OBJECTIVES, NATIONAL ROLES, AND ORIENTATIONS

Most of the types of objectives discussed before derive from or are consistent with orientations and role conceptions. A government that sees itself as a bastion of the revolution will probably have at least some vague objective or plan to create a new revolutionary world or regional order. A government that sees itself as a regional collaborator will probably have an objective relating to the construction of a common market. Regional protector roles can be related to objectives of creating stable alliances.

States typically will have many more objectives than either orientations or national roles. This is because a number of objectives relate to private inter­ests, peripheral problems, and issues that have only slight impact on the interests of other states. However, on major issues affecting security interests or access to markets and sources of supply, objectives may be deduced from national roles or orientations.

Contemporary Libyan foreign policy illustrates the relationships among the four types of foreign-policy outputs—orientations, roles, objectives, and actions. Toward the outside world in general, Libya has emphasized its indepen­dence, refusing to commit its foreign policy to the objectives of either of the super powers. While its sympathies have often been extended to the socialist countries, at least verbally, it has refrained from identifying itself as a member of the socialist bloc—despite its own domestic programs which are termed a form of "Arab socialism." The regime's self-conception is also one of an active independent, totally overturning the previous royal government's rather passive stance in regional and global affairs. The basic objective through this role has been to destroy Libya's dependence upon the West so that it can strike out in many different directions, promoting the cause against Israel and for Arab and Muslim unity. While blatantly anti-Western actions have been prominent in the range of Libyan foreign policy, they have been limited by the recognition that for reasons of internal development and to prosecute the war against Israel, Libya needs Western markets for its oil exports and Western technology and technicians.

Table 5-1Orientations, Roles, Objectives, and Actions in Libyan Foreign Policy

In the regional context, the Libyans under Khaddafy have been willing to make all sorts of military and diplomatic commitments, pursuing basically an orientation of coalition-formation with any and all who share Libya's commit­ment as an anti-Zionist agent to the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Arab Palestine. Such large resources have been committed to fulfilling this role that we could term the resulting objectives as a "core" value. The activities to achieve the objectives have ranged from assassination attempts against Arabs with more moderate views about Israel, to the channeling of funds and equipment to the PLO and Syria. The promotion of Arab unity, a prominent middle-range goal, is also related, though not exclusively, to the role of the anti-Zionist agent. A role which carries with it less compelling commitments is that of the leader of the Muslim "revolution," a vague and rather amorphous self-conception that

142 Foreign-Policy Objectives

carries with it commitments to build increasing unity among all Muslim societies and a parallel sentiment to reduce the diplomatic and commercial influence of the Western countries in Muslim areas. As a leader of the Muslim renaissance, Libya has extended aid to a variety of countries, financed Pakistan's development of a nuclear capability, proposed solutions to the problem of the Muslim minority rebellion in some of the Philippine islands, and intervened on behalf of pro-Muslim faction in neighboring Chad's civil war. An illustration of the problems arising from incompatible objectives is also seen in Libya's case. While devoted strongly to the pan-Arab and Muslim causes, Libya was not willing to compromise its close relationship to the Soviet Union by condemning the lattter's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Here an important trade-off had to be made: reduced prestige among the Arab and Muslim countries in exchange for continued mili­tary supplies from the Soviet Union. In foreign policy, what a country does not do is often as important as what it does.

For a country as small as Libya (population = 2.6 million), it has taken an astonishing range of actions in fulfilling its orientations, roles, and objectives. These have ranged from quiet diplomacy, to assasination and subversion, to military intervention and extensive grants of foreign aid. Most countries of its size have much more limited aspirations and of course do not possess the where-withall to conduct a vigorous diplomacy. But Libya has the combination of a revolutionary regime dedicated to the reconstruction of the regional environ­ment, including the elimination of Israel, and massive revenues obtained from the sale of oil. In the following chapters we will examine in detail how such actions are taken and the conditions under which they tend to succeed or fail. We are concerned, in general, with the various techniques governments employ to wield influence over other actors in the system and to achieve their objectives.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beard, Charles A., and G.H.E. Smith, The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical

Study in American Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1934. Frankel, Joseph, National Interest. London: Pall Mall and Macmillan, 1970. Good, Robert C, "National Interest and Moral Theory: The 'Debate' Among

Contemporary Political Realists," in Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues

and the Instruments, eds. Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good. Baltimore,

Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. Hanrieder, Wolfram, "Actor Objectives and International Systems," Journal

of Politics, 27 (February 1965), 109-32. Hermann, Charles F., "Policy Classification: A Key to the Comparative Study

of Foreign Policy," in The Analysis of International Politics, eds. James N.

Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice East. New York: Free Press, 1972. "The Idea of National Interest," Symposium, American Perspective, 4 (1960), 335-

401.

143 Foreign-Policy Objectives

Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics, Chap. 8. New York:

John Wiley, 1957.

Knorr, Klaus, "Theories of Imperalism," World Politics, 4 (1952), 402-31. Lichtheim, George, Imperialism. New York: Praeger, 1971. Modelski, George A., A Theory of Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1962. Moon, Parker, Т., Imperialism and World Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1926. Morgenthau, Hans, J., "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the

United States," The American Political Science Review, 46 (1952), 961-88.

---------, In Defense of the National Interest. New York: Knopf, 1951.

Morse, Edward L., Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations.

New York: The Free Press, 1976. Nuechterlein, Donald, "The Concept of'National Interest': A Time for New

Approaches," Orbis, 23 (Spring, 1979), 73-92. Osgood, Robert E., Ideals and Self-interest in American Foreign Relations. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1953. Robinson, Thomas, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations,"

International Studies Quarterly, 11 (1967), 151-79. Schilling, Warner R., "The Classification of Ends, or, Which Interest is the

National," World Politics, 8 (1956), 566-78. Seabury, Paul, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy, Chaps. 4, 11. New York: Random

House, 1963. Wolfe, Bertram D., "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign

Affairs, 41 (1962), 152-70. Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Chaps.

2, 5, 6, 10. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Yalem, Ronald J., "The 'Theory of Ends' of Arnold Wolfers," fournal of Conflict

Resolution, 4 (1960), 421-25.

Foreign-Policy Actions:

Power, Capability, and Influence

Orientations, roles, and objectives are composed of images in the minds of policy makers, attitudes toward the outside world, decisions, and aspirations. But policy also has a component of actions, the things governments do to others in order to effect certain orientations, fulfill roles, or achieve and defend objec­tives. An act is basically a form of communication intended to change or sustain the behavior of those upon whom the acting government is dependent for achiev­ing its own goals. It can also be viewed as a "signal" sent by one actor to influence the receiver's image of the sender.¹ In international politics, acts and signals take many different forms. The promise of granting foreign aid is an act, as are propaganda appeals, displays of military strength, wielding a veto in the Security Council, walking out of a conference, organizing a conference, issuing a warning in a diplomatic note, sending arms and money to a liberation movement, instituting a boycott on the goods of another state, or declaring war. These types of acts and signals, and the circumstances in which they are likely to succeed, will be discussed in this and the following five chapters. Our organizing principle will be the amount of threat involved in the various tech­niques of influence. Diplomatic persuasion seemingly involves the least amount of threat; economic pressures, subversion, intervention, and various forms of

¹ A comprehensive treatment of how governments "signal" each other is in Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images m International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

145 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

warfare involve increasingly great amounts of threat and punishment. To help understand what all these types of action or techniques of influence have in common, however, we will discuss in a more abstract manner the behavior gov­ernments show when they turn toward each other to establish orientations, fulfill roles, or achieve and defend objectives.

The international political process commences when any state—let us say state A—seeks through various acts or signals to change or sustain the behav­ior (for instance, the acts, images, and policies) of other states. Power can thus be defined as the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others. This definition can be illustrated as follows, where the solid line represents various acts:

A seeks to influence В because it has established certain objectives that cannot be achieved (it is perceived) unless В (and perhaps many other states as well) does X. If this is the basis of all international political processes, the capacity to control behavior can be viewed in several different ways:

1. Influence (an aspect of power) is essentially a means to an end. Some governments or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake, but for most it is instrumental, just like money. They use it primarily for achieving or defending other goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances.

