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ISSUE FIELDS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT



Still another study has focused on the question of the types of issues which have led to confrontations and wars.6 In some cases, the conflicts involved so many incompatible objectives that it was impossible to classify any as being of prime importance. The sample of ninety-four conflicts comes from the period 1919 to 1980, of which thirty-eight occurred in the interwar period and fifty-six since 1945. Of these, eighty-seven could be classified as to the major, although not sole, issue field in which incompatible positions led the parties to adopt threats, coercion, and frequently violence. Looking over these conflicts, six major types of state objectives or sources of conflict can be identified.

1. Limited territorial conflicts, where there are incompatible positions with reference to possession of a specific piece of territory or to rights enjoyed by one state in or near the territory of another. The attempt to obtain more secure frontiers, such as Israel's conquest of the Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula in 1967, is fairly common. The issue of sovereignty over ethnic minorities is often related

5 Istvan Kende, "Twenty-Five Years of Local War," Journal of Peace Research, No. 1 (1971), 5-22.

g 6 KJ. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behavior and Some Fig-

ures on Procedures," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (1966), 272-96; in addition to those cases listed in Appendices A and В of that article, the following conflicts since 1965 have been included: Algeria-Morocco (1958-1970), Morocco-Mauritania (1958-1970), Somalia-Kenya (1960-1969), Arab-Israel (1967), Soviet Union-Czechoslovakia (1968), United States-North Vietnam (1965-1973), India-Pakistan (1971), North Vietnam-South Vietnam (1954-1975), Turkey-Cyprus (1974), Indone­sia-East Timor (1975), Vietnam-Cambodia (1977), Uganda-Tanzania (1978), Somalia-Ethiopia (1978), Tanzania-Uganda (1979), China-Vietnam (1979), North Yemen-South Yemen (1979), Iraq-Iran (1980).

404The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

6.

to the claim by one state to control territory held by another and, therefore, will also be classified under the limited territorial conflict. Recent examples include a limited Ugandan invasion of Tanzania in 1978 to fulfill a territorial claim; Somalia's 1978 "war of liberation" in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, claimed on historical grounds and on the fact that the region was populated by ethnic Somalis; and the Iraqi attack on Iran in 1980, with the objective of establishing full Iraqi authority over the commercially and strategically important Shatt-al-Arab waterway dividing the two countries.

Conflicts concerned primarily with the composition of a government. These types of conflict often contain strong ideological overtones; the purpose is to topple one regime and install in its place a government more favorably disposed to the interests of the intervening party. Examples would include the American efforts to "desta­bilize" the socialist Allende regime in Chile, 1970-1973 (not included in the list of cases); the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to restore to authority the orthodox communists who had been replaced by the socialist reformers led by Alexander Dubcek; and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979 to drive out Idi Amin, whose tyrannical regime had been denounced throughout the world as genocidal.

National honor conflicts, in which governments undertake military threats or actions to vindicate some alleged wrongdoing. States may escalate some relatively minor incident into a full-scale crisis. The Greek invasion of Bulgaria in 1925, arising out of a border incident involving the killing of two Greek frontier guards, is one example. China's "punishment" of Vietnam through limited military opera­tions in 1979 is another.

Regional imperialism, in which one government seeks to destroy the independence of another state, usually for a combination of ideological, security, and commeri-cial purposes. Nazi Germany's incorporation of Austria in 1938 would be placed in this category.

Liberation conflicts, or revolutionary wars fought by one state to "liberate" the people of another state, usually for ethnic or ideological reasons. Conflicts arising from a government's objective of unifying a divided country. Vietnam is a prominent example.

Table 15-1 shows that incompatible positions in the fields of territorial jurisdiction, rights on territory, and control over ethnic minorities are a major source of international conflict. Ideological confrontations between the great

Table 15-1Types of Issue Fields as Sources of International Conflict, 1919-1980

  NUMBER OF CONFLICTS, NUMBER OF CONFLICTS,  
ISSUE FIELD 1919-1939 1945-1980 TOTAL
Limited territorial
Government composition
National honor
Regional imperialism
Liberation conflicts
National unification
Not classified
Total

405 The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

powers concerning the composition of governments in small states were a hall­mark of the cold war, as were the conflicts over German, Korean, and Vietnamese reunification. On the other hand, the blatant, unlimited imperialism typical of the foreign policies of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan during the 1930s is not to be found in the cold war period, or since.

ATTITUDES

We can say little regarding the unique configuration of attitudes that underlay the action taken in each of these international conflicts. Our comments will refer, therefore, primarily to the general conclusions that can be drawn from the diplomatic-historical literature on crisis behavior, as well as the studies of social scientists who have concerned themselves with foreign-policy decision making in conditions of great stress. These studies show that certain attitudes and psychological predispositions typically surround any serious conflict or crisis. These frames of mind help to explain the propensity to use violence in attempts to achieve or defend collective objectives. The following are some of the most typical attitudes; in each case, we can illustrate how the attitude affects the decisions policy makers ultimately take in a crisis.

