposes, while simultaneously promoting an ideology or political value system abroad. Russian expansion into central Asia—a process started by the Tsars for religious, economic, and military purposes—was revived after 1917, as the drive to convert the indigenous peoples to socialism gave the objec­tive new urgency. Italian expansion into Ethiopia and Albania between 1936

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and 1941 was undertaken primarily for reasons of prestige—in the latter case, keeping up with Hitler's conquests elsewhere. The Chinese Communists ex­panded into Tibet in 1950-1951 for traditional, strategic, and ideological rea­sons.

LONG-RANGE GOALS

v Long-range goals are those plans, dreams, and visions concerning the ultimate political or ideological organization of the international system, rules governing relations in that system, and the role of specific nations within it. The difference between middle-range and long-range goals relates not only to different time elements inherent in them; there is also a significant difference in scope. In ' pressing for middle-range goals, states make particular demands against particular

У states; in pursuing long-range goals, states normally make universal demands, for their purpose is no less than to reconstruct an entire international system according to a universally applicable plan or vision. As Lenin, one of the great modern visionaries, wrote in 1920:

We have always known, and shall never forget, that our task is an international one, and that our victory [in Russia] is only half a victory, perhaps less, until an upheaval takes place in all states, including the wealthiest and most civilized.12

Since destruction and reconstitution of an established international order obvi­ously conflict with the middle-range and "core" objectives of its members, any system that contains one or more actors committed to such plans will be unstable and typified by violent international conflict.

Some of these visions may be delineated explicitly, deriving from a coher-. ent political or religious philosophy. Others, such as Hitler's concepts of the J "Thousand-Year Reich" and the European "New Order," are merely vague images of a future state of affairs. But it is not the explicitness or rationality of a vision that creates international tensions and conflict; it is the degree to which a political unit is willing to commit capabilities and resources to its achieve­ment. Whereas in recent years the Soviet government has been cautious in seeking to promote its long-range objectives, Hitler mobilized tremendous mate­rial and manpower resources in pursuit of his vision. Indeed, he was willing to destroy Germany and sacrifice all his middle-range objectives for the sake of creating the "New Order."

 




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