2. State A, in its acts toward state B, uses or mobilizes certain resources. A resource is any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement to persuade, reward, threaten, or punish. The concept of resource may be illustrated in the following example. Suppose an unarmed robber walks into a bank and asks the clerk to give up money. The clerk observes clearly that the robber has no weapon and refuses to comply with the order. The robber has sought to influence the behavior of the clerk, but has failed. The next time, however, the robber walks in armed with a pistol and threatens to shoot if the clerk does not give up the money. This time, the clerk complies. In this instance, the robber has mobilized certain resources or capabilities (the gun) and succeeds in influencing the clerk to comply. But other less tangible resources may be involved as well. The appearance of the person, particularly facial expression, may convey determination, threat, or weakness, all of which may subtly influence the behavior of the clerk. In international politics, the diplomatic gestures and words accompanying actions may be as important as the acts themselves. A government that places troops on alert but insists that it is doing so for domestic reasons will have an impact abroad quite different

146 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

from the government that organizes a similar alert but accompanies it with threats to go to war. "Signals" or diplomatic "body language" may be as impor­tant as dramatic actions such as alerts and mobilizations.

3. The act of influencing В obviously involves a relationship between A and B, although, as will be seen later, the relationship may not even involve overt communication. If the relationship covers any period of time, we can also say that it is a process.

4. If A can get В to do something, but В cannot get A to do a similar thing, then we can say that A has more power than В regarding that particular issue. Power, therefore, can also be viewed as a quantity, but as a quantity it is only meaningful when compared to the power of others. Power is therefore relative.

To summarize, power may be viewed from several aspects: It is a means; it is based on resources; it is a relationship and a process; and it can be measured, at least crudely.

We can break down the concept of power into three distinct analytic elements: power comprises (1) the acts (process, relationship) of influencing other states; (2) the resources used to make the wielding of influence successful; and (3) the responses to the acts. The three elements must be kept distinct. Since this definition may seem too abstract, we can define the concept in the more operational terms of policy makers. In formulating policy and the strategy to achieve certain goals, they would explicitly or implicitly ask the five following questions:

1. Given our goals, what do we wish В to do or not to do? (X)

2. How shall we get В to do or not to do X? (implies a relationship and process)

3. What resources are at our disposal so that we can induce В to do or not to do X?

4. What is B's probable response to our attempts to influence its behavior?

5. What are the costs of taking actions 1, 2, or 3—as opposed to other alternatives?

Before discussing the problem of resources and responses, we have to fill out our model of the influence act to account for the many patterns of behavior that may be involved in an international relationship. First, the exercise of influence implies more than merely A's ability to change the behavior of B. Influence may also be seen when A attempts to get В to continue a course of action or policy that is useful to, or in the interests of, A.² The exercise of influence does not always cease, therefore, after В does X. It is often a continuing process of reinforcing B's behavior.

Second, it is almost impossible to find a situation where В does not

² J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 420-30. State A might also wish state В to do W, Y, and Z, which may be incompatible with the achievement of X.

147Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

also have some influence over A. Our model has suggested that influence is exercised only in one direction, by A over B. In reality, influence is multilateral. State A, for example, would seldom seek a particular goal unless it has been influenced in a particular direction by the actions of other states in the system. At a minimum, there is the problem of feedback in any relationship: If В complies with A's wishes and does X, that behavior may subsequently prompt A to change its own behavior, perhaps in the interest of B. The phenomenon of feedback may be illustrated as follows:

Third, there is the type of relationship that includes "anticipated reaction."³ This is the situation where B, anticipating rewards or punishments from A, changes his behavior, perhaps even before A makes any "signals" about possible action. Deterrence theory clearly assumes that В—the potential aggres­sor against A—will not attack (where it might, were there no deterrent), knowing that an unacceptable level of punishment would surely result. A similar situation, but in reverse, is also common in international politics. This is where A might wish В to do X, but does not try to influence В for fear that В will do Y instead, which is an unfavorable response from A's point of view. In a hypothetical situation, the government of India might wish to obtain arms from the United States to build up its own defenses, but does not request such arms because it fears that the United States would insist on certain conditions for the sale of arms that might compromise India's nonalignment. This anticipated reaction may also be multilateral, where A wishes В to do X, but will not try to get В to do it because it fears that C, a third state, will do Y, which is unfavorable to A's interests. India wants to purchase American arms, but does not seek to influence the United States to sell them for fear that Pakistan (C) will then build up its own armaments and thus accelerate the arms race between the two countries. In this situation, Pakistan (C) has influence over the actions of the Indian government even though it has not deliberately sought to influence India on this particular matter or even communicated its position in any way. The Indian government has simply perceived that there is a relatively high proba­bility that if it seeks to influence the United States, Pakistan will react in a manner contrary to India's interests.