1. Suspicion is directed toward the opponent, his intentions, and the motives under­lying his actions. Intentions and actions of friendly states not in conflict are largely predictable. In a conflict or crisis, however, a sudden change in relation­ships is likely,7 as well as a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability— as indicated by the great lengths hostile governments will go to engage in espio­nage against each other, and to deduce intentions from capabilities ("Why should he have such large military forces if he doesn't plan to use them against us?"). Suspicion colors (usually pessimistically) speculation as to the other side's inten­tions. Peace gestures, for example, will probably be rejected as a trick.

2. Issue escalation* is another attitude common to policy makers operating in a crisis or conflict. They tend to attach symbolic importance to interests that, from a commercial or strategic point of view, are not worth very much. Control of a small and insignificant piece of territory may be defined by policy makers as crucial to national honor or symbolic of a state's willingness to resist the enemy's "aggression." As issues in a conflict or crisis become encrusted with ideological or symbolic importance, compromise may become more difficult, because gov­ernment officials and publics will regard any withdrawal from a symbolic position as a sacrifice of some great principle.

3. A feeling of urgency surrounds the policy makers, at least during the crisis stage of an international conflict. They commonly feel that only a little time is available for making critical decisions and correspondingly believe that unless decisions

7 Dean G. Pruitt, "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13 (1969), 18-38.

8 E.James Lieberman, "Threat and Assurance in the Conduct of Conflict," in International Conflict and Behavioral Science, ed. Roger Fisher (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 105.

406 The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

and actions are taken rapidly, disastrous consequences, ensuing from the enemy's hostile actions, may result.9

4. Under the feeling of urgency and the uncertainties surrounding the enemy's motives and actions, policy makers perceive fewer alternative courses of action open to themselves than to the enemy. In the typical crisis situation, a government will announce that it has "no choice" but to respond by some military means, yet asserts that it is in the hands of the enemy to decide whether peace or war will result.10 One's own options appear to be closed, while it is perceived that those of the enemy remain open.

5. Policy makers perceive the crisis, if not all conflicts, as a turning point in the relationship between the parties and sometimes in the history of the world.11 A corollary is the common opinion that a war will somehow "solve" the problems between the conflicting parties.

6. In a crisis, perceptions of threat are more salient than perceptions of the opponent's relative capabilities.12 The practical consequence of this common response is that if a government perceives great threat to a fundamental value, it will be willing to resist with armed force even though the odds of staving off the enemy's military actions are perceived as very slight.

ACTIONS

Various research projects have demonstrated that the presence of these and other attitudes—hostility, lack of trust, and nationalism—are directly linked to the propensity of people to overreact to provocations.13 The studies help to explain why armed force is frequently the action that is ultimately taken in crisis, although other action may precede the use of force. In the early stages of conflict or crisis, protest, rejections, denials, accusations, demands, warnings, threats, and symbolic actions are likely to occur, whereas formal negotiation is more likely

9 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: Norton, 1969); Charles F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy Making: A Simulation of International Politics (China Lake, Calif.: Project Michelson Report, U.S. Naval Ordinance Test Station, April 1965), p. 29; Ole R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case," American Political Science Review, 59 (1965), 370.

10 Karl W. Deutsch, "Mass Communication and the Loss of Freedom in National Decision-Making: A Possible Research Approach to Interstate Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1 (1957), 200-11; Holsti, "The 1914 Case," pp. 365-78; James A. Robinson, Charles F. Hermann, and Marga­ret C. Hermann, "Search under Crisis in Political Gaming and Simulation," in Theory and Research on the Causes of War, eds. Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

11 Oran R. Young, The Intermediaries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 18.

12 Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1961).

13 Pruitt, "Stability and Sudden Change," p. 32. In a study of thirty-two crises, Michael Haas found that warning signs of impending crises are seldom decoded properly by the future opponents. Inability to interpret "signs" may be related also to overreactions. See Michael Haas, "Communication Factors in Decision-Making," Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 12 (1969), 65-86. For a good case study, see Charles Lockhart, The Efficacy of Threats in International Interaction Strategies, (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, #02-023, 1973).

The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

in the settlement stage of the conflict or crisis.14 Some common forms of action include:

1. Protest notes

2. Denials and accusations

3. Calling ambassadors home for "consultations"

4. Withdrawal of ambassador assigned to the opponent's capital

5. Threat of "serious consequences" if certain actions by the opponent do not cease

6. Threat of limited or total economic boycott or embargo

7. Extensive official denunciation of the opponent; propaganda at home and abroad

8. Application of limited or total economic boycott or embargo

9. Formal break in diplomatic relations.

10. Exemplary nonviolent military actions—alerts, cancelling leaves, partial or full mobilization

11. Harassment or closing of travel and communication between the antagonists' citizens.

12. Formal blockades

13. Exemplary limited use of force; reprisals

14. War—of which there may be a great variety according to the nature of the objectives, level of force, geographic scope, and so forth

Note that a conflict or crisis may involve any of these actions and that many may be taken simultaneously. Also, it should not be assumed that all conflicts and crises necessarily "escalate" from one step to the next; policy makers may decide to go from denunciation and warnings to use of military force rather than proceed step by step to war. Notice also that many of the actions in the list involve symbolic communication. A decision to call home an ambassador for consultation commonly indicates a government's serious con­cern with a situation or constitutes a limited form of reprisal. A partial mobiliza­tion involves more than just effecting some military plan; its main purpose may be to impress the opponent with one's own resolve to fight.

