IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Most governments at some time use all their techniques for influencing others, but probably over 90 percent of all relations between states are based on simple persuasion and deal with relatively unimportant technical matters. Since such interactions seldom make the headlines, we often assume that most relations between states involve the making or carrying out of threats. But whether a government is communicating with another over an unimportant technical matter or over a subject of great consequence, it is likely to use a particular type of tactic in its attempts to influence, depending on the past tradition of friendship or hostility between those two governments and the amount of compatability between their objectives and interests. Allies, for example, seldom threaten each other with force or even make blatant threats of punishment, but governments that disagree over a wide range of policy objectives and hold attitudes of suspi­cion and hostility toward each other are more likely to resort to threats and imposition of punishments. The methods of exerting influence between Great Britain and the United States are, typically, persuasion and rewards, whereas the methods of exerting influence between the Soviet Union and the United , States in the early post-World War II era were typically threatening and inflicting punishments of various types. We can construct rough typologies of international relationships as identified by the typical techniques used in the act of influence.

¹¹ Francois de Callieres, a renowned French diplomat of the eighteenth century, also sug­gested the utility of these techniques when he wrote, "Every Christian prince must take as his chief maxim not to employ arms to support or vindicate his rights until he has employed and exhausted the way of reason and persuasion. It is to his interest, also, to add to reason and persuasion the influence of benefits conferred, which indeed is one of the surest ways to make his own power secure, and to increase it." On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, trans. A.F. Whyte (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), p. 7. In a treatise on foreign policy written approximately 300 B.C., Kautilya noted four fundamental techniques for obtaining the desired results from other Indian states: concili­ation (sama), gifts (dana), dissension (bheda), and punishment (danda). See George Modelski, "Kau­tilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World," American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), 553.

158 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

1. Relations of Consensus. Relations of consensus would be typical between those states that have few disagreements over foreign-policy objectives, a high degree of mutual responsiveness, or a very low level of interaction and involvement in each other's affairs. An example of the first would be Anglo-

• American relations, and, of the last, the relations between Thailand and Finland. In the relations of consensus, influence is exercised primarily by the technique of persuasion and through the subtle offering of rewards. Since violence as a form of punishment is almost inconceivable between two countries, the military capabilities of neither actor are organized, mobilized, and "targeted" toward the other.

2. Relations of Overt Manipulation. Here, there may be some dis­agreement or conflict over foreign-policy objectives, or state A might undertake some domestic policy that was disapproved by state B, such as a form of racial discrimination. Since there is some conflict, there will also be at least a modest degree of involvement between the two actors, or a perception that A and В are in some kind of a relationship of interdependence. The techniques used to influence will include, if normal persuasion fails, (a) offers of rewards, (b) granting of rewards, (c) threats to withhold rewards (such as not to give foreign aid in the future), or (d) threats of nonviolent punishment, including, for instance, the raising of tariffs against B's products. Militarily, in relations of overt manipula­tion, there is still no mobilization or targeting of military capabilities toward state B. Military capabilities are thus of little relevance to the power of each state toward the other. Examples of overt manipulation would include contempo­rary relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union and relations between France and the United States during de Gaulle's presidency.

3. Relations of Coercion. In relations of coercion, there are funda­mental disagreements over foreign-policy objectives. Almost all actions that A takes externally are perceived by В to be a threat to its own interests. Involvement is therefore high, and the degree of mutual responsiveness is usually very low, if it exists at all. A seeks to influence B's behavior typically by (a) making warnings and threatening punishments; (b) inflicting nonviolent punishments; and, under extreme provocation, (c) the selective and limited use of force, as, for example, in a peacetime blockade. Military capabilities are likely to be targeted toward each other and become a relevant factor in power relationships, since they are often mobilized for threats and the policy makers labor under the assumption that they might have to be used. Examples would include relations between the Soviet Union and the Western coalition until detente, Cuba and the United States in the early 1960s, Syria and Israel since 1948, and Iran and Iraq in 1979.

4. Relations of Force. Here, there is almost total disagreement on foreign-policy objectives, and the areas of consensus are limited to a few necessi­ties, such as communications. The degree of involvement is obviously extremely

159 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

high. The typical form of exercising influence is through the infliction of violent punishment, although, in some instances rewards (say, peace offers) might be proffered. National resources are mobilized primarily with a view to conducting the policy of punishment. However, the quantity of military capabilities used will vary with the geographic and force-level boundaries that the disputants place on the conflict.