Fourth, power and influence may be measured by scholars, but what is important in international politics is the perceptions of influence and capabilities held by policy makers and the way they interpret another government's signals.

³ Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," Journal of Politics, 15 (1953), 500-16. For further analysis, see David A. Baldwin, "Inter-Nation Influence Revisited," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15 (December 1971), 478-79.

148 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

The reason that governments invest millions of dollars for gathering intelligence is to develop a reasonably accurate picture of other states' capabilities and inten­tions. Where there is a great discrepancy between perceptions and reality, the results to a country's foreign policy may be disastrous. To take our example of the bank robber again, suppose that the person held a harmless toy pistol and threatened the clerk. The clerk perceived the gun to be real and deduced the robber's intention to use it. As a result, the clerk complied with the demand. In this case, the robber's influence was far greater than the "objective" character of the robber's capabilities and intentions; and distorted perception by the clerk led to an act which was unfavorable to the bank.

Finally, as our original model suggests, A may try to influence В not to do X. Sometimes this is called negative power, or deterrence, where A acts in a manner to prevent a certain action it deems undesirable to its interests. This is a typical relationship in international politics. By signing the Munich treaty, the British and French governments hoped to prevent Germany from invading Czechoslovakia; Israeli attacks on PLO facilities in Lebanon are designed to demonstrate that PLO guerrilla operations against Israel will be met by vast punishments, the costs of which to the PLO would far outweigh the gains of the terrorist acts. Such a cost-benefit analysis, the Israelis hope, would deter the PLO from undertaking further operations. The reader should keep in mind the distinction between compellance and deterrence.

RESOURCES

The second element of the concept of power consists of those resources that are mobilized in support of the acts taken to influence state B's behavior. It is difficult to assess the general capacity of a state to control the actions and policies of others unless we also have some knowledge of the capabilities involved.⁴ Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that social scientists do not understand all the reasons why some actors—whether people, groups, governments, or states—wield influence successfully, while others do not.

It is clear that, in political relationships, not everyone possesses equal influence. In domestic politics, it is possible to construct a lengthy list of capabili­ties and attributes that seemingly permit some to wield influence over large numbers of people and important public decisions. Robert Dahl lists such tangi­bles as money, wealth, information, time, political allies, official position, and control over jobs, and such intangibles as personality and leadership qualities.⁵ But not everyone who possesses these capabilities can command the obedience of other people. What is crucial in relating resources to influence, according to Dahl, is that one mobilize them for one's political purposes and possess the skill

⁴ We might assess influence for historical situations solely on the basis of whether A got В to do X, without our having knowledge of either A's or B's capabilities.

⁵ Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961).

149 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

to mobilize them. One who uses wealth, time, information, friends, and personal­ity for political purposes will probably be able to influence others on public issues. A person, on the other hand, who possesses the same capabilities but uses them to invent a new mousetrap is not apt to be important in politics. The same propositions also hold true in international politics. The amount of influence a state wields over others can be related to the capabilities mobilized in support of specific foreign-policy objectives. To put this proposition in another way, we can argue that resources do not determine the uses to which they will be put. Nuclear power can be used to provide electricity or to deter and perhaps destroy other nations. The use of resources depends less on their quality and quantity than on the external objectives a government formulates for itself. The variety of foreign-policy instruments available to a nation for influ­encing others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of capabilities. What a government seeks to do—the type of objectives it formulates—and how it attempts to do it will depend at least partially on the resources it finds available. A country such as Thailand, which possesses relatively few resources, cannot, even if it would desire, construct intercontinental ballistic missiles with which to intimidate others, establish a worldwide propaganda network, or dispense several billion dollars annually of foreign aid to try to influence other countries. We can conclude, therefore, that how states use their resources depends on their external objectives, but the choice of objectives and the instruments to achieve those objectives are limited or influenced by the quality and quantity of available resources.

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