It is difficult to generalize about the conditions under which propaganda appeals will succeed and about the extent to which the hundreds of millions of dollars spent each year by the major powers on foreign information programs result in desired attitudes and actions by various "targets." Surveys and studies by propaganda agencies are often unreliable, because administrators have to prove that the resources spent are bringing desired results. And although it is relatively easy to measure the number of listeners to radio programs or attendance at cultural-exchange events, it is virtually impossible to identify the impact these media have on attitudes and actions. Yet, most governments must believe that information programs are an important technique of influence, because they continue to expand their resources in this area.
24 A survey in 1969 found that of regular radio listeners in India, 83% listened occasionally to Radio Ceylon, 66% to the B.B.C., 58% to the Voice of America, and 55% to Radio Moscow. Francis S. Ronalds, Jr., "The Future of International Broadcasting," in Martin, ed., Propaganda in International Affairs, p. 79.
212 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda
As yet, television has not been used extensively for propaganda purposes, although once satellite-beamed television becomes inexpensive and readily available to developing countries, some governments may try to exploit this medium to a greater extent. But an increasing number of governments are beaming radio broadcasts to foreign countries, and a number of them have projects to set up new transmitters or to increase the power of those already in operation. By the early 1980s, various governments were already broadcasting an aggregate of over 17,000 hours weekly, with the Soviet Union leading, at 2,000 hours per week in 88 foreign languages. The Chinese have rapidly expanded their foreign-language broadcasts, and Radio Cairo sends programs to the Arab world on a daily basis. Radio broadcasting is relatively cheap, and the availability and low cost of transistor radios have created an ever-expanding audience, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, relatively small countries such as Saudi Arabia, Zaire, and Albania find it within their means to broadcast abroad extensively.25 Finally, cultural-exchange programs and propaganda through printed media have grown rapidly as well.
In the long run, most propaganda clearly does not create new attitudes or lead to any particular actions. Indeed, most of it is "facilitative communication," the main purpose of which is simply to keep in contact with foreign audiences and to maintain an awareness of the general foreign-policy goals or social characteristics of a state. Awareness in itself often creates positive attitudes over a period of time, if not political action.26 In the short run and in highly favorable circumstances of political turmoil, revolution, war, or general fear, however, propaganda can be used very effectively—that is, to the point where "targets" can be motivated to undertake actions desired by the communicator. As the next chapter reveals, propaganda has been used particularly effectively in attempts at subversion where a "revolutionary" situation already prevails in the target state.
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25 See Ronalds, '.'The Future of International Broadcasting," pp. 71-80.
26 L.John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," in Martin, ed.,Progaganda inInternational Affairs, pp. 62-70.
213 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda
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