THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SYSTEM

The contemporary state system is in some ways similar to its nineteenth-century predecessor. Most main issues and characteristic forms of interaction are not significantly different from those in the European state system. Contemporary ideological issues trace their origins to nineteenth-century Europe; the question of nationhood and national independence still raises serious international prob­lems; and the search for economic modernization that took place on the continent during the nineteenth century is only beginning in the developing countries. Diplomatic forms and procedures developed in Europe have extended to all areas of the world, even though they are almost unrecognizable when compared to eighteenth-century practices. The main rules governing international transac­tions are also an extension, development, and refinement of those that arose during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe.

It is not difficult to understand why these characteristics of European international politics are still predominant in a global system. In 1875, less than one-tenth of Africa had been colonized by Europeans; twenty-five years later, only one-tenth of the area remained free of colonial administration. In the last three decades of the nineteenth century, Great Britain acquired over 4 million square miles of territory, France acquired ЗУ2 million square miles, Belgium colonized almost 1 million square miles, and the Tsarist regime in Russia extended its control over territory amounting to a half-million square miles. The processes of establishing colonial administration and control differed in various areas; but, in each case, the administering powers unwittingly created aspirations among indigenous populations for many of the values they themselves cherished: independence in political life, industrialization of the economy, and international prestige. Despite the great variety of cultural contexts in which relations between states occur today, some important characteristics of the system represent an extension into new areas of the diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military traditions of the Europeans.

What sets off the contemporary international system from its European predecessor is (1) the rise in the number and types of states; (2) the great potential for destruction by those who possess nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems; (3) increased vulnerability of states to external intrusions, in­cluding subversion, economic pressures, and military conquest; (4) the rising importance of nonstate actors, such as national liberation movements, multina­tional corporations, international interest groups, and political parties transcend­ing national frontiers; (5) the predominant position of influence that has been

65 The European and Contemporary State Systems

achieved by three essentially non-European states—the Soviet Union, China, and the United States; and (6) the great degree of dependence and interdepen­dence between all types of actors. These differences will be discussed under the four categories of the preceding chapter—the nature of the political units, the types of stratification and structures of power and influence, the major forms of interactions, and the rules governing relations between actors.

The Nature of the Units

A major characteristic of the political units comprising the contemporary interna­tional system is their territorial basis. States today maintain systematic adminis­trative control over people living in a well-defined territory. Some territorial divisions are artificial—particularly in Africa—in the sense that frontiers do not correspond to ethnic, language, or geographic distinctions; but in most cases the territorial boundaries of modern states are closely related to such distinctions. England can have no claim to continental French territory as long as language and culture serve as a basis for differentiating legitimate frontiers; but, when ethnic and linguistic differences did not matter in international politics, it was perfectly conceivable for the English to own territory in France, as they did until the seventeenth century. Although the units in many historical international systems derived their identity, strengths, and weaknesses from the territory they occupied, and although some even developed a concept of a frontier or boundary setting them off from other political units, not until modern times have the boundaries of states been so carefully defined and given such legal and ideologi­cal sanctity.

Despite the great value placed on independence, sovereignty, and territo-riality, political, economic, and technological changes of recent decades have made the nation-state highly vulnerable to outside intrusions and, in some cases, to overwhelming external controls. Governments claiming sovereignty often rely on outside funds and arms to protect themselves from external and internal enemies. The Soviet Union, China, the United States, and other countries fre­quently siphon funds—and sometimes arms—to political parties, opposition groups, or military establishments in other countries; lobbyists representing other governments or multinational corporations abound in the capitals of most states; the Chilean junta hires a New York public relations firm to improve its "image" among the American people; most governments in the 1980s can do little to control high rates of inflation, because the forces producing price increases are mostly external. Thus, whatever our emotional commitment to the notion of independence, the interdependent and "penetrated state"⁹ is the normal type of actor, not the exception. The domestic and foreign policies of countries are thoroughly intermixed as they were not in previous eras, and the possibilities of governments' undertaking major domestic policies without

⁹ For some theoretical discussion of the penetrated state, see James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969).

66 The European and Contemporary State Systems

considering the limitations imposed by external conditions are slight. Unemploy­ment levels in Western Europe, for example, have as much to do with the price of Middle East oil or the interest-rate policies of the United States as with conditions on the continent.

