American Subversion in Chile, 1970-1973

American use of force abroad to protect commercial interests, maintain "law and order," and prevent inroads by "international communism" has occurred frequently since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. One study lists more than 100 American military interventions in Latin America between 1806 and 1933.²⁴ Despite the signature of important articles in both the Rio Treaty (1947) and the Bogota Charter (1948) prohibiting direct or "indirect" interference in Latin American countries' internal affairs, in practice American governments have never admitted that such principles could invalidate the right and responsibility of the United States to intervene, in case of external armed attack, Communist penetration, or even anticipated Communist activity, in Latin America's domestic politics. No Latin American government or revolutionary group is immune from American subversion or intervention if that government or group allows local Communists to play a prominent role in its activities; and any amount of Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban supply of arms, advisors, or techni­cal assistance is usually defined as evidence of Communist subversion, and hence justification for countersubversion or intervention.²⁵ In short, American govern-

²³ See Ivo Duchacek, "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," World Politics, 2 (1950), 511-33.

²⁴ Cited in C. Neale Ronning, ed., Intervention in Latin America (New York: Knopf, 1970), p. 25.

²⁵ For quotations and the ideological underpinnings of American responses to Latin Ameri­can social reform, see Melvin Gurtov, The United States against the Third World: Antinationahsm and Intervention (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 82-84.

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ments have historically reserved for themselves the right to decide what forms of domestic political change in Latin America are legitimate or illegitimate, toler­able or intolerable. The parallels are striking between American policies and the Brezhnev Doctrine, which allocates to the Soviet government the right to intervene with armed force into Eastern Europe any time a government is threat­ened by counterrevolution or "imperialism."

Instances of direct American military intervention have declined since 1933, with the launching of Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy. The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 (organized and financed by the United States) and the American invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 are the only recent cases of direct use of military force. Subversive techniques, however, have been used frequently. In the late 1950s, the United States employed a combination of economic and political pressures to help drive General Trujillo out of the Domin­ican Republic; and in the early 1950s, the United States, by financing and arming a group of Guatemalan emigres in Honduras, organized the downfall of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, which had earned Washington's enmity by expro­priating idle lands of the United Fruit Company, importing weapons from East Germany, instituting social reforms, and allowing full civil liberties to reign in the country.

Unlike the case of Guatemala, where Americans subversion was an un­qualified success, the case of Chile is difficult to assess, in part because the known facts can lead to different inferences. For example, it is likely, but impossi­ble to prove, that there would have been a military coup d'etat against the Socialist government of Salvadore Allende even if the United States had maintained a policy of strict nonintervention. Allende's policies were undoubtedly leading to irreconcilable differences in Chile. Numerous radicals, including many who had come to Chile from other countries in Latin America, were pressing Allende to institute a "real" revolution by force of arms. Middle-class groups, facing mounting suppression of civil liberties, were similarly clamoring for fundamental changes in Allende's unsuccessful economic policies. Since Chile was beset with serious economic dislocation and a 350 percent yearly inflation rate (partly caused by American economic steps), the military coup d'etat was predictable months before it occurred.

The U.S. government's attempts to influence Chilean political life go back as far as 1964, when through covert means it helped finance the electoral victory of Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian Democrat with a reformist pro­gram, over the Socialist candidate, Salvador Allende. But Frei's victory had been narrow, and Allende's popularity was fully established during the campaign. Since, according to the Chilean constitution, Frei could not run again for the presidency in 1970, Allende was considered by most observers to be the strongest candidate in the elections of that year. The Central Intelligence Agency therefore posted a team in Santiago long before the elections, with instructions to keep the balloting "fair." The CIA operatives interpreted this to mean that they should try to prevent Allende's election. They ultimately spent approximately

259 Clandestine Actions and Military Intervention

$3 million to buy votes and a further $350,000 to bribe Chilean congressmen, who, under the constitution, had to ratify the results of the election. These efforts, of course, failed to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency.

The American government, fearing that Chile would serve as a base for South American revolutionaries (many activists and agents from China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Communist parties throughout Latin America flooded into Chile after the election), then set about to create conditions in Chile that would make it difficult for AUende to administer the country effectively. One American corporation with Chilean investments, ITT, put great pressure on Washington to act directly to bring down the AUende government. Indeed, ITT went so far as to approach the CIA with a plan of its own, which would involve a coup d'etat by the Chilean military forces. After the Chilean government nationalized American-owned copper mines and refused to pay what the compa­nies demanded in compensation, the pressure by private firms on Washington increased, and the response became increasingly positive.

The means used to help create economic and social turmoil in Chile included economic embargoes and classic subversion. Between November 1970 and early 1972, the Export-Import Bank (under the Department of the Treasury, headed by John Connally), the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank cut back credits and new loans to Chile. Private American banks quickly followed the lead of these lending institutions. Although European banks did renegotiate Chilean debts, the United States refused to enter into bilateral discussions with Allende's officials to take similar steps. The AUende government was hardly a good credit risk, but the evidence suggests that shutting off the flow of funds necessary to finance Chile's imports was basically a political decision designed to create further instability in Chile. The credit embargo did not have effects as severe as those of the total American embargo against Cuba, but it did create a shortage of spare parts in important sectors of Chile's economy (most of Chile's trucks, cars, and industrial machinery originally came from the United States). We can infer the political objectives underlying the credit embargo by the fact that it was lifted as soon as the military junta had disposed of AUende.

Direct activities by CIA agents in Chile complemented the muted and "low profile" economic pressures. Personally ordered by President Nixon, a secret attempt by CIA agents to organize a Chilean military coup d'etat to prevent the installation of AUende as president failed.²⁶ The CIA then turned its attention not so much toward removing AUende as supporting opposition groups. It chan­neled funds to the opposition press in an effort to keep it alive—AUende had steered government advertising to only those newspapers that supported him. Additional funds went to opposition politicians, private firms, and trade unions. The CIA also infiltrated Chilean agents into the upper echelons of Allende's

²⁶ For details, see Thomas Powers, "Inside the Department of Dirty Tricks," The Atlantic (August 1979), 45-57.

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party; and provocateurs were asked to make deliberate mistakes in their govern­ment jobs, thus adding to the economic management problems already facing Allende. Finally, CIA agents organized street demonstrations and funded a truck­ers' strike that had disastrous consequences on the economy. There is no evi­dence that the CIA organized or directly supported the ensuing military coup d'etat, but it was clearly trying to create conditions that would drastically increase the probability of a military intervention into Chilean politics.²⁷

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