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Submission or Deterrence



The criterion used to distinguish submission or deterrence from conquest is whether or not a threat to employ force is implemented. In submission or deter­rence, one side withdraws from a previously held value, position, or interest because the opponent makes effective threats to "push" him out by the use of force (in a voluntary withdrawal, of course, no such threats are made). Even though no violence may occur, we will consider any submission resulting from military threats a nonpeaceful mode of conflict resolution. One of the parties accomplishes deterrence or forced submission (deterrence if the initiator of change in the status quo is forced to withdraw the offensive demand, submission

19 Ibid., p. 398.

20 Lewis A. Coser, "The Termination of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (1961), 349.

21 Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958).

411The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

if the initiator of new demands accomplishes them at the expense of the status quo) by demonstrating to another party that the probable risk of pursuing its actions or maintaining its position outweighs the costs of retreating and with­drawing. For instance, most observers believe that the Allied military buildup in Berlin and West Germany in 1961 forced the Soviet government to withdraw its plan to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The Russians appar­ently concluded that the risks of nuclear war were not worth the possible gain in East German prestige resulting from a peace treaty.

Compromise

Award

The fourth outcome of an international conflict or crisis is some compromise in which both sides agree to a partial withdrawal of their initial objectives, posi­tions, demands, or actions.22 The withdrawal need not be of the same magnitude to both parties (symmetrical). Any settlement that entails some sacrifice of initial position by both sides can be considered a compromise, even if one side seems to get the better of the bargain.

The main problem in arranging a compromise settlement is to get both sides to realize that the price of continued conflict is higher than the costs and consequences of reducing demands or withdrawing from a diplomatic or military position. An important prerequisite for achieving a compromise thus may be a military stalemate, a condition wherein both parties have neither the resources nor the will to conquer or force submission of the opponent.23 Unfortu­nately, many governments do not raise international issues to compromise them and are convinced at the beginning that no goal short of total "victory" is consistent with national honor, some ideological principle, or "sacred trust." Stalemate may thus come only after a protracted and tragic military encounter, as in Korea and Vietnam. In each case, neither side was willing to discuss a settlement seriously until a military stalemate had developed. As long as any party believed it could achieve its objectives, even if slightly altered because of strong resistance, settlement was not likely. The anticipation of possible victory is thus a serious impediment to compromise, as are suspicion and distrust, the constriction of communication, and "issue escalation."

A complicated outcome based on a previous compromise is the award, wherein the opponents agree to a settlement achieved through nonbargaining proce­dures. An award is any binding decision effected by an independent third party (such as a court) or criterion (such as majority rule), which sets out the substantive terms of settlement. Most conflicts are not, of course, resolved through awards, because procedurally they involve a surrender of bargaining and require a will-

22 Boulding, Conflict and Defense, pp. 309-10.

23 George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. James N. Rosenau (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 141—43.

412The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

ingness to resolve the issue on the basis of some impartial criterion, such as law, under which there can be only a winner and a loser. If one side has only a weak chance of gaining a favorable decision, it is not likely to accept such a criterion, especially when it sees a possibility of obtaining more favorable terms through a bargained compromise. On the other hand, if a stalemate develops in a conflict and if both sides trust the third party and expect a fair award, they may be induced to accept the impartial determination of certain issues by means of formal judicial proceedings.

An award settlement need not, however, be made through litigation. As long as some external and impartial criterion for settlement is accepted by both sides, the outcome may be termed an award, even though it is administered by a nonjudicial institution. A plebiscite to determine the allocation of contested territory and population is an impartial device used occasionally to settle both international disputes and conflicts.

Passive Settlement

Often, international conflicts have no formal outcome (deterrence, avoidance, compromise, conquest, or award), but persist for a long period until the parties implicitly accept a new status quo as partially legitimate. Quincy Wright has suggested that most international conflicts are resolved by becoming obsolete.24 That is, both sides learn to live with a situation over a period of time, even though their formal positions are imcompatible. The involved governments have quietly reduced commitments to their respective objectives to the point where no overt military actions are deemed worth the cost. It is almost im­possible, however, to determine when a conflict reaches obsolescence. Some of the postwar territorial conflicts in which the Soviet Union and the United States have had a stake—Korean reunification, German reunification, the Ber­lin wall, and the like—have been shelved, if not resolved, through the slow acceptance of new positions rather than through formal agreements or settle­ments. These outcomes may never be very secure, of course, but since many re­cent conflicts have been handled in this fashion, it suggests that sometimes the least violent method of settlement is the one in which both sides learn to live with their common problem until neither is tempted to impose a solution by force.

Any conflict will culminate in one of these six outcomes. Some, such as compromise and awards, are usually achieved through negotiations, mediation or adjudication, and formal agreements, whereas others, such as avoidance and passive settlement, result from unilateral self-abnegation or bilateral nonaction. The latter do not require formal negotiations or treaties, yet they are just as much a way of settling conflicts and crises as are surrenders or formal agreements. Looking at the 94 conflicts of our study, what has been the incidence of these six types of outcome?

24 Wright, A Study of War, pp. 1256-57.

THE OUTCOMES

 




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