And Making Overall Policies

The final important function of diplomats, aside from bargaining and negotia­tion, is to provide advice to those who formulate goals and plans of action and occasionally to make important policy decisions themselves. All diplomats serve in a sense as policy makers, because they provide a large portion of the information upon which policy is based. A principal contribution of diplomats in the policy-making process thus comes from their skill of interpretation and judgment about conditions in the country to which they are accredited. But even if diplomats are particularly useful in this capacity, it does not mean that their judgment will always be considered or that their advice or warnings will be heeded. Diplomats' influence in the formulation of a nation's goals will depend on a number of considerations. If they enjoy political prestige among the top policy experts at the home foreign office, if they have a reputation for reliability, initiative, and resourcefulness and refrain from attempting to sabotage official policy in its execution, they may be called upon frequently to make policy recom­mendations—their functions will include giving advice as well as providing infor­mation. They will probably not have any role in formulating the broad objectives of government policy abroad, but given those objectives, they may be asked to suggest the best ways to achieve them. On the other hand, if diplomats are new in their posts or careers, if they vigorously question official policy, and if their assessments are not reliable, it is unlikely that they will have much influence in policy formulation.

Beyond such general considerations, a number of conditions peculiar to modern diplomatic organizations diminish the influence of career diplomats in the policy-making process. One is the ease with which bureaucratic officials can combine policy making and diplomatic roles. Prior to World War I, the prevailing practice was for government officials to formulate external goals and strategies and then direct their diplomatic agents abroad to attempt to achieve them. With the modern means of travel at their disposal, foreign ministers can now visit foreign capitals and obtain their information firsthand; they can simi­larly become negotiators and perform the task of diplomatic bargaining as well as policy making. While they must still rely on ambassadors abroad for some information, there are few impediments, aside from the rush of business, that prevent foreign ministers from being policy makers, administrators, and negotia­tors simultaneously.

Another impediment to a significant role in policy making for diplomats is the limited environment within which they operate. Ambassadors generally develop considerable competence in handling bilateral relations between govern­ments, but it is more difficult for them to perceive these relations in the broader context of overall foreign policy. Although political officials at the highest level of government lack detailed knowledge of conditions abroad, they act upon a broad understanding of situations, of which bilateral relations are only a part.

172 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

What to the ambassador may seem a logical and desirable policy to pursue in the bilateral system may be the wrong policy in view of the total substance of a country's foreign policy. Moreover, foreign ministers and high political officials also view policy in terms of the domestic political environment and requirements. The definition of the situation that operates in foreign-policy decision making includes an important domestic sector that is not always understood by the diplomatic agent who has lived abroad for a long period.

The bureaucratic structure and organization of foreign offices hinders many reports and recommendations from ambassadors abroad from reaching those who make policy at the highest level. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, communications were slow, there were only approximately twenty states in the European system, and foreign contacts were limited to a few political or commercial affairs, so foreign ministers could keep abreast of all the activities of their diplomats. Today, most dispatches—including some potentially impor­tant ones—never get beyond the "desk officer" in the foreign ministry. High-level officials who formulate major policy decisions within the context of large organizations tend to become increasingly removed from the environment in which their diplomats operate. In a period of crisis between two countries, ambas­sadors may play a more significant role in recommending courses of action; but, even in this situation, they are merely experts whose advice may or may not be followed.

Finally, there are personal and social reasons that prevent diplomats in the field from initiating proposals on major policy decisions. Occasionally, diplomats are so afraid of being accused of lack of judgment by their superiors that they may prefer to avoid making any recommendations at all. Evading re­sponsibility in this way may not be solely their fault, since most bureaucratic organizations have established policies, persisting by the sanction of time and tradition, that can only be changed by those with the greatest political strength. Diplomats who challenge these traditions are in many cases likely to become suspect. High-level officials in organizations that hold strong commitments to certain policies tend to overlook or downgrade information provided by ambassa­dors that contradicts or questions the validity of these policies.

One example is provided in a detailed study of the crisis preceding the outbreak of World War I. In the summer of 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed the accurate warnings of Prince Lichnowsky, his ambassador in London, as utter nonsense coming from "that old goat." Prince Lichnowsky's reports, the study reveals, did not conform to the Kaiser's view that England would remain neutral if war broke out between the major antagonists of the crisis. On the other hand, the highly inaccurate reports of the German ambassador in St. Petersburg supported the Kaiser's expectations that the Tsar's government was bluffing in its announced policy of supporting Serbia and were thus accepted uncritically.⁸

⁸ Robert С North, "Fact and Value in the 1914 Crisis" (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration, 1961).

173 The Instruments of Policy: Diplomatic Bargaining

When diplomats are faced with circumstances wherein their advice is either rejected or ignored, it is little wonder that they judge their policy-making role to be insignificant. It is a fact, nevertheless, that most foreign offices suffer from rigid procedures and established policies that impel policy makers to down­grade "uncomfortable" information. As a former Secretary in the Australian Department of External Affairs has written:

The only facts and opinions regarded [in foreign offices] as relevant will be those which fall within the framework of broad government policy, and which are compatible with the basic assumptions on which government policy is con­ceived. There will be "reliable" sources, those which support government policy, and "suspect" sources, which have the unfriendly habit of producing facts which do not support government policy. Very important human factors, of course, creep into activities of this nature. The desire for promotion, the need not to offend by producing embarrassing facts, the reluctance to report from overseas events which would suggest policy was wrongly based, are all most relevant influences in the final formulation of national policy.⁹

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