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OF FOREIGN-POLICY OUTPUTS



Ethics and moral principles can be related to all four types of foreign-policy outputs discussed previously. Foreign-policy orientations may reflect not only "hard-headed" responses to conditions in the environment, but also general cultural values or norms that suggest what, in the long run, is ethically good. The orientation of nonalignment, for instance, can be explained only partly by the structure of the system, domestic needs, and the fear of involvement in great power conflicts. It also reflects a widespread contemporary attitude in many developing countries and elsewhere that it is immoral to make military alliances or to become involved with the more unsavory aspects of cold-war politics. Governments whose orientations involve coalition making have similarly justified their policies on moral arguments, or on a combination of practical considerations, historical analogies, and moral judgments. The orientation of collective security through alliances rests in part on analogies drawn from the history of the 1930s (the best way to avoid war is to build overwhelming coalitions against those that are tempted to commit aggression), on common perceptions of threat, and on certain ethical views. Some of the last are that powers have a responsibility to protect weaker states faced with external threats; that commit­ments, if freely entered into, must be kept even if it is to one's disadvantage; and that world peace demands that aggression be punished. Indeed, consider­ations of expediency or narrow self-interest could easily lead foreign-policy offi­cials to argue the reverse of these views: The best way to avoid war is to mind one's own business; big powers have no responsibilities toward weaker states faced with external threats; commitments should never be kept except when it is clearly in one's own advantage to meet them.

Ethical norms are also revealed in the reasoning behind, and justification of, certain national roles and functions. From the Leninist point of view, fraternal states and parties have a duty to assist each other economically and in defense matters. The regional-defender role conception reflects the view that the Soviet Union, because of its overwhelming military capabilities, has a special responsibil­ity to help "protect" the weaker members of the bloc. The advantage accrues not only to the Soviet Union, but to the bloc as a whole. The role conception of "bastion of the revolution" expresses the moral imperative that the nation

«Arnold Wolfers. "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," World Politics, 1 (1949), 178-80.

 

389 Ethics in Explanations of Foreign Policy

should make sacrifices to promote and support revolutionary movements abroad even if doing so is not to its immediate advantage. The role of faithful ally similarly reflects the normative judgment that a government should support the foreign policies of its allies, not just for its own protection, but also for the good of the whole alliance. The developer role is usually spelled out in terms that reflect moral considerations: the developed states have a duty to assist those whose economic needs are greater than their own.

It should be emphasized again that orientations and national roles cannot be explained only in ethical terms. We have already seen in Chapter 12 that foreign-policy outputs can be linked to a variety of personal, societal, and sys­temic attributes and conditions. But ethical norms and moral judgments are relevant to any explanation. They enter into the making of policy through the explicit or implicit views of policy makers, the demands and expectations of attentive publics, and occasionally in the expectations of other governments or populations.

Virtually any government's main foreign-policy objectives are cast in moral terms and justified with ethical rhetoric. "Detente," "defense of the social­ist commonwealth," "Arab unity," "the liberation of Palestine," and like objec­tives all reflect governments' commitments to a future state of affairs that they perceive as more just or desirable than the present. Indeed, on major commercial issues, where it is difficult to clothe greed or self-interest in moral rhetoric, governments often appear uncomfortable; they cannot easily buttress their case on the grounds that it is inherently right, just, or good. Yet, even on such "hard" issues, elements of justice (as distinct from morality, though the two are related) do appear. Justice refers to some "fair" distribution of spoils— whether territory, people, profits, or trade balances. The vast majority of conflicts over these issues are settled according to some formula incorporating an explicit or implicit standard of justice. Seldom is there one party which gains all and the other which loses all. For the same reasons that governments normally ob­serve legal constraints in their foreign-policy actions, they similarly like to appear "fair" in their dealings with others. Yet, there are also problems with justice when one government's objectives—particularly long-range objectives—are por­trayed as serving not only national interests, but universal justice and the interests of humanity as well. Lord Wolseley once maintained:

I have but one great object in this world, and that is to maintain the greatness of the British Empire. But apart from my John Bull sentiment on this point, I firmly believe that in doing so I work in the cause of Christianity, of peace, of civilization, and the happiness of the human race generally.7

To the United States, a world of free, independent states, regulating their rela­tions according to law, is eminently just and ethical. A Communist views this

7 Quoted in Kenneth W. Thompson,Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 151.

390 Ethics in Explanations of Foreign Policy

order as representative of American world domination, slavery under capitalism, and an international law that perpetuates inequalities between states and eco­nomic exploitation of developing countries by imperialists. Observed in this light, the goals hardly seem just and ethical. Whether or not these goals are ethical depends very much from which position they are being viewed.

Rules, which today are contained under such slogans as "free trade," "noninterference in internal affairs," "self-determination," "observance of treaty obligations," or "pacific settlement of disputes" relate not to goals but to the actions governments take to influence the behavior of other states. They establish the distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate means of utilizing a state's capabilities. Thus, it is in this realm of how states pursue their objectives that ethics might seem most immediately relevant to foreign policy. Since there may still be obvious advantages to following these rules, self-interest and ethics coin­cide.