The international systems of Greece or the Italian city-states were notable for their relative equality. There were great powers and lesser states, of course; but size, population, and military capability differentials were not extreme. In contrast, consider some of the differences today. If one compares actors accord-• ing to size, they vary from the Soviet Union, which covers one-sixth of the world's land surface, to Singapore and Tonga, which cover only several hundred square miles, or the size of a metropolitan area. Population variations are equally extreme. Fewer than 100,000 people inhabit the Maldive Islands, a member of the United Nations. Many states in the global system have populations well under 1 million; but China has a population of over 900 million. The physical and population differences between the Soviet Union and Tonga are much greater than the differences between Athens and one of the smaller city-states in Greece, or between Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein in the eighteenth century.

Other differences may also be important for foreign-policy behavior and the structure of the international system. There are a number of states that are economically and technologically underdeveloped, whose populations suffer from high illiteracy, malnutrition, low productivity, land shortage, and very unequal distribution of wealth. Many of these states also have minority problems and have little hope for prolonged economic development because they lack natural and human resources. Even though they normally maintain administrative mechanisms providing a variety of government functions for citi­zens, their influence often barely reaches the grassroots level, where life is con­ducted according to tribal, village, or other traditional patterns. Political instabil­ity is rife; few of these states have resolved their major constitutional issues or developed political "rules of the game" that command widespread support. Political stability depends more on the influence or coercion of key personalities or groups—often the armed forces—than on widely accepted constitutional or legal principles. When these personalities change, or ruling groups become politically weak, corrupt, or demoralized, rebellion and civil war are often the result.

The important point about these characteristics, as far as the nature of the international system is concerned, is that they help create international dependencies. The lack of resources makes many developing states weak in all dimensions; to survive, they need outside sources of economic aid, frequent doses of humanitarian assistance to help cope with natural disasters such as droughts, military aid to build and maintain even rudimentary armed forces (which are often used more for maintaining the regime against its internal critics than against external attack), and markets for their exports.

A second important point, given the vast inequalities in the world, is that many weak microstates, such as Tonga, Lesotho, the Bahamas, Mauritius,

67 The European and Contemporary State Systems

and Sao Tome—to name a few—have no foreign policies as we understand that term. They have little access to the decision-making points concerning global problems, and, for the most part, their actions have little impact on the global system as a whole. A few become involved in regional problems, but, in general, these actors are really subjects of international politics; they are highly vulnerable to events in their external environment, and, yet, their policies have little impact on that environment. They are acted upon, but, given their weak diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities, they act upon few others. Their major hope of influencing international problems is to join diplo­matic or military coalitions (see Chapter 4).

Compared to these microstates, there are a number of nonstate actors that have a great deal more influence in the structure and processes of the international system. Although there are great varieties of nonstate actors func­tioning today, we will consider only those that have the most important impact on international politics. These would include (1) territorial nonstate actors,-' such as liberation movements, (2) nonterritorial transnational organizations, such as multinational corporations, and (3) intergovernmental organizations, such as NATO or the Food and Agricultural Organization.

Territorial nonstate actors include all political movements, parties, or cliques that, while focusing their activities within a state, establish linkages with other governments, political movements, or international organizations. The most common today are the various national liberation movements. They do not possess the attributes of sovereignty, yet their actions often have important consequences on the international system. The Palestine Liberation Organiza­tion, for example, maintains "diplomatic" relations with a large number of gov­ernments and militant groups abroad. It has its own "foreign policy," dissemi­nates propaganda, maintains links with sympathizers throughout the world, and purchases arms from both governments and private concerns abroad. In the late 1960s, its actions virtually nullified the efforts of the Soviet Union, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel to begin peace negotiations; in 1970, the PLO, whose leaders and followers were concentrated primarily in Jordan, started military action against the Jordanian government. The war between this nonstate actor and the Jordanians almost caused the military intervention of Syria, Iraq, and the United States. Moreover, its activities have spread far beyond the confines of the Middle East. In attempts to obtain funds, notoriety, or retalia­tion against Israelis, some of its agents have participated in airplane hijackings, massacres of athletes and civilians, kidnappings, and plots to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan. By any measure, then, its activities have had an impact on the contemporary global system, including the foreign policies of the major powers. The same cannot be said for most of the microstates.

