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The Missile Crisis of 1962



The events of October 1962, an intense international crisis that escalated to the brink of war and then de-escalated, can be contrasted with the decision making during the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I. The first nuclear confrontation in history was precipitated by the establishment

21 Quoted in Virginia Cowles, The Kaiser (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 343.

Weapons, War, and Political Influence

of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. For a period of approximately one week, the likelihood of a full-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was higher than at any time since World War II.

As in 1914, time pressure was woven inextricably into the entire crisis situation. The pressure created by work on the Soviet missile sites in Cuba has been described by Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President: "For all of us knew that, once the missile sites under construction became opera­tional, and capable of responding to any apparent threat or command with a nuclear volley, the President's options would be dramatically changed."22 There was also the countervailing force created by the President and his advisors, who sought to minimize the probability that either side would respond by a "spasm reaction."

One important aspect of American policy making during the crisis was a deep concern for adequate information upon which to make decisions. Despite public pressure, the administration resisted taking action until photographic evidence of the missile sites was available. During the week after discovery of the missiles, a series of alternatives was being considered pending more accurate information; and while the decision to institute a blockade of Cuba was being hammered out, open discussion of the alternatives was encouraged.

Groups that achieve early consensus because dissent on matters of policy is subtly or overtly discouraged often produce decisions of low quality;23 this was true, for example, of the group in Washington that sanctioned the CIA plan to invade Cuba in 1961. Although many of the same persons were involved in the decisions regarding missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy took various steps to encourage open and sometimes heated debate. As a consequence, at least six significantly different policy options—ranging from doing nothing to launching air strikes and an invasion to dismantle the missiles—were considered and argued in detail. A participant in the decision making at the highest level wrote that President Kennedy, aware that discussions of alternatives in the Na­tional Security Council would be franker in his absence, encouraged the group to hold preliminary meetings without him.

It was not until Saturday, October 20, almost a week after the photo­graphic evidence became available, that the consensus developed. The president himself acknowledged that the interim period was crucial to the choice of a policy; he asserted that if the decision had had to be made during the first 24 hours after verification of missile sites, the government would not have chosen as prudently as it did one week later, when it finally settled on the quarantine against introduction of further missiles.

Unlike many decision makers in the 1914 crisis, American leaders also

22 Theodore Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 31.

23 Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); and Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, "Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers," in Cornelius P. Cotter, ed., Political Science Annual: Individual Decision-Making, Vol. 6 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975).

286 Weapons, War, and Political Influence

displayed a considerable concern and sensitivity for the manner in which Soviet leaders were apt to interpret American actions. President Kennedy and others were acutely aware of the possibility of misperception by their counterparts in the Kremlin. Only weeks earlier, a serious miscalculation by the president and most of his advisors may have played a major part in the events leading up to the crisis. It was an almost unexamined article of faith in Washington that the Soviets would never place sophisticated weapons in bases so far from Moscow and within reach of a volatile leader such as Fidel Castro. Evidence to the contrary was thus dismissed, all the more easily because it came mostly from Cuban refugee sources that had proved unreliable in the past. The Soviets, for their part, appear to have misperceived how Washington would react to strategic missiles in Cuba, apparently believing that the president was too weak to act resolutely. During the deliberations in Washington, Kennedy even recalled that World War I had developed through a series of misjudgments about each nation's intentions toward the others. This concern for anticipated reactions is evident in all the accounts of discussions regarding an appropriate response to the Soviet missiles.

Sensitivity for the position of the adversary manifested itself throughout the crisis. There were attempts to ensure that Premier Khrushchev and his col­leagues not be rushed into an irrevocable decision; it was agreed among members of the decision group that escalation of the crisis should be slowed down to give Soviet leaders time to consider their next move. An interesting example of Kennedy's concern emerges from his management of the naval quarantine. The president ordered the Navy to delay intercepting a Soviet ship until the last possible moment, and he sent his order "in the clear" rather than in code. The Soviets, certain to intercept the message, would thus be assured that they had time in which to consider their decisions. There was, in addition, a conscious effort not to reduce the alternatives of either side to two—surrender or total war. An air strike on the missile bases or invasion of the island would have left the Soviets only two alternatives: acquiescence to destruction of the Soviet position in Cuba or counter-attack. A blockade, on the other hand, would give the Soviet government a choice between turning back the weapons-bearing ships or attempting to run the blockade.

Another characteristic of the decision process in October 1962 was the conscious choice of a response at the lowest level of violence or potential violence necessary to achieve withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Senators J. William Fulbright and Richard B. Russell, were among those who urged bombing and an invasion of Cuba in order to ensure removal of the missiles. The decision to impose a naval quarantine was based on the reasoning that it would allow further and more massive actions should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its missiles. The Kremlin leadership was thus given both the time and the opportunity to reassess its policy. However, although the quarantine succeeded in preventing further shipments of missiles to Cuba, it did not result in removal of those already deployed there. The

287Weapons, War, and Political Influence

threat of an air strike was employed in an ultimatum delivered by Attorney General Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Just prior to a White House meeting at which the air-strike option would again be discussed, Premier Khrushchev accepted the compromise plan calling for Soviet withdrawal of offen­sive missiles in exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba.

Comparison of the decision processes in 1914 and 1962 underscores the importance, in a crisis, of the ability to lengthen decision time. Although the weapons available to the protagonists of 1962 were of incalculably greater destructive capacity than those available to World War I combatants, those weap­ons also permitted a more flexible approach to strategic and diplomatic maneu­vers. Most important, the policy makers were aware not only of the frightful costs of miscalculation, failures in communication, or panic, but also of the consequences of reducing options to war or total surrender. They appear not to have lost sight of the need to consider the consequences of their decisions for the adversary. Yet, the ability of American and Soviet leaders to avoid a nuclear Armageddon is no assurance that even great skill in crisis management will always yield a peaceful escape from war. As President Kennedy said some months later, referring to the missile crisis, "You can't have too many of those."

DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

It is a truism that no strategy or weapon system can ensure that adversaries will abstain from attack either out of aggressive intent or out of fear. This does not mean, however, that all military doctrines and weapons are equally credible and stable and will therefore contribute equally to national security and to the effectiveness of deterrence. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we will use these two criteria—credibility and stability—to examine a number of issues relating to strategic doctrines and characteristics or weapons sytems: capability requirements; limited nuclear war; targeting policy; active defense (ABM system); civil defense; and arms control and disarmament. Because the primary purpose of military policy today is to influence the behavior of potential adversaries, our discussion will focus on weapons and strategies as instruments of influence. We will be less concerned with the problems of fighting a war—the ultimate form of punishment—than with the possible consequences of various strategic doctrines on the behavior of others. In short, our focus will be political rather than purely military.

 




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