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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE



A significant feature of eighteenth-century European international politics was the relatively even distribution of diplomatic influence and military capabilities among the major states, a characteristic found also in China, Greece, and Renais­sance Italy in certain periods of their history. England, France, Sweden, Spain, the Austrian Empire, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey (to the extent that the last was involved in European politics) were not significantly different in their domes­tic political institutions, armed might, or international prestige. This relatively equal distribution of power and influence made it possible for the dynastic states to shift alliance partners without radically upsetting the structure of the whole system. Alliances were based on the juxtaposition of constantly changing dynastic, economic, and colonial interests, not on ideological principles. Flexibil­ity within the groupings of states was the result.

The dynasts of the eighteenth century, as well as the aristocratic classes within each state, were united by strong cosmopolitan bonds and a common political culture. They commonly spoke French and identified themselves as the joint rulers of "Christendom" as well as the rulers of particular pieces of territory.1 Royal families and many aristocrats were joined across state bound­aries by marriage, while professional soldiers and diplomats, regardless of nation­ality, worked for the services that gave them the highest rank, salary, or prestige. There was no stigma attached to the German who commanded Russian forces or to the Italian who became one of the French court's most favored and trusted advisers. The Spanish diplomatic and military services in the eighteenth century were graced by such names as Konigsegg, Wall, O'Reilly, Fitzgerald, and Albe-roni, while John Elphinstone, Sir Samuel Greig, and Peter Lacey made fine careers in the service of the Russian Tsarina. The continent was also unified through common support for the principles of royal legitimacy and dynastic

1 The Holy Roman Empire, although of little practical consequence, still symbolized the cultural unity of the continent.

59 The European and Contemporary State Systems

succession. Although radical political theories had already developed in England and France in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most literate upper-class subjects adhered faithfully to the royal mystique.

The stability of political life and the consensus in support of royal legiti­macy helped preclude intervention and subversion as means of achieving political objectives. There were court intrigues of various types; but, if one dynast at­tempted to unseat another through military intervention or court subversion, he was undermining the principles of royal succession and the divine right of kings, principles upon which his own authority often rested.

Wars, too, displayed conservative characteristics. They were fought by , professional and mercenary armies, usually for the purpose of outmaneuvering the enemy rather than annihilating him. Destruction of lives and property was often limited (although losses attributed to disease were high) because of the low level of military technology, high cost of maintaining a professional army, and high rate of desertion, as well as the limited objectives for which force was used—to obtain strategic territory, generate prestige for a dynast, or secure colonies. War was to be used, according to philosophers of violence such as Clausewitz, to impose the will of one sovereign upon another by defeating the latter's capacity to resist.2 This purpose did not require annihilation, occupation, or the forcible imposition of alien social institutions onto other populations.

International politics of the eighteenth century have thus been character­ized under various terms, each designed to illustrate the essence of the system. To some, it has been known as the period when the "balance of power" operated. Kings and their advisers could conduct foreign affairs as if they were playing a game of chess or strategy, easily calculating the power of their adversaries and adjusting their foreign-policy orientation through alliances or neutrality to achieve or defend their interests. If conflicts on the continent threatened to become too violent, the dynasts could play out their quarrels in the New World, where vast lands and commercial opportunities could be traded back' and forth in wars and peace treaties. Others have called this era the "golden \/ age of diplomacy," emphasizing the consensus of political values that prevailed in Europe; the cosmopolitanism of the upper classes; the regard for principles of royal authority and Christianity; and the propensity to resolve conflicts through skillful diplomatic bargaining, territorial exchanges, or alliance making, rather' than through large-scale violence, propaganda, or subversion.3

But lying behind those conditions that helped to create stability and moderation in the politics of the eighteenth-century European state system were some characteristics that led to conflict. The religious wars of the preceding century were not easily forgotten, and their memory sustained international

2 Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics, and Power, ed. and trans. Edward M. Collins (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 63.

3 For a characterization of eighteenth-century diplomatic relations that emphasizes the elements of stability in the system, see Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 17-30.

60 The European and Contemporary State Systems

hostilities and suspicions. Strongly held national sentiments did not exist at the grassroots level, but many peasants and townspeople were not entirely indif­ferent toward the policies of their rulers—particularly not toward those whom they regarded as alien in nationality or religion; insurrection against "foreign" rule was an occasional consequence of a system in which land and peoples were traded back and forth to satisfy the strategic requirements or to enhance the prestige of dynasts. Monarchs' sensitivity to the rules of etiquette as well as their status among foreign courts did not prevent them from occasionally employing deceit and fraud as diplomatic tactics. Wars, although less destructive by today's standards, were limited more by the crude military technology of the day than by any great concern over humanitarian principles. In other words, the elements of stability—cosmopolitanism, the principles of dynastic legitimacy, limited wars, shifting alliances, and a roughly equal distribution of power— did not prevent the occurrence of sharply contentious issues and frequent re­course to the use of force.4 But various diplomatic procedures and mechanisms, operating within a common political culture, were adequate for the kinds of conflicts that arose. No one state conquered Europe; Europe did not collapse into chaos, inviting invasion from eastern adversaries; no technological develop­ments fundamentally changed the main characteristics of political and economic life; and there were no important ideological incompatibilities that made divisions between states deep and rigid. If the eighteenth-century system was not entirely peaceful and stable, neither was it inflexible or unable to cope with the main issues of the day.

THE STATE SYSTEM

 




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