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THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS: INDUCING AGREEMENT



'JThe choice of techniques and tactics to employ in diplomatic negotiation depends /generally upon the degree of incompatibility between two or more nations' objectives and interests, the extent to which the nations are committed to those interests, and the degree to which the parties want to reach agreement. Diplo­matic negotiations between friends and allies seldom display the same character­istics as those between hostile governments. Where there is already considerable agreement about the principles of an issue, negotiation may involve only working out the details or deducing the consequences from the principles.14|When gov­ernments are responsive to each others' interests, moreover, they have a good basis for arranging compromises and exchanging concession^. In negotiations within the Common Market, for instance, the parties agree widely on the objec­tives of the organization and have intimate knowledge of each others' economic needs and interests. To a large extent, they can negotiate over essentially techni­cal matters and do not have to worry about reconciling great principles/A com­mon desire to reach agreement may also induce the bargaining agents to make concession^. The alternative is to adhere inflexibly to a position, prevent agree­ment, and accept the adverse publicity for adopting such a position.

Where objectives are fundamentally incompatible and both sides main­tain strong commitments to their respective positions, the problem of influencing behavior, actions, and objectives through diplomatic bargaining becomes much more complex./Two stages toward reaching a settlement in such conditions are involved. First, one party must get the other to want an agreement of some sort; he must somehow make the other realize that any agreement or settlement is preferable to the status quo of incompatible positions or nonagreement or, conversely, that the consequences of nonagreement are more unfavorable to him than the consequences of agreement^ Second, once the stage of "agreeing to an agreement" has been reached, the two parties must still bargain over the specific terms of the final agreement.

Of the two steps, the first is probably more difficult to achieve when commitments to incompatible objectives are strong; as long as one or both

"Fred С Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), Chap. 11.

 

179 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

parties believe they can achieve their objectives through actions other than nego­tiations, diplomatic bargaining cannot lead to settlement. In the postwar negotia­tions over the status of Austria, negotiators from the Western allies and the Soviet Union met over 400 times before an agreement was worked out. It was clear that, with the exception of the last several meetings, the Soviet government did not wish to make an agreement or change its objectives toward Austria but was content to maintain the occupied status of the country. ^Negotiations were not used to bargain, but to mark time, discuss other issues, make propa­ganda, and give the impression that serious talks were proceeding} Only after other developments had occurred within the Soviet government and throughout Europe did the Russian government, over Foreign Minister Molotov's objections, decide that it wanted to conclude a permanent settlement of the Austrian issue. Once that decision was made, negotiations were completed in a matter of weeks.

If both sides have made the prior decision that agreement is more desir­able than nonagreement or maintenance of the status quo, it remains for them to bargain over the specific details of settlement.tyDiplomats can employ a great variety of bargaining techniques. Basically, they present their conditions, define their own objectives, and use persuasion by making arguments or presenting data to illustrate the correctness of their views or the degree of their needsj> Occasionally they can use threats and offers of rewards to try to obtain acceptance of their proposals and, if this fails, reassess their original positions in terms of possible concessions that they hope will elicit agreement or a change in the objectives of the other side, All the time, they must simultaneously reveal their commitment to their bargaining positions, lest the other party assume that they do not feel very strongly about their conditions and would be willing to compro­mise them without significant compensations.

Promise of a reward is in a sense a bribe or inducement that offers some future advantage in return for agreement on a specific point under conten­tion. These may range from promises of "soft" peace terms, monetary loans, or diplomatic support at some future conference to such symbolic acts as unilater­ally releasing prisoners of war or suspending hostilities. One common ploy of governments that make extensive demands on the territorial status quo is to offer the reward of a permanent settlement of all other issues dividing two or more states if the other side will just give in on one specific territorial demand. Hitler promised that he would make no more territorial demands in Europe if only the Western powers would assist him in inducing the Czechs to cede the Sudetenland to him. He held out the possibility of a permanent settlement of all outstanding issues if this last problem could be resolved in his favor.

Threats can be conceived as the opposite of rewards, whereby state A announces that if state В does not do X, it will do Y, which will hurt or damage B's interests. |In a general setting, if objectives between two or more states conflict, this can include a threat to start war, break diplomatic relations, impose economic embargoes or boycotts, institute a blockade, withdraw a foreign-aid program, or in other ways punish state ВІ In addition, threats more peculiar

180 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

to a particular diplomatic negotiating situation can be employed. The negotiators of one side might threaten to break off discussions (implying that it would prefer nonagreement to continued stalemate or acceptance of B's conditions), reveal secret agreements, increase its terms of agreement, or "let the military take over."

