DETERRENCE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

Most importantly deterrence must be stable under conditions of great interna­tional tensions, when policy makers may be making important decisions while experiencing severe stress. Yet no system of deterrence can be absolutely stable, if only because all weapons are to some degree provocative, because the capacity of individuals and organizations to deal effectively with complex problems is not unlimited and because in any foreseeable international system there will always be nations or subnational groups who are prepared to challenge the status quo with force.

Decision Time

Probably the most pernicious attribute of crisis is time pressure; the aphorism that "haste makes waste" can take on a terrible new meaning in nuclear confron­tations. Not only is short decision time likely to constrain full exploration of policy options; it may also materially increase the probabilities of unintended escalation and war. Let's assume that military technology has made nuclear war as an instrument of policy unthinkable because it has become too costly even for the "winner." (A similar argument was, incidentally, also quite popular during the decade before 1914.) We still cannot totally overlook the unintended

¹⁷ Glenn H. Snyder and others have pointed out that deterrence may operate in war as well as before war. This does not negate the point, however, that the outbreak of violence represents a failure of deterrence. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

11 Weapons, War, and Political Influence

ways in which war might occur: escalation of limited war into a thermonuclear holocaust; catalytic war, in which major powers are drawn into a conflict initiated by other nations; war arising from an accident or a breakdown in discipline among subordinate military personnel; and a war resulting from erroneous intel­ligence, faulty interpretation of radar images, or other types of communication difficulties.¹⁸

Most of these occurrences are extremely unlikely, owing to complex devices and procedures designed to circumvent accidents. For example, a num­ber of aircraft armed with nuclear weapons have crashed without a nuclear detonation, owing to safety devices built into the triggering mechanism. The presence of such safeguards does not, however, provide absolute insurance against errors of human perception, judgment, and performance. But in the absence of time pressure, these scenarios can perhaps be dismissed as too im­probable for serious concern.

The capacity to respond with weapons of almost incalculable speed of delivery and destructiveness has created one of the crucial paradoxes of the nuclear age: The very decisions that, because of their potentially awesome conse­quences, should be made with the greatest deliberation may have to be made under the most urgent pressure of time. "He who hesitates is lost" may be a sound rule for card players; we can scarcely afford to have statesmen act on that principle. The ideal deterrence system is thus one that clearly and continually impresses everyone with the fact that striking first is the irrational, not the "safe" choice.

Ample experimental and historical evidence indicates that individual and group decision-making processes tend to become less effective with the compression of decision time. Beyond a moderate level, time pressure has an adverse effect on creativity, memory, productivity, accuracy, and other factors crucial to decision making under conditions of uncertainty. There actually ap­pears to be a two-way relationship between time and stress. On the one hand, the common use during crises of such techniques as ultimata and threats with built-in deadlines—as well as the rapid delivery time of modern weapons—is likely to increase the stress under which the recipient must operate. On the other hand, high stress tends to result in distorted perceptions of time. Finally, when decision time is short, the ability to estimate the probable outcomes— the costs and benefits—of each policy option is likely to be reduced, and concern for short-run consequences of decisions increases. To some extent, then, deci­sions made under stress may be more apt to violate some of the premises about calculated decision processes that underlie nuclear deterrence: Extreme stress may increase the likelihood of reflexive behavior and concomitantly decrease

¹⁸ Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament. A somewhat different set of "scenarios" describing possible causes of war is presented in Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 524ff. The thesis that the likelihood of nuclear war between the superpowers is disappearing is developed by Werner Levi, The Coming End of War (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981).

282 Weapons, War, and Political Influence

the probability of cautious and calculated policies. (For further discussion, see Chapter 15.)

The 1914 Crisis

The events leading up to World War I, a classic example of a minor local crisis that escalated rapidly into a world war, can be used to illustrate how weapons, time, and stress can affect decision making.¹⁹ Archduke Francis Ferdi­nand, heir apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was assassinated June 28, 1914, in Sarajevo by a young Serbian nationalist. Within a week, Germany had promised "blank-check" support for Austria's policy of punishing and humil­iating Serbia and perhaps even provoking a "local war." On July 23, the Austro-Hungarians presented Serbia with an ultimatum of unprecedented severity, the answer to which was regarded as unsatisfactory. Five days later, Vienna declared war against its southern neighbor.

When war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia could no longer be prevented, it also became evident that efforts to localize it might fail As late as August 1, many European statesmen expressed the belief that if time permitted a reconvening of the concert powers, general war might be avoided. But at the same time, attention turned to the risks of being unprepared for the war that might break out.

Here was the dilemma. Time would be required if a general European war was to be averted; above all, a moratorium on military operations was neces­sary. It was clear that military alerts, mobilizations, and deployment of troops near frontiers would stimulate similar actions by others. But increasingly, these considerations were overshadowed by another: To permit a potential adversary any time advantage in mobilizing the military power of the state was perceived to be disastrous. On July 28, Nicholas II had warned, "I foresee that I will succumb very soon to the pressure put upon me and will be compelled to take extreme measures which will lead to war." Three days later, in the course of his desperate last-minute correspondence with the Kaiser, the Tsar asserted, "It is technically impossible to stop our military preparations which were obliga­tory owing to Austria's mobilization."