However, most problems that confront the policy maker daily do not appear to him as moral problems. They are practical problems that demand practical responses and actions.8 Some people claim, for example, that it is immoral for a democratic government to maintain an alliance with a regime that practices certain domestic policies not in accordance with democratic princi­ples. But the policy maker is primarily concerned with a security problem or a more general problem of peace, not with the characteristics of foreign political systems. The policy maker would argue that the alliance partner's internal affairs are irrelevant to the alliance relationship, just as he or she does not pass judgment on a grocer's private life before being willing to buy food. The grocer's morals are largely irrelevant to the selling and purchasing relationship.9

Is a decision to make an alliance with a dictator really devoid of ethical content? Is this really expediency forsaking principle? It is difficult to predict the costs of not making the alliance, but if by not making the alliance, war is the result, who is right in arguing that alliances with dictators are immoral? And, in any case, the policy maker could, instead of forming an alliance, order the invasion and occupation of the dictator's country, thereby creating a more effective deterrent. This would be perhaps a more practical course of action, but the policy maker's values would probably preclude even consideration of such an alternative. Any choice of policy alternatives involves selection among ethical standards and values. There is no such thing as a pure realist, if bv that term we mean one who sacrifices all values for the quickest gratification of his self-interest. In most diplomatic situations, ethical restraints are not very conspicuous, in the sense that policy is deduced from moral maxims; but they can be observed in the policies that were not adopted and in the general manner, whether courteous, respectful, and honest or brusque and deceitful, in which actions were carried out with other involved countries.

8 Halle. Diplomacy in a Changing World, pp. 28-29.

9 Ibid.

391 Ethics in Explanations of Foreign Policy

In these examples we can see the extent to which both moralists and realists oversimplify. The moralists fail to observe the necessities imposed on the policy maker by conditions abroad over which he or she has no control; they also neglect the possibility that strict observance of rules and commitments might lead to catastrophic consequences. And they fail to realize that policy makers are often cast into a situation where all the alternatives are equally un­pleasant. The realists, who say the policy makers' behavior is, or should be, dictated only by "reasons of state," also fail to observe the role of ethical limita­tions in ruling out what may be more expedient alternatives. Moreover, in focus­ing on behavior in crisis situations, the realists fail to acknowledge thousands of transactions between states in which diplomatic positions conform rigidly to the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. If in some situations, all possible courses of action are ethically reprehensible, in many others, self-interest and ethical behavior are highly compatible.

In situations where a state's objectives, interests, and values are threat­ened or frustrated, high-sounding platitudes and general principles do not often serve as realistic guides to action. No foreign policy is conducted exclusively by deducing actions from vague moral principles. Leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Woodrow Wilson, who stressed the importance of observing legal and ethical standards of conduct in international relations, did not behave in practical situa­tions very differently from other political leaders who claimed to be "realists." It is, for example, easy for a government to forswear the use and threat of force in its relations with other states. No government admits that it is anything but "peace-loving." But what if that government is subsequently threatened by a neighbor when the international organization is paralyzed because of a veto and little diplomatic support elsewhere can be obtained? Does the general principle of not using threats or force suggest any practical policy in this situa­tion? From the point of view of the observer-moralist, is it ethically more correct to remain faithful to principle and endure certain invasion than to try to create an effective defense with which to deter the perceived enemy? Or suppose that a government had in its policy statements solemnly declared its faith in the principles of international law but found later that a treaty to which it was a partner imposed not only heavy, but clearly unjust, burdens and that the other signatory was unwilling to adjust the treaty through negotiations. When justice and the principle of treaty observation conflict, which is the correct course of

і action? Is public declaration in support of the "rule of law" a meaningful guide

у by which to formulate policy in this situation?

у Despite their rhetoric, policy makers have to choose constantly among

courses of action that represent conflicting values and often feel compelled to accept not the "best" solution, but the one that requires the least sacrifice of direct interests and values. When governments are not deeply involved in a critical situation, they can afford to proclaim fidelity to ultimate purposes and commonly recognized rules; but when they are in the middle of conflict, vague principles such as those in the United Nations Charter may not help very much.

392 Ethics in Explanations of Foreign Policy

The appeasement strategy of England in the 1930s is a good example of the kinds of conflicting principles and values with which policy makers have to struggle. In this case, British government leaders believed that peace and the principles of conduct in the Covenant of the League of Nations had to be observed. They also believed that reasonable negotiations with the Nazi regime could avert the holocausts experienced during World War I. Prime Minister Chamberlain was a man of great rectitude, and he personally abhorred organized violence. His principles and intentions were above reproach. By surrendering one position after the other through diplomatic negotiations, he was able to keep peace for two years; but, in the process, he and his colleagues sacrificed the independence of Austria, Danzig, and Czechoslovakia. Was two years of "peace" and strict adherence to the League Covenant worth this price? The principles the British observed were commendable, but they did not help to create any effective policies for the Nazi threat.

Policy makers thus confront difficult choices, and absolute fidelity to treaty obligations and other standards of diplomatic behavior may require sacri­fices that few people would willingly condone. Fortunately, in most cases, the pursuit of interests and values does not conflict so obviously with the principles a government declares as guides to its external behavior.

ETHICS AS A FUNCTION

 




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