* The effectiveness of threatening actions depends above all on their credi­bility] State В has to believe that the threat will be carried out if it does not meet state A's demands./Credibility would seem to be established when В realizes that A can fulfill the threat and thereby damage B, without seriously harming its own interests^ If, for instance, state A's diplomats threaten to walk out of a conference, and В knows that such action would seriously jeopardize the chances of obtaining an agreement it wants, it might very well be willing to make last-minute concessions to prevent a breakdown of negotiations.

/The effectiveness and credibility of a threat would also seem to require that there be some symmetry between the magnitude of the threat and the issue under contention! If the Soviet Union threatens to start a nuclear war with Iran because the latter will not concede some relatively minor point in frontier negotiations, the threat will not seem credible; it is out of proportion to the issue at stake. Or, as Kenneth Boulding has summarized it, beyond a certain point, the higher the magnitude of a threat, the lower is the subjective probability that it will be believed.15

To be credible, threats must also appear to be one-sided. State A has to make it clear that if the threat is fulfilled, it will not damage its own interests— in other words, the costs to the target of the threat will be much greater than to the party that makes the threat.16 If A threatens to walk out of a conference (usually after some signal, such as sending home the chief negotiator for "consul­tations"), but В knows that A would suffer serious public condemnation for "wrecking" the conference, the threat is not very credible. Indeed, В might be seriously tempted to call A's bluff, in which case A would be placed in a most difficult position.

In some instances, those who make threats may also have to take certain actions that demonstrate that they have the capacity to fulfill them. This might involve mobilizing troops, cutting off foreign aid or trade for a short period, ordering a reduction in embassy personnel, or staging a short walkout from a conference—all actions designed to indicate that the "real thing" can be done if necessary.

Finally, it may be advantageous to make deliberately vague threats or, as some might put it, ominous warnings. Although these may not be entirely

15 Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 255.

16 In certain circumstances, a threat may be more credible if it would damage both sides See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 124-31.

181 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

credible, they have the advantage of giving the threatening side many alternative forms of punishing actions—or inaction—if the other side does not take heed. The common diplomatic phrases "we will not stand (or sit) idly by" while state В does something, or state В "must bear complete responsibility for the conse­quences of its actions" are threats of this kind. They do not commit the threatener to specific actions, but indicate that state B's actions are perceived as dangerous and could lead to counteraction or reprisal. The vague threat avoids placing A in a position where it cannot maneuver. As Jervis points out, there is an inherent conflict between the desire to make a credible threat and the desire to preserve freedom of action.17

The problem with making threats in diplomatic negotiations is that even if they are reasonably credible, the other side might test them. In this case, the threatener has to act and perhaps damage his own interests or back down and earn the reputation of being a bluffer. In other words,Iff the threat is actually challenged, it has failed its purpose^ Between 1958 and 1962, the Soviet govern­ment threatened several times to~Jsign a peace treaty with East Germany, in effect, giving the Communist regime there control over Allied access routes to West Berlin. In each instance, the Russians gave the three Western allies a time limit to join the negotiations or otherwise be left out altogether. The Allies refused to act and, instead, built up their military capabilities in West Germany and West Berlin to signify that if the Soviet Union fulfilled its threat, the Allies would fight, if necessary, to keep the access routes open. Each time the Soviet government failed, as threatened, to sign a treaty with the East German regime, the credibility of its threats declined further.

A problem partly related to that of making threats credible is establishing a commitment to a bargaining position. Diplomatic negotiations normally start with all sides presenting their "maximum" demands, usually the positions they would like ideally to achieve in the negotiations. Since diplomats realize that initial positions are maximum positions, they must probe to find out how far their opponents are willing to pull back from them. During the negotiating process itself, they bargain over various proposals until some point of compro­mise has been reached. But where that point is located depends on the effective­ness of persuasion, presentation of data and arguments, threats and rewards, and also on the extent to which diplomats can convince others that they and their government are committed to certain points, principles, and values. If the opponents know or suspect that a government is not deeply committed to one of its proposals or bargaining positions, they will be inclined to demand extensive concessions, hoping to attain a point of compromise much more advan­tageous to themselves. Compromise, after all, does not require that the parties place the point of agreement exactly halfway between the initial positions. An

17 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 90.

182 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

important part of diplomatic negotiating strategy thus concerns the efforts of bargaining agents to show each other, as convincingly as possible, why a position cannot be compromised beyond a certain point.