Nonterritorial transnational organizations are characterized by (1) orga­nized activities occurring simultaneously in a number of countries, (2) objectives that do not relate to interests within any given territory, and (3) component parts that are essentially nonpolitical. The Catholic Church is perhaps the oldest

68 The European and Contemporary State Systems

organization with these characteristics. Although it has an administrative center in Rome, its activities occur in virtually every country in the world. Like all nonterritorial transnational organizations, its livelihood depends upon unfet­tered access to people living in all countries. Its activities are also transnational in the sense that if one component unit gets into difficulties, it can draw upon the financial, administrative, personnel, and spiritual capabilities of other units or of the entire organization. The Church, of course, has only a very indirect and intermittent impact on international politics, but occasionally its involvement becomes more apparent. The Pope has made pronouncements on a variety of international issues, including economic development, arms control, and the nature of political regimes. To the extent that these pronouncements influence public attitudes or the views of foreign-policy makers, the impact may be direct.

A newer type of nonterritorial transnational organization is the multina-^v tional corporation (MNC). Like the Church, its operations depend upon access to a number of societies. Also like the Church, its activities are primarily nonpolit-ical. The Church exists to save souls and to cultivate the spiritual life of people no matter where or how they live. The multinational corporation exists to make profits for shareholders and to expand markets. The component units of the multinational corporation are independent, yet tied together by financial and personnel bonds. If one unit gets into financial difficulties, it can be rescued from the headquarters or some other unit. If one of the units is no longer profitable, it can be closed down and reestablished somewhere else.

Most authorities on the multinational firm distinguish between nationally based firms that conduct some operations abroad and true multinationals. To be classified in the latter group, a firm must have some minimum number of foreign subsidiaries operating in various countries. A minimum of six countries is often used as the cutoff point. Others have listed as MNCs only those corpora­tions whose assets, sales, earnings, production, and employment come signifi­cantly (perhaps 25 percent) from abroad.

Multinational corporations reflect the increasing globalization of the world economy. Just as in Europe and America, where most firms began with local markets and ultimately spread their activities to regions and then the entire nation, since World War II many industrial giants have continued expanding their productive and marketing activities to other regions of the world. Until the late 1960s, most MNCs were American- or European-based, but over the last decade Japanese firms have become prominent as economic actors in many regions of the world. Most recently, we have witnessed the appearance of MNCs whose home is a developing country (LDC). The Korean-based Hyundai firm operates a variety of enterprises throughout the world; Indian companies have projects in African countries such as Zambia, Somalia, and Tanzania; a number of Brazilian-based companies have built plants throughout Latin America and in several African countries. Many of these LDC-based MNCs specialize in tech­nologies and products particularly appropriate for developing nations. Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of MNCs, they are becoming an increasingly

The European and Contemporary State Systems

visible form of economic organization, one which is no longer confined to the major industrial nations of the West. More than half the total production of manufactured goods in the world may soon—by the end of the century—be accounted for by the 200 or 300 largest MNCs, two-thirds of which are American.¹⁰

By their size in physical and financial assets, we would assume that multi­national corporations have a great impact on the contemporary global system. The assets of some of the largest MNCs, such as Unilever, IBM, General Motors, British Petroleum, and Standard Oil of New Jersey, far outstrip the economic capabilities of small nations. How can we measure the political impact of such immense concentrations of wealth and centers of control over economic re­sources? By allocating factors of production and controlling investment flows, no doubt the activities of MNCs seriously influence the character of economic development. Payment of royalties and taxes; establishment of new plants or closing down of old ones; decisions on where to locate plants; and advertising— these and many other decisions can crucially affect a developing country's eco­nomic structure, tax revenues, level of employment, and consumption patterns. It can be argued, for example, that by fostering American-style consumerism through advertising, MNCs seriously distort development patterns in poor coun­tries. Rather than promoting rural development, public transportation, or com­munal enterprise, MNCs try to create markets for middle-class needs and aspira­tions. By helping to destroy or alter indigenous cultural and economic patterns, moreover, the MNC may, at least indirectly, foster social strains and ultimately anti-American movements. Several important guerrilla groups in Latin America, for example, claim that MNCs lead not only to direct political imperialism, but to a more subtle form of cultural pollution. Whatever the indirect impact, it is hard to identify and measure. No doubt it is greater among small, weak countries than in the industrial countries, where a majority of the activities of MNCs are already located.