The reaction of German officials to the events leading up to mobilization and war was almost identical. On the one hand, they repeatedly asserted that, owing to the pressure of time, they had no choice but to take vigorous military measures against the threat to the east. On the other hand, they claimed that only Russia was free to act in order to prevent war. "The responsibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment is still lies in your [Nicholas's] power to avert it." And Wilhelm, like the Tsar, finally asserted that he had lost control of his own military and that only the actions of the adversary could stop further escalation.

On July 29, Russia had ordered—and then canceled—a general mobiliza-

¹⁹ The following discussion of the 1914 and Cuban missile crises draws upon Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Esculation, War (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).

53 Weapons, War, and Political Influence

tion. Later it was decided in St. Petersburg that the mobilization of the four southern military districts would deter an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia without, it was assumed, alarming Germany. But, in part because Russia had no effective plan for a partial mobilization, the Tsar was persuaded to reverse his decision once again on July 30 in favor of general mobilization, German warnings notwithstanding.

In response to what was perceived as a mounting threat against its eastern frontiers, the German government proclaimed a "state of threatening danger of war" on July 31 and dispatched a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia demanding a cessation of military preparations. The Kaiser then ordered mobilization on August 1. The French government simultaneously ordered general mobilization. Although official British mobilization was delayed until August 2, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, and many others had advocated such action considerably earlier.

Thus, each mobilization was defended as a necessary reaction—made more urgent by the pressure of time—to a previous decision within the other coalition. A gnawing awareness that the probable responses to one's military measures would be counter measures by the opponents failed to deter, and assurances of defensive intent failed to reassure adversaries sufficiently to cause them to abandon their own military steps. Thus, ten days after the small-scale mobilizations by Serbia and Austria-Hungary on July 25, each of the major participants had ordered a general mobilization, a decision commonly regarded in 1914 as an act of war. The armies totaling less than 400,000 troops, called to fight a limited war between two nations, had grown to nearly 12 million men, representing, in addition to Serbia and Austria-Hungary, Montenegro, Russia, France, Germany, Belgium, Turkey, and Great Britain.

One factor contributing to the rapid escalation was the rigidity of the various mobilization plans. Austria-Hungary and Russia had more than one plan for mobilization, but once any one of them was set in motion, it was impossible to change to another. The Russians could order either a general mobilization against both Germany and Austria-Hungary or a partial one directed only at the latter. But, as Russian generals were to argue vehemently during the crucial days at the end of July, a partial mobilization would preclude a general one for months to come, leaving Russia completely at the mercy of Germany. Accord­ing to General Dobrorolski, "The whole plan of mobilization is worked out ahead to its end in all its detail. When the moment has been chosen, one has only to press the button, and the whole state begins to function automatically with the precision of a clock's mechanism. . . . Once the moment has been fixed, everything is settled; there is no going back; it determines mechanically the beginning of war."²⁰ Although Austria-Hungary also had a number of differ­ent military plans, the condition of her army served as a constraint against diplomatic flexibility.

p. 481.

²⁰ Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, 2nd ed., 2 (New York: Free Press, 1966),

284Weapons, War, and Political Influence

The other two continental powers—France and Germany—each had but a single plan for calling up its armed forces; and, in the case of Germany, political leaders were ill-informed about the rigidity of mobilization and war plans. The Kaiser's last-minute attempt to reverse the Schlieffen plan—to attack only in the east—shattered Moltke, who replied, "That is impossible, Your Maj­esty. An army of a million cannot be improvised. It would be nothing but a rabble of undisciplined armed men, without a commissariat. ... It is utterly impossible to advance except according to plan; strong in the west, weak in the east."²¹

Finally, all the mobilization plans existed only on paper; except for the Russo-Japanese War, no major European power had mobilized since 1878. This fact rendered the plans all the more rigid and made military leaders who were responsible for carrying them out less likely to accept any last-minute modifica­tions. It may also have added to the widely believed dictum that one did not mobilize for any purpose other than war.

Does the outbreak of World War I have any relevance for national secu­rity policy during an age in which weapons systems have only the slightest resem­blance to those existing in 1914? An analysis of European military technology and doctrines would reveal, for example, that objectively, time was of incalculably less importance than in the 1980s. The necessity of harvesting the summer crops was an important consideration in the military calculations of all the conti­nental powers. Russia's ability to mount a rapid offensive against Germany could be discounted; this assumption of Russia's lack of speed in fact underlay the Schlieffen plan.

Yet, any analysis confined to the "objective" situation misses the point that individuals and groups make decisions on the basis of their appraisal of a situation, and that this may or may not correspond to some objective definition of reality. In the high-stress situation in 1914, European statesmen believed that time was of crucial importance, and they acted on that assumption. During the culminating phases of the crisis, foreign-policy officials attributed to potential enemies the ability to deliver a sudden and possibly decisive military blow, even though they knew that their own armed forces lacked such a capability. As a consequence, the costs of delaying immediate military action were perceived as increasingly high. Or, to use the language of modern deterrence theory, decision makers in each alliance perceived those of the other coalition as able and willing to launch a massive first strike and thus hastened their own prepara­tions.

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