One way is to argue that as much as the government or diplomatic delegation would like to make further concessions, it cannot do so for fear of alienating the public at home and jeopardizing the chances that any treaty or agreement would be approved by a legislative body. This is the ploy (often sincere, of course) that "public opinion" or parliamentary opinion is committed to certain positions, principles, or values, and that no agreement that compro­mises them could be concluded. In other words, diplomats try to create the impression that neither they nor their government has the authority to make concessions.18 Another way is to transform a dispute over a relatively concrete issue such as a piece of territory into a matter of principle. This strategy, some­times called "issue escalation," is also designed to illustrate commitment, for it is generally understood that concessions over principles are harder to make than concessions over trivia. Instead of treating the problem of access to West Berlin or defense of the offshore islands of Communist China and Formosa as narrow territorial issues, the United States chose to characterize them in terms of freedom versus communism. This has the effect of displaying commitment to the cause, and at the same time it enables the government to incite public enthusiasm for the principle, thus further displaying its commitment. Both citi­zens and allies can be rallied, whereas if the issue were characterized in legal or technical terminology, little public or international support could be gener­ated. When one side has firmly displayed a commitment to a position, it is in a better position to resist demands for concessions.

The problem with establishing commitments is that governments and diplomats decrease their bargaining flexibility and in effect cut off the possibility of backing down in case one side seriously presses its demands.19 If both sides remain committed—particularly, publicly committed—to fundamentally incom­patible positions of principle, then little room remains for effective bargaining. By attempting to establish commitment or credibility to a position, negotiators and their governments may create such inflexibility that the possibilities of reach­ing agreement are closed out.

Persuasion through argument and presentation of information, offering rewards, making threats, and establishing commitments are thus the major tech­niques employed in the process of diplomatic bargaining between nations. Some of the problems common to these techniques are listed above, but each bargain­ing situation is unique, and no one can predict with certainty which methods of inducement will work. We can only suggest the conditions under which they would be more likely to succeed. In addition to the basic strategies involving

"Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 28.

19 E.James Liebermann, "Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict," in International Conflict and Behavioral Science, ed. Roger Fisher (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 105.

183 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

threats, rewards, and commitments, a number of more specific techniques have been used recurrently by diplomats and need to be mentioned briefly.

One is to exploit the impatience of the opponents—particularly when they want an agreement quickly—and induce them to make concessions they might avoid were they content to engage in lengthy bargaining processes. The foremost ploys for exploiting impatience are haggling over minor details, intro­ducing new and unexpected topics for the agenda, and evading crucial points. Conversely, overall settlements may be reached more quickly by starting with quick agreements on small and minor issues where considerable consensus al­ready prevails, and subsequently exploiting this "momentum" to obtain conces­sions on important issues. A further technique is to offer large concessions at first, on the assumption that if you show your goodwill, the other side will feel compelled to reciprocate. This is a calculated gamble, for if the other side does not come through with important concessions, you are left with either having to maintain your initial concessions and continue making even more until some point of compromise is found, or retracting concessions, an action that, although frequently performed in disarmament negotiations, leaves you open to the charge of not negotiating "in good faith."

Finally, a government and its diplomats can threaten to increase its terms later on if the opponents do not take what is offered now. A familiar gambit by shopkeepers, this may be extremely effective if the opponent is, in terms of the specific issue under contention, much weaker. In the summer and fall of 1939, the Soviet government made territorial and other demands on Finland. When Finnish diplomats rejected most of the Soviet demands and pro­posals, Stalin and Molotov let it be known that once the Red Army had its say in the matter, the demands would increase. After the Soviet Union attacked Finland that winter and its armies made some headway against the Finns, Soviet demands did in fact grow stiffer, and the peace signed in March 1940 was consid­erably more disadvantageous to Finland than the original Soviet demands of 1939. The situation in wartime when one side is on the verge of defeat is also a propitious moment to employ this technique for inducing the opponent to agree to surrender or to armistice terms.

So far, the discussion might imply that all negotiations involve solely the statement of maximum positions which, after the employment of various tactics, are whittled down through compromises and concessions to some reason­ably equitable distribution of advantages between the bargaining parties. This is indeed a common pattern, but there are other possibilities. In a situation of extreme power asymmetry, one party may be in a position to make a virtual diktat. It offers its terms on a take-it or leave-it basis. Some compromises may be made on matters of details, but the basic pattern is one where the weaker party is compelled to give legal sanction to a capitulation. This form of negotia­tion was common in Hitler's treatment of weak or defeated opponents and was attempted initially by the North Vietnamese in the Paris negotiations. An-

184 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

other type of negotiation involves the search for a general formula or set of principles acceptable to both sides. There is little bargaining involved in the sense of using threats or rewards; rather, one or both parties (often a mediator) searches for alternative solutions which are presented for consideration as a package. Once a formula is accepted, then bargaining begins in order to fill out the details. This type of negotiation has been prominent in the formulation of the Camp David agreements and the subsequent Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979.20

 




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