The direct political impact of the MNC is perhaps easier to deal with. While it is more intermittent, it is also more obvious. For example, MNCs have occasionally played an important role in the domestic policies of host states. The United Fruit Company's record of activities in the "banana republics" of Central America is well known: It primarily involved attempts to keep govern­ments in power that would allow the company to operate unfettered by regula­tions and excessive taxes. When a government hostile to its interests came to power in Guatemala in 1952, the company apparently assisted in helping the American government, through exiles in Honduras and Nicaragua, to overthrow the Arbenz regime. In 1970, the International Telephone and Telegraph Com­pany promoted a scheme for toppling the Allende government in Chile. Nothing came of the matter, as U.S. government officials had already undertaken their own program to oust Allende (see Chapter 10).

¹⁰ See George Modelski, "Multinational Business: A Global Perspective." International Studies Quarterly, 16 (December 1972), 24.

70 The European and Contemporary State Systems

Despite such examples of direct involvement in host-country politics, studies show that such episodes are exceptional. William Thompson studied 274 successful and unsuccessful military coups in the period 1946-1969 and found very little evidence of direct involvement by MNCs.¹¹ Likewise, there is little evidence that MNCs have been a significant factor either as causes of, or participants in, international wars. There are, however, a number of cases where the interests of an MNC and a home government coincided, so that the interven­tion of the home government against the host country served the interests of the MNC. Such was the case of the American government's involvement in the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953, after which American oil companies obtained new operating privileges in that country; the European oil companies' strong support of the French-British-Israeli invasion of the Suez canal in 1956; the direct role of the Union Miniere Company in the Belgian government's support of the Katanga secession from the Congo in the early 1960s; and the pressure that American oil companies put on Washington to "do something" about Fidel Castro's nationalization of their assets in Cuba, so that the interests of the oil companies were probably one factor, among many, taken into consideration in planning the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. Again, however, the evidence indicates that these are exceptional cases; although MNCs constantly seek, through persuasion of various sorts, to have the host governments treat their operations with a minimum of interference, or without high taxation, the occasions where such activity has included subver­sion are few. When a company prevails upon the home government to take up its case, if it feels it is being dealt with unfairly by the host government, there are regular and legitimate procedures provided under international law. It should be acknowledged, too, that often host governments have nationalized the assets of MNCs or instituted extremely high taxation rates and that these steps were taken without the threat or commission of retaliation either by the MNCs or the home government. An increasing trend for hosts to expropriate MNC assets without compensation suggests that impact does not flow in only one direction.

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are also nonstate actors that often have important influences on international politics and the domestic orders of nation-states. Most IGOs reflect the interests of their members, but, occasion­ally, it makes sense to talk of the Common Market's "policy," the "action" of the United Nations, or the "reaction" of NATO. These organizations often develop a common "external" policy that has behind it all the forces of persua­sion the organization can muster. And sometimes the policy may contravene the interests of any single member's state. Thus, the United Nations was instru­mental in creating the Congo Republic and in reducing the possibilities of inter­vention into the Congo crisis by the United States and the Soviet Union. The

¹ Cited in Modelski, "Multinational Business," pp. 16—17.

71 The European and Contemporary State Systems

Common Market has a single external tariff and, on many occasions, bargains as a single political actor in its relations with nonmembers. The Food and Agricul­ture Organization can be expected in the coming decades to play an important role in helping to set up food reserves; in some cases, its activities could spell the difference between mass starvation and life in some of the least-developed countries.

That intergovernmental organizations are fulfilling needs that cannot be met solely through the unilateral action of states is attested to by their dramatic growth over the past quarter century. The number has increased from thirty-eight in 1946 to more than 270 in 1982. Their variety and relative importance to international political questions vary greatly; but the important point is that many of them have a persistent and direct impact on the processes and issues of the contemporary global system, on the rules governing those processes, and on the foreign policies of virtually all the state actors in the system. In terms of their impact, they loom much more important than many of the smaller states in international politics.

