THE EXERCISE OF INFLUENCE

One reason that gross quantities of resources cannot be equated with effective influence relates to the distinction between a state's overall capabilities and the relevance of resources to a particular diplomatic situation. A nuclear force, for example, is often thought to increase the diplomatic influence of those who possess it. No doubt nuclear weaponry is an important element in a state's general prestige abroad and may be an effective deterrent against a strategic attack on its homeland or "core" interests. Yet the most important aspect of a nuclear capability—or any military capability—is not its possession, but its relevance and the ability to signal one's determination to use it. Other govern­ments must know that the capability is not of mere symbolic significance. The , government of North Vietnam possessed a particular advantage over the United States (hence, influence) because it knew that in almost no circumstances would the American government use strategic nuclear weapons against its country. It therefore effectively broke through the significance of the American nuclear capability as far as the Vietnam War was concerned. A resource is useless unless it is both mobilized in support of foreign-policy objectives and made credible. Likewise, nuclear weapons would be irrelevant in negotiations on cultural ex­changes, just as the Arab countries' vast oil resources could not be effectively mobilized to influence the outcome of international negotiations on satellite communications. Influence is always specific to a particular issue, and resources must be relevant to that issue.

A second variable that determines the success or failure of acts of influ­ence is the extent to which there are needs between the two countries in any influence relationship. In general, a country that needs something from another ' is vulnerable to its acts of influence. This is the primary reason that states that are "weak" in many capabilities can nevertheless obtain concessions from "strong" countries. Consider the case of France and Germany and some of the "weak" states in the Middle East. Both European countries are highly depen­dent upon Arab lands for oil supplies. They have an important need, which only the Arab countries can satisfy at a reasonable cost. On the other hand, the Middle Eastern countries that control these oil resources may not be so dependent upon Germany and France, particularly if they can sell their oil easily elsewhere. Because, in this situation, needs are not equal on both sides, the -independent states (in terms of needs) can make demands (or resist demands made against them) on the dependent great powers and obtain important conces­sions. The German and French governments know that if they do not make these concessions or if they press their own demands too hard, the Arab states

152 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

can threaten to cut off oil supplies. Their dependence thus makes them vulnera­ble to the demands and influence acts of what would otherwise be considered "weak" states. To the Arab states, oil is much more important as a capability than military forces—at least in their relations with major powers. In the form of a general hypothesis, we can suggest that, regardless of the quantity, quality, and credibility of a state's capabilities, the more state В needs, or is dependent upon, state A, the more likely that state A's acts—threats, promises, rewards, or punishments—will succeed in changing or sustaining B's behavior.

A third variable that has assumed increasing importance in the past several decades, and one that can be considered an important resource, is level of technical expertise. An increasing number of issues on the international and foreign-policy agendas are highly technical in nature: law of the sea, satellite broadcasting, international monetary matters, and the like. Many of these issues are discussed in international fora, where leadership often depends more on knowledge of the technical issues than on other types of resources. Those govern­ments which come armed with technical studies, have a full command of the nature of the problem, and are prepared to put forth realistic solutions are more likely to wield influence than are governments which have only rudimentary knowledge of the problem and no scientific studies to back their national posi­tions. A number of recent case studies have demonstrated conclusively that the outcomes of negotiations on technical questions cannot be predicted from the gross power of the participants and that knowledge, among other factors, accounts for more than raw capabilities.⁷

Understanding the dynamics of power relationships at the international level would be relatively easy if resource relevance, credibility, need, and knowl­edge were the only variables involved. Unfortunately, political actions do not always conform to simple hypotheses, because human characteristics of pride, stubbornness, prestige, and friendship enter into all acts of influence as well. A government may be highly dependent upon some other state and still resist its demands; it may be willing to suffer all sorts of privations, and even physical destruction and loss of independence, simply for the sake of pride. The govern­ment of North Vietnam was willing to accept a very high level of destruction of lives and productive facilities by American bombers rather than make diplo­matic or military concessions to the United States.

Additional variables affecting the exercise of influence can be observed in the situation where two small states of approximately equal capabilities make similar demands upon a "major" power and neither of the small states is depen­dent upon the large—or vice versa. Which will achieve its objectives? Will both exercise influence equally? Hypothetically, suppose that the ambassadors of Nor­way and Albania go to the British Foreign Office on the same day and ask the

⁷ See, for example, the case studies in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). See also David Baldwin's strong emphasis on the relevance of resources to particular situations in "Power Analysis and World Politics," World Politics, 31 (January 1979), 161-94.

153 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

British government to lower tariffs on bicycles, a product that the two countries would like to export to England. Assume that the quality and price of the bicycles are approximately the same and that the British government does not wish to allow too many imports for fear of damaging the domestic bicycle industry. Assume further that both the Norwegian and Albanian ambassadors offer roughly equal concessions if the British will lower their tariffs on bicycles. Both claim they will lower their own tariffs on English automobiles. Which ambassador is most likely to succeed—that is, to achieve his government's objectives? Chances are that the British government would favor the request of the Norwegian ambas­sador and turn down the representation by the diplomat from Tirana. The explanation of this decision can probably not be found in the resources of either of the small countries (both offered approximately equal rewards) or in need, since in this hypothetical situation Britain needs neither of the small countries' automobile markets. Norway would get the favorable decision because British policy makers are more responsive to Norwegian interests than to those of Albania. Albania represents a Communist state whose government normally displays through its diplomacy and propaganda strong hostility toward England.