The propensity to use symbolic actions as means of communication results from another characteristic of crisis behavior: As the level of threat and hostility rises, there is a tendency to reduce formal diplomatic communication.15 The "mildest" step or action in the crisis, such as withdrawing an ambassador, makes official communication more difficult. One would suppose that explicit communication by authoritative sources is most vital precisely when suspicion, mistrust, and sense of urgency are at their highest.

A review of conflicts and crises reveals a common sequence of actions

"Charles A. McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963," in Quantitative International Politics, ed. J. David Singer (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 159-86.

15 Holsti, "The 1914 Case"; and Paul Smoker, "Sino-Indian Relations: A Study of Trade, Communication and Defense," Journal of Peace Research, 2 (1964), 65-76.

408 The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

and counteractions that may end in the use of force. One government (the "offensive" party) presents demands or takes actions to change the status quo or its position in an issue field. In almost all cases, it makes its position on some principle of justice. The present situation, in other words, is regarded as violating some standard of justice, whether ethnic unity, "historical rights," rule by a repressive and corrupt government, or the like.16 The "defensive" party communicates to the initiator that these actions or demands are a violation of a treaty or are a threat to its security or "vital interests." The offensive party responds by claiming that its actions or demands are fully justified accord­ing to various historical, legal, moral, or ideological criteria and that it has no intention of withdrawing from them, although it is certainly willing to negotiate. The defensive party thereupon begins to consider various responses to protect its interests, to block (deter) the fulfillment of the offensive state's demands, or to repel the latter's actions if they have already been taken. Moreover, the defensive party usually refuses to negotiate until the initiator has first withdrawn its demands or physical presence from the field or area under contention. The offensive government, however, is publicly committed to its demands or course of action and refuses to withdraw, although it still offers to negotiate. At this point, the defensive party, after indulging in the usual protests and denuncia­tions, begins to take various reprisals and symbolic actions by withdrawing diplo­mats or ordering mobilizations. If these actions have no effect—and they usually don't—the crisis stage may follow; the decision then has to be made whether to reply with force or to seek some avenue of peaceful settlement.17

The Berlin study provides some clues about the incidence of various levels of coercion and violence in international conflict. It classified all 638 conflicts according to the highest level of threat, coercion, or force used in each. The possibilities were (1) verbal threat to use force; (2) demonstrations of force (e.g., alerts, mobilizations); (3) use of force with no casualties (e.g., blockades); (4) use of force involving fewer than 1,000 fatalities; and (5) war, involving more than 1,000 fatalities. Only 4 percent of the confrontations ended at the level of verbal threats; 22 percent ended with the parties involved in displays of force; 27 percent involved forms of nonviolent coercion such as blockades and commercial embargoes and boycotts; and 31 percent reached the level of force, but with relatively few fatalities. The remainder, 16 percent, resulted in war.

What are the probabilities of conflicts escalating all the way to violence involving large losses of life? Again categorizing by types of states—major powers and minor powers—some interesting differences emerge. Data for the 76-year period indicate that slightly fewer than one in five great power confrontations, including conflicts pitting great powers against minor states, ended in war. How-

16 See F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 1971), Chap. 4.

17 For full elaboration of bargaining strategies in crisis situations, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). For theory and case studies, see Michael Brecher, ed., "Studies in Crisis Behavior," special issue of The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978).

409The Interaction of States: Conflict and Conflict Resolution

ever, the probability of war as the outcome of a major power conflict since 1945 has declined to one out of seven. The explanation for the decline is no doubt complicated, but one can speculate that the possession of nuclear weapons has dramatically increased the cost of a crisis getting out of hand; policy makers have become somewhat more prudent as a result. A second argument could be that international norms against the use of force are becoming increasingly secure as effective "rules of the game" restraining brash action. The very high cost of waging warfare—where materiel costing hundreds of millions of dollars can be destroyed in a single battle—could be another factor. In the case of minor powers, the probabilities of a confrontation ending in war are even lower— about one in sixteen during this century. We can conclude, then, that overall the incidence of international conflict is increasing, in large part because of the dramatic increase in the number of states in the system, but that the probabil­ity of these conflicts escalating to the point of war appears to be diminishing. This may not be much consolation, but the figures suggest that governments are often reasonably prudent and that various conflict-resolving mechanisms, such as those offered by the United Nations, may have an important role to play in helping to prevent conflicts from breaking out in war. We now turn to the second problem in this chapter: Once a crisis or confrontation has developed and various forms of bargaining involving manipulation of the instruments of coercion and violence come into play, what are the possible outcomes of the situation?

 




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