International Stratification

Observers of contemporary international politics usually make distinctions be­tween "super powers," "great powers," "middle powers," and "small powers." The basis for this type of classification is seldom explicit, but it is not difficult to place some states into each category. The United States and the Soviet Union are undoubedly "great powers," whereas Costa Rica would fit easily into the "small power" class. Others, however, defy instant categorization. Should India be termed a "great power" or a "middle power"? If we employ any single criterion, such as military capability, for differentiating the status of states, we may run into difficulties. The United States is militarily much more powerful than France, but this does not mean that on all international issues or in all relationships it enjoys greater status and influence than France does. We cannot assume that a "great power" is great solely by virtue of its military strength any more than we can assume that the nation that is most powerful militarily will also wield the most influence in the world. What is important is that today, policy makers "rank" states according to different criteria in different situations. Status and prestige are not objective facts; they result from subjective estimations of worth, and not everyone will agree as to what constitutes worth.

One study of differentiation among states¹² suggests that policy makers today judge other countries primarily on the basis of three criteria, each reflecting values that generally command esteem throughout the world. These include (1) a nation's level of technology, (2) its immediately available military capabili­ties, closely related to its technology, and (3) the reputation it can generate

¹² Gustavo Lagos, International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: Univer­sity of North Carolina Press, 1963), Chap. 1. Lagos uses the concept of prestige as his third basis of stratification.

72 The European and Contemporary State Systems

abroad through its day-to-day diplomatic conduct and political, economic, and social behavior at home.

During the eighteenth century, the royal family's connections and wealth and the size of the professional armed forces served as predominant indicators of international status. Today, the primary standard of judgment is technology and all the material things that derive from its application to economic activity. Economic growth and technological progress are among the main national objec­tives of developing countries, not only because they are necessary to sustain rapidly increasing population, but also because they are symbols of modernity and nationhood. We often hear of projects in both developed and developing countries that, from an economic point of view, are of questionable value— the steel mill that depends upon imported raw materials; the national jet airline that relies upon foreign personnel for its operation and maintenance; the modern highway that leads to no useful destination; and physically impressive but ineffi­cient manufacturing concerns. These enterprises cannot be judged only for eco­nomic value, because they serve important social and psychological needs as well. They are tangible evidence of a country's modernity and search for status and prestige among other states. Similarly, am important value—quite apart from scientific knowledge—in space programs is the opportunities they provide for displays of technical and scientific prowess.

Military capacity, unlike technological level and economic activity, has always symbolized a political unit's status among others. No "great power" in the present or past has failed to maintain a large military establishment, and those states that aspire to great-power status allocate a large portion of their resources to developing an impressive military machine. Both the French and Chinese governments have claimed, for instance, that they could not hope to achieve great-power status unless they developed arsenals of nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems.¹³ Nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and space technology are important components or symbols of great-power status. Like the displays of chariots in ancient China, these weapons and instruments are designed partly to impress others and thereby increase diplomatic bargaining influence.

In the past, it was not so difficult for states to impress neighbors, allies, and enemies by developing military forces. Dynasts were limited by the supply of funds, but if the money was available, any government could build a fleet of wooden ships or train a professional army of 20,000 men, armed with cannon and carts. All states were roughly equal, because all possessed basically an agricul- I tural economy and a crude technology. Today, the costs of research and develop­ment, as well as the labor force and scientific and technological skills required I

¹³ In 1963, Communist China's foreign minister claimed that nuclear weapons, missiles, I

and supersonic aircraft were the most important indicators of the technical level of a nation's industry I

Unless China possessed the most modern weapons, he suggested, it would "degenerate" into a I

second- or third-class nation. For the direct quotation, see Alice L. Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear I Dialogue: 1963," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8 (1963), 110.

73 The European and Contemporary State Systems

to create and maintain a modern armed force, are beyond the capacity of all but a few societies. Some economically and technologically advanced nations have already learned that even with a highly skilled labor force and a heavy indus­trial base, it is difficult both to create modern armed forces and to maintain a reasonable level of economic growth. The governments of these nations have decided instead to obtain their most expensive equipment from the major pow­ers' military arsenals and concentrate on developing less costly weapons. Cer­tainly most developing countries cannot hope to achieve status by attempting to build military capabilities matching those of the industrialized states. In fact, as measured by military capabilities, the gap between developed and developing nations is growing wider, as is the gap between their economic levels. The cost of developing and producing the most sophisticated and destructive arma­ments has become prohibitive to all but a few nations. And yet, states such as Nigeria, Turkey, or Japan do not lack international status just because they do not possess the most modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

