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DEMONSTRATIONS OF FORCE



One of the traditionally effective techniques of intervention—with low risks and costs—is to display or threaten to use force either to help or hinder a domestic rebellion in a foreign country. One example of forceful demonstration suggests that this technique may be sufficient in some cases to influence the course of domestic politics in a country.

In 1961, a demonstration of force prevented supporters of the deposed Trujillo dictatorship from overturning the newly established provisional regime in the Dominican Republic. Throughout November, rumors had circulated in Santo Domingo that Trujillo's three sons (one of whom was commander in chief of the Dominican Forces) were ready to launch an assault on the provisional government, whereupon the United States sent twenty-two warships to patrol off the Dominican shore. The provisional government had not asked for this show of force, but it later acknowledged that the American action had prompted the Trujillos to flee the Dominican Republic and had averted a coup d'etat and possible civil war.

Although the costs and risks of demonstrations of force may be slight, we should not conclude from the case above that they are always an effective means of promoting some change in the internal structure or governing person­nel of a state. The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 would indicate that a govern­ment of even a small state may refuse to be intimidated by demonstrations of force on its frontiers. The Dubcek government was well aware of Soviet, Polish, and East German antipathy to its reform programs. During the spring of 1968, Warsaw Pact joint maneuvers had taken place in Czechoslovakia, and there were persistent reports that the Soviet contingents were making their withdrawal, after completion of the maneuvers, unduly slow. During the summer, as relations between Prague and Moscow worsened, Soviet troops were mobilized near the Czech frontier and were sent on "maneuvers" for an extended period of time. The meaning of these military steps was of course clear to all the parties con­cerned: the Soviet Union might intervene militarily if the Dubcek government did not abandon some reforms held most distasteful by the Soviet and other European governments. The demonstrations of force did not persuade the Czech authorities to alter their policies, with the result that the Soviet government and four of its East European allies intervened militarily and forced the Czechs to remove Dubcek and his associates.

SUBVERSION

The term subversion has characterized almost any rebellious activity in a country, but the distinguishing feature of subversion is that it is organized, supported, or directed by a foreign power, using for its own purposes the disaffected ele­ments in a society. Open displays of propaganda by a foreign power would

251 Clandestine Actions and Military Intervention

not constitute subversion unless the displays were related to a systematic cam­paign to help an indigenous rebel group seize power. One of the recent problems of Western policy makers relates to this distinction: is a revolt against an estab­lished regime truly serving the interests of the local population or rebels, or is it promoted abroad basically to serve the interests of a foreign power? Where to draw the line is extremely difficult, because almost every revolution today involves some external power. The major Western powers have generally viewed any connection between a rebel movement and a Communist state as evidence of Communist subversion. The modern techniques of subversion can be illus­trated by describing briefly how Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States have enlisted and aided dissident elements in foreign countries to over­throw constituted regimes or pave the way for an outright military assault on the target state.

Nazi Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1939

The main target of Nazi subversion of Czechoslovakia were the 3.5 million German-speaking Czechs living in the Sudetenland. Shortly after Hitler became the German chancellor, some Sudeten Germans organized a political party (SDP, Sudeten German party) under the leadership of Konrad Henlein. In his early political career, Henlein professed no desire to turn his party into an agency for carrying out Hitler's plans to take over Czechoslovakia. In a 1935 speech, he specifically declared that the German minority in Czechoslovakia would seek to protect its rights and interests only by cooperating with the Czech government and people.14 Less than seven years later, Henlein boasted publicly of the role that he and his party had played in subverting Czechoslovakia for Nazi Germany. He pointed out that his party, with the support of many Sudetenland Germans, had so completely destroyed internal stability and created so much confusion throughout Czechoslovakia that the entire country became "ripe for liquidation," according to Hitler's plans. He attributed his success to having turned 3.5 million Sudetenlanders into 3.5 million National Socialists.15