After relevant resources, need, and knowledge, the fourth variable that determines the effectiveness of acts of influence is thus the ephemeral quality of responsiveness.⁸ Responsiveness can be seen as a disposition to receive anoth­er's requests with sympathy, even to the point where a government is willing to sacrifice some of its own values and interests in order to fulfill those requests; responsiveness is the willingness to be influenced. In one study, it was shown that members of the State Department in the United States may take considerable pains to promote the requests and interests of other governments among their superiors and in other government agencies, provided that the requesting gov­ernment feels that the issue is important or that the need must be fulfilled.⁹ In our hypothetical case, if the quality of responsiveness is present in the case of the Norwegian request, members of the British Foreign Office would probably work for the Norwegians and try to persuade other government agencies con­cerned with trade and commerce to agree to a lowering of the tariff on bicycles. In the British reaction to the Albanian request, it is not likely that the government would display much responsiveness. Suspicion, traditional animosities, lack of trust, and years of unfavorable diplomatic experience would probably prevent the development of much British sympathy for Albania's needs or interests. Although Albania and Norway made similar requests and similar counteroffers, the lack of responsiveness on the part of the British officials toward Albania's government and its policies would probably account for their rejection of the

⁸ The concept of responsiveness is introduced by Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); developed by Dean G. Pruitt, "National Power and International Responsiveness," Background, 7 (1964), 165-78. See also Dean G. Pruitt, "Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action," in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 393-432.

⁹ Pruitt, "National Power," 175-76.

154 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

Albanian request. When the other variables, such as resources or need, are held constant or made equal, the degree of responsiveness will determine the success or failure of acts taken to influence other states' behavior.

If effective influence cannot be deduced solely from the quantity and quality of physical capabilities, how do we proceed to measure influence? If we want to assess a situation that has already occurred, the easiest way to measure - influence is to study the responses of those in the influence relationship.¹⁰ If A i. can get В to do X, but С cannot get В to do the same thing, then in that particular issue, A has more influence. If В does X despite the protestations of A, then we can assume that A, in this circumstance, did not enjoy much influence over B. It is meaningless to argue that the Soviet Union is more power­ful than the United States unless we cite how, for what purposes, and in relation to whom the Soviet Union and the United States are exerting influence.

Predicting influence in a future situation, however, is more difficult. Since such factors as pride, traditional friendships and enmities, personality character­istics of policy makers, and unique circumstances cannot be measured, our task would be to assign values, however crudely, to only three of the variables dis­cussed above: capability (composed of the relevance and degree of mobilization of resources); extent of needs or dependence; and extent of responsiveness. Below are some examples of how such an exercise might be conducted. Keep in mind, however, that the values on the scales are rough, subjective guesses, and that effective prediction of the probable outcome of any influence relationship would require precise indicators and measures of the variables. Let us outline, then, a situation where one government (A) is attempting to influence the actions, images, and decisions of another government (B). Each of the three variables is measured on a scale from 0 to 10. Our crude formula will be:

One illustration might be the case where Canada attempts to arrange some preferential trade agreement with the Common Market. The resources mobilized by Ottawa are (1) a guaranteed supply of fuels—especially uranium— to the European countries, (2) offers of special considerations or tax write-offs for Europeans who wish to make direct investments in Canada, and (3) the skills, knowledge, and documentation of Canadian negotiators. We would assign a value of six to the first variable. On the question of need, the Europeans, having faced the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, are very sensitive to obtaining alternative and secure sources of supply. Thus, we would assign a value of seven to the second variable. Finally, although Canadian-European ties have not been extensive, responsiveness is reasonably high; we will assign a value of six to this variable. The sum of the three variables, then, is nineteen out of

¹⁰ Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power,"Behavioral Science, 2 (1957), 201-15.

155 Foreign-Policy Actions: Power, Capability, and Influence

a possible thirty, indicating that there is about a 63 percent probability that Canada's objective will be achieved.

One final variable involving costs and commitments should be identified; it was omitted from the example because it is virtually impossible to measure. Success in the wielding of influence seems to be related also to the extent to which the objectives of the states are compatible or the degree of commitment each government has toward those objectives. If I am strongly committed to attending a poker game Friday night and you ask me to go to a football game, no matter what sorts of arguments you make, I will not go. The costs of breaking the commitment—displeasure of friends and possible dismissal from the poker group—would far outweigh the possible advantages of seeing a ball game. But where no significant costs are associated with not going to the poker game— perhaps there are already too many players—then I might well be persuaded to see some football instead. My interests are not well defined, I have no firm commitment to one course of action; hence, I will be more open to persuasion, provided that you have relevant resources (your offer to pay my way) and I recognize that you would rather not go to the game by yourself.

Thus, there is also an element of probability in predicting the outcome of influence acts and in measuring the degree of influence actors have over each other. It would be incorrect to infer that since A gets В to do X, A has much power, because it might not make much difference to В whether or not it does X. Or, in the case of nuclear deterrence, it doesn't make much sense to argue that the United States has much power over the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union has not attacked North America. The point is that such an attack has extremely low probability in any event; power could be inferred only if we knew the Soviet Union had strong intentions of launching an attack but was dissuaded by threats of American retaliation.

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