A state's status and reputation today may be based more on its diplomatic behavior and domestic socioeconomic and political institutions than on its tech­nological level or military capacity. A government may enjoy a reputation for meeting its treaty commitments, being a loyal ally, or the quality of its trained diplomats. Or it may derive prestige from adhering to a particular foreign-policy orientation. Yugoslavia's active nonalignment, combined with the late President Tito's career and personality, has created for the country a prestige that is not warranted on the basis of military or technological capabilities alone. Today, many Afro-Asian countries underscore their independence by refusing to make alliances or special military arrangements with members of the NATO or Soviet blocs, while they scorn countries that do make such commitments. Governments and publics also tend to judge other nations by the character of their political leadership and economic and social institutions. Israel has a reputation in West­ern Europe and North America for being able to run democratic institutions successfully under adverse conditions, whereas Egypt's status may derive largely from the prestige of its political leaders. Sweden and Switzerland, while possess­ing some prestige in the developing world on account of their neutral foreign policies, are probably better known and admired in the Western world by virtue of their high standards of living and progressive social policies.

Because there are so many different standards for judging the status of nations, no single and permanent hierarchy of states—the great and the small, or the influential and the weak—exists. If governments generally rank each other by their armaments, technology, diplomatic behavior, and domestic institutions, this does not mean that these criteria are the most important in all issue areas or subsystems or that all the criteria are given equal weight by different policy makers. On the international trade issue, for example, one may find states ranked in one way, based on the general role they occupy in the international trade sys­tem, and another way on the issue of disarmament, depending upon which states possess the largest military capabilities, seriously tackle disarmament problems,

74 The European and Contemporary State Systems

and display a more reasonable diplomatic bargaining style. In the Communist sub­system, the ranking of states may be based on unique criteria, such as the state's (or party's) adherence to a particular doctrinal line, or even the revolutionary careers of its political leadership. Furthermore, even if the criteria of technolog­ical level, military capacity, socioeconomic institutions, and diplomatic behavior determine a country's status among most policy makers and publics, different governments may perceive the combination of these criteria in different ways.

The Structure of the System

Many observers have characterized the postwar world as "polarized." Since 1947, the United States and the Soviet Union have not only originated and defined most international issues, but have also taken the diplomatic and military leadership in dealing with them. Whether concerned with military policies, the fate of Germany, security for Europe, or arms control, the two major actors in each case have been the Soviet Union and the United States. But the structure of power and influence in the world is no longer polarized on all issues, for there are other problems in which quite different states are involved and where these two great powers have not assumed or appropriated leadership positions.

For example, in matters of foreign trade, still another configuration of power and influence exists. Here, the main actors are the nations that purchase the bulk of the world's raw-material exports, those that sell heavy machine goods, those that can control the flow of currency between nations by their fiscal policies, and the countries dependent upon foreign trade either to sustain a tolerable standard of living or help develop a modern economy. These would include the United States, Canada, most Western European countries, Japan, and the oil-producing nations. Even today, the Soviet bloc, including China, is not a major factor in international trade relationships and has little, if any, impact on the major diplomatic decisions affecting that trade. If the world is polarized on the trade issue, it is a north-south polarity, where producers of raw materials in many developing countries—oil producers excepted—receive low income from their export products but must pay high prices for heavy manufactured goods imported from industrialized nations.

In geographic, rather than issue, subsystems (the two are, of course, related), one may also find unique structures of power and influence. The United States may be a leader in Latin American affairs; its diplomatic and economic resources can be used in such a way that most Latin countries will adjust their behavior and interests to correspond with those of the United States. But the United States is certainly unable to provide such leadership in Africa, where it has few traditional interests, has relatively little economic influence, and receives slight sympathy for its position on many international issues. In brief, the struc­ture of power and influence in the world is neither static nor universally definable. It appears under different configurations, depending upon the issue and geo­graphic subsystems involved.

Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States

75 The European and Contemporary State Systems

still overshadow other issues areas to such an extent that for some purposes, the world may legitimately be characterized as polar. The fate of millions of people throughout Europe and in many developing countries depends upon decisions made in Moscow and Washington. But to the extent that China or the Arab states have begun playing an important part in defining and resolving international issues, there is, of course, a decline in polarity. On some questions, such as monetary policy or oil supplies, the Arab states have reached the rank of the great powers, for their actions similarly affect millions throughout the world. But on other issues, such as arms control, the use of the United Nations for resolving international conflicts, or security in Europe, the main actors remain the United States and the Soviet Union.