Henlein's first step in preparing for eventual Nazi "liquidation" of the Czech nation was to mobilize the Sudeten Germans, many of whom were neither Nazis nor pro-German, to his cause. He accomplished the objective by deliber­ately provoking incidents with Czech authorities, whose reprisals led the Sudeten Germans to believe that they were being persecuted as a minority. The SDP held mass public meetings, circulated manifestos demanding "rights" for the German minority, and issued false or exaggerated propaganda stories about Czech political outrages against the Sudeten Germans. Once a split within the society was achieved through propaganda, it was exacerbated by giving the mili­tant side a feeling of insecurity—in this case by claiming that the Sudeten Ger-

14 Vincent Urban, Hitler's Spearhead (London: Trinity Press, n.d.), p. 16.

15 Ibid., p. 17.

252 Clandestine Actions and Military Intervention

mans had to remain vigilant lest they be completely destroyed as a distinct nationality by the Czechs. Social perceptions of threat rose to such a high level that political compromise became unacceptable and was, of course, discouraged by the subversive party. Moreover, the Henleinists systematically penetrated Sudeten German social and cultural groups and purged their leadership of anti-Nazi or Czech sympathizers. By 1938, an important part of the German pop­ulation in Czechoslovakia had become not only anti-Czech, but pro-Nazi as well.

Because some Sudetenlanders, particularly in rural areas, were reluctant to give their support to the SDP, the party also indulged in kidnapping and terrorism. The campaign—which was executed by a corps similar to the German SS, called the Freiwilliger Schutzdienst (FS)—was directed against both uncoop­erative Germans and innocent Czechs. The terror against the Czechs naturally caused reprisals, which permitted the Henleinists to charge the Czechs with further "atrocities" against the Sudeten Germans. While Henlein's party was active in its work of propaganda, infiltration, and terror, its leaders simulta­neously wore a mask of political respectability by entering into formal negotia­tions with the Czech government to seek "honorable" guarantees for the rights of the Sudetenlanders.

By 1938, it was apparent to the Czech government—if not to foreign diplomats—that Henlein and the Nazis did not wish any real accommodation, but sought only to create a situation that would warrant German diplomatic and military intervention and ultimate cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. On August 6, 1938, Henlein released a fateful order to his followers, inviting them to organize a series of violent acts that would give Nazi Germany an excuse for intervening. His own attempt to seize power one month later failed, and he was forced to flee to the Third Reich. Now without leadership in the SDP, German intervention had to proceed openly. As clashes between Czechs and Sudeten Germans increased in violence and frequency, causing repressive action by the Czech army, Hitler began a series of propaganda broadcasts throughout Europe, which sought through vitriolic language and gross exaggera­tion to create the impression that the Sudeten Germans were indeed the subject of systematic persecution. Using a combination of military-invasion threats against Czechoslovakia and reasoned appeals for "peace" against the Western governments, Hitler, through the Munich settlement, eventually annexed the Sudetenland to Germany; Czechoslovakia was left a rump state without viable military defenses.

Although the SDP and its paramilitary FS organized and conducted most of the infiltration, propaganda, and terror, the Nazi government of Germany made the policy decisions on the strategy of subversion. Henlein maintained contact with Himmler's SS through a German liaison officer in Czechoslovakia, and his lieutenants frequently traveled to Germany to attend festivals, fairs, and competitions, where they were exhorted and instructed by Nazi officials

253Clandestine Actions and Military Intervention

in the techniques of subversion.16 Henlein himself agreed, in March 1938, to coordinate and clear all policy with the German Foreign Office and submit all public statements (commands to his followers) to the Germans for approval. The Nazi government also supplied money and weapons to the FS for conducting its campaign of terror and intimidation, and members of the Gestapo occasionally crossed the frontier into Czechoslovakia to kidnap Czech citizens. Throughout the period, the German government also released an avalanche of propaganda directed at three distinct targets: (1) the Sudeten Germans, to rally them behind the SDP and against the Czechs; (2) the Czechs, to undermine their morale; and (3) other European countries, to create the impression that Germany was intervening only to safeguard the rights of a minority. Finally, the German gov­ernment took advantage of the violence in Czechoslovakia to threaten military intervention. Czechoslovakia did not collapse, then, solely through Henlein's activities. Subversion was used to create conditions that gave the Germans a pretext for threatening and finally carrying out annexation and military invasion.

 




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