To summarize this analysis of power, we can suggest that power is an integral part of all political relationships; but in international politics we are interested primarily in one process: how one state influences the behavior of another in its own interests. The act of influencing becomes a central focus for the study of international politics, and it is from this act that we can best deduce a definition of power. If we observe the act of influencing, we can see that power is a process, a relationship, a means to an end, and even a quantity. Moreover, we can make an analytical distinction among the act of influencing, the basis, or resources, upon which the act relies, and the response to the act. Resources are an important determinant of how successful the wielding of influ­ence will be, but they are by no means the only determinant. The nature of a country's foreign-policy objectives, the skill with which a state mobilizes its capa­bilities for foreign-policy purposes, its needs, responsiveness, costs, and commit­ments are equally important. Acts of influencing may take many forms, the most important of which are the offer and granting of rewards, the threat and imposition of punishments, and the application of force. The choice of means used to induce will depend, in turn, upon the general nature of relations between any two given governments, the degree of involvement between them, and the extent of their mutual responsiveness. Having analyzed the general techniques of wielding influence and the conditions under which power is likely to succeed, we may now turn to the specific instruments of inducement used to achieve objectives, ranging from simple diplomatic persuasion to the use of violence on a massive scale.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 947-52.

Baldwin, David A., "Inter-Nation Influence Revisited," Journal of Conflict Resolu­tion, 15 (December 1971), 471-86.

_____, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics, 24 (October 1971),

19-38.

_____, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tenden­cies," World Politics, 31 (January 1979), 161-94.

_____, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," International Orga-

nization, 34 (Autumn 1980), 471-506.

160 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

Bell, Roderick, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner, eds., Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research. New York: Free Press, 1969.

Cox, Robert, and Harold K. Jacobsen, The Anatomy of Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Dahl, Robert, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, 2 (1957), 201-15.

Ferris, Wayne H., The Power Capabilities of Nation-States. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973.

Fox, Annette В., The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.

George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, Chap. 21. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Gross, Ernest A., "Moral Power in International Relations," Journal of Interna­tional Affairs, 12, (1958), 132-37.

Haskel, Barbara G., "Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of Power," International Organization, 34 (Winter 1980), 89-120.

Jones, Stephen В., "The Power Inventory and National Strategy," World Politics,

6 (1954), 421-52.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

Knorr, Klaus, Military Power and Potential. Lexington, Mass.: Raytheon/Heath Co., 1970.

_______, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations. New

York: Basic Books, 1975.

Mack, AndrewJ.R., "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymme­tric Conflict," World Politics, 27 (January 1975), 175-200.

Pruitt, Dean, "National Power and International Responsiveness," Background,

7 (1964), 165-78.

Simon, Herbert A., "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political

Power," Journal of Politics, 15 (1953), 500-16. Singer, J. David, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," American Political

Science Review, 57 (1963), 420-30.

The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

In seeking to achieve objectives, realize values, or defend interests, govenments must communicate with those whose actions and behavior they wish to deter, alter, or reinforce. Today there are many occasions and media of communication that may be employed for conveying hopes, wishes, or threats to others. At the press conference, political rally, or banquet, government officials make state­ments directed not just to domestic audiences but to foreign governments and peoples as well. Nevertheless, most official attempts to wield influence abroad are carried out through formal diplomatic channels or by direct communication between foreign ministers and heads of state.

The subjects of interstate communication include definitions of a govern­ment's objectives, rationalizations for them, threats, promises, and the holding out of possibilities for concluding agreements on contentious issues. As will be seen, the function of diplomats is not so much to formulate their government's goals as to explain them abroad and attempt to persuade others to adjust their own policies to conform to those objectives. Diplomats are partially successful when they can get the government to which they are accredited to see a particular situation as their own government perceives it; they are totally successful when they are able to alter or maintain the actions of a foreign government in a manner favorable to the interests of their own government. Normally during the process of communication, those who formulate policy will reassess their objectives in the light of changing circumstances and varying foreign responses. Diplomats then convey the modified objectives to foreign governments; and

162 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

the whole routine continues until consensus is reached through bargaining, until it is imposed by the use of force, or until one government abandons or withdraws from its objectives if they meet resistance abroad.

Objectives and diplomatic bargaining strategies are thus subject to con­stant reformulation on the basis of information and assessments provided by diplomats abroad and by various acts and signals governments make to each other. When mutual interest and consensus on a problem exist, the policy-formu­lating and policy-implementing processes may require only the length of time needed to fill in details on a piece of paper. When there is disagreement, misun­derstanding, or incompatibility between two or more governments' values, objec­tives, and interests, the process may involve long periods of time. Both India and Pakistan, for instance, have maintained their basic objectives with regard to the states of Kashmir and Jammu for three decades although all of their diplomatic bargaining, threats, rewards, and use of force to resolve the issue have not succeeded in changing each other's position. The main purposes of this chapter are to illustrate some of the techniques of diplomatic bargaining and to discuss some of the contemporary problems attending diplomatic action. Before discussing these processes, however, it is necessary to examine some of the basic rules and traditions of diplomatic communication between indepen­dent states and analyze the position of the main medium for interstate communi­cation, the ambassador.

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