The argument so far is that there is no single system of stratification in the world, much less a single criterion according to which states are "ranked." The patterns of power and influence in the world change very much according to issue area and geographic location. And yet, as cold-war polarity declines, a fundamental cleavage in the international system, based on the level of eco­nomic development, is becoming more prominent as a potential source of inter­national conflict. As a rule, influence on any particular global issue (as compared to a local or regional issue) tends to correlate highly with a country's general level of development. Decisions about armaments, international banking, mone­tary flows, trade patterns, and many other world problems are generally made by a fairly small group of industrialized countries. Thus, while it might be over­simplifying reality to argue that there are only two categories of states in the system today—the "haves" and the "have-nots"—various indices showing the patterns of trade, communications, influence, and dependency suggest that such a dichotomization is not too far off the mark and may become even more accurate as a characterization of the international system's structure in the future.

Some countries, like Taiwan, the two Koreas, Iran, Mexico, and Greece, were labeled "underdeveloped" only a few years ago. Although still far behind the economic and technological levels of the industrialized states, they have at least achieved a level where basic human needs are met reasonably, and, given favorable world economic conditions, they can expect growth to continue. The "haves," then, have been joined by an impressive number of former "have-not" states in a fairly short period of time. But prospects are not so bright for the most populous developing states. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Egypt, whose combined populations are close to 1 billion, suffer from a combination of comparatively low growth rates, rapid population increases, lack of additional fertile land, and natural calamities.

Patterns of Interaction

Types of interaction between governments and peoples of the contemporary system's actors are unprecedented in comparison to historical systems. Transac­tions, whether in trade, tourism, diplomacy, private investment, or communica­tion find no historical counterparts, and they are growing at exponential rates.

76 The European and Contemporary State Systems

Take a few examples. The value of world exports (excluding the Communist countries) increased from $54 billion to $1,266 billion in constant (1963) prices between 1938 and 1977.^u In 1948, only 14,000 people visited Greece as tourists; thirty years later, almost 3 million tourists visited that country. Mail-flow rates between nations have increased dramatically, as have the number of airline and shipping routes. And whereas a typical embassy of a major power located in Paris or London might have had a staff of a dozen or so at the turn of the century, today the figure is several hundred. The number of international civil servants approaches 1 million; a scant fifty years ago, they could be counted in the several thousands.

Of more political significance than aggregate growth rates, however, are the patterns of interaction, because they underline the types of cleavages, dependencies, and interdependencies that characterize the contemporary inter­national system. Tourism is not distributed equally among countries. Neither are trade, foreign investment, diplomatic representation, and the various forms of communication.

Private foreign investment flows primarily from the United States to Canada, Europe, and Latin America. A secondary flow is from Europe to North America and, trailing far behind, to Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Communist nations have recently begun to accept some private investment, usually in the form of joint ventures. Virtually all these funds come from North America and Western Europe. In brief, the flow of private investment is predominantly between industrialized countries, although most of the vast profits being made by Arab oil states are now being invested in the developed countries.

Tourism flows primarily between North America and Europe and sec­ondarily between the Communist countries. There are insignificant amounts of tourism between Communist and non-Communist countries, whether devel­oped or developing. Similarly, there is virtually no tourism originating from the developing countries.

Trade flows are primarily between non-Communist industrial countries, within the Communist bloc, and between the developing countries and the indus­trial countries. The composition of trade thus reflects patterns that were estab­lished at the height of colonialism. Most developing countries continue to export raw materials or partly processed goods and to import manufactured goods. There has been growth in manufactured exports by the developing countries, but it does not yet begin to compare with their imports of manufactured items.

These and other figures suggest a pattern of interaction that runs in most dimensions from Western industrial country to Western industrial country, from Western industrial countries to the developing countries, and from Commu­nist country to Communist country. Virtually all the flows are unequal, again reflecting the cleavages mentioned in the previous section.

Dependence characterizes the relations between the developing coun-

¹⁴ All statistics are taken from United Nations Statistical Yearbook (New York, 1963, 1968, 1972, and 1978).

77 The European and Contemporary State Systems

tries and the industrial West, where dependence is denned as unequal degrees of reliance on markets and sources of supply and unequal ability of the members of a pair of states to influence, reward, or harm each other. Although there are some notable exceptions, such as the oil-producing countries, the actions or policies developing states undertake have little impact on the political or economic fortunes of industrialized states, even small ones. The policies of an industrialized state, on the other hand, often have significant consequences on a developing country; and any attempt to alter drastically or terminate the rela­tionship is extremely costly to the latter, and less so to the former. Consider some of the dimensions or indicators of dependence.

The direction of airline flights remains predominately from New York, London, and Paris to the major cities of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Air and ship communications between developing countries remain at rudimentary levels. Although some regional news agencies have been organized, and many developing countries beam programs abroad, the predominant pattern for the newer nations is to obtain their news from the major Western wire services. As Singer points out, for people in Nigeria to find out about an event in Ghana, less than 400 miles away, they must get news that has gone from Accra to London and then to Lagos. Naturally, the news they receive includes all the perceptual distortions of Western correspondents and editors.¹⁵

These patterns are repeated in many other types of interaction, whether foreign economic assistance, private investment funds, military aid and training, higher education, athletics, or even culture.

Most important from the day-to-day diplomatic perspective, the sources of information for developing nations' foreign-policy establishments are not only limited in scope, but also highly dependent upon the news media of the major industrial countries. A typical small developing country will have embassies in immediately adjacent states, in the capitals of some of the major powers, and perhaps in a few regional states. These countries have no special facilities for obtaining information about other areas of the world and must, therefore, rely on published accounts in the better Western newspapers. Few have the specialized skills and data-gathering capacities of even the smaller European countries. Again, the trend is toward diversification, but the unequal resources and flow of information remain characteristic.

If North-South relations are best described by the term dependence, the pattern of interaction between the Western industrial states is best characterized by the term interdependence, where flows, rewards, and costs are more nearly equal.¹⁶ Although Western Europe and Japan remain largely dependent upon

¹⁵ The analysis of various forms of dependence is presented comprehensively in Marshall R. Singer, Weak States m a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York: Free Press, 1972).

¹⁶ Dependence and interdependence are obviously relative concepts, or different ends of a continuum. State A can be dependent on B, but interdependent with C, and virtually irrelevant to D. Likewise, A can be economically dependent upon B, but militarily dependent upon C. Singer argues, however, that the various dimensions of dependence correlate highly with each other: If A is dependent in one dimension, it is likely to be dependent in all dimensions.

78 The European and Contemporary State Systems

the United States in terms of nuclear deterrence, on other dimensions, including trade, private investment, education, and communication, interactions tend to­ward equality. Vulnerabilities, although hardly equal, are not as asymmetrical as they were in the early postwar years. Thus, economic trends in Europe can have a significant impact in the United States, as could a fundamental reordering of Great Britain's military relationship with North America.

A clear pattern of transactions between the socialist states and the West­ern industrial countries is only beginning to emerge. East-West trade configura­tions reveal a slight balance in favor of the West; but the makeup of trade suggests a complex pattern of vulnerabilities and dependencies. For example, by 1981, Poland was indebted to Western bankers by a sum of about $20 billion, a potential vulnerability that under extreme circumstances could be exploited by Western governments for political-military objectives. The socialist states are generally dependent upon the West for modern technology; while academics debate the consequences of this dependency, all agree that Western technology transfers do make a difference in the growth rates of socialist economies. But the dependence does not run only in one direction. Western European countries, such as Germany and Finland, are becoming increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union for oil and natural gas supplies. To develop large export markets in the socialist countries involves some risk—in a crisis situation, those markets can be shut off, although only at a very high cost to those who are attempting to wield the economic weapon.

The Soviet Union, like its socialist allies, depends to a certain extent upon transfers of Western technology. Its unimpressive agricultural output cre­ates another vulnerability: most years it must import large quantities of grain from the United States, Canada, and Australia. In 1980, the United States ex­ploited this vulnerability by boycotting the sale of feed grains to Russia in retalia­tion for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. Generally, then, dependence, interdependence, and vulnerability have dramatically increased in East-West eco­nomic relations—even to the extent that the socialist world has lost its immunity to inflationary pressures from the West. This is a significant difference in the pattern of interactions compared to the immediate postwar period. The implica­tions of this fact are not entirely clear; we can conclude, nevertheless, that the economies of both types of systems are going to be influenced increasingly by trends and conditions in the other.

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