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Doctrines and Ideologies



A doctrine can be defined as any explicit set of beliefs that purports to explain reality and usually prescribes goals for political action. Foreign-policy objectives that derive from political doctrines are often put into slogan forms, such as "extending freedom," "trade follows the flag," "he who holds the land will hold the sea," "the throne and the altar," "the white man's burden," "make the world safe for democracy," "the New Order," or "world revolution." In

8 Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study,"Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962), 244-52.

9 John K. Galbraith, "Germany Was Badly Run," Fortune (December 1945), p. 200.

325 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

some political systems, the leadership inculcates into the society a comprehensive framework of doctrines, known also as an ideology. Ideologies not only establish foreign-policy goals, evaluative criteria, and justifications for actions, but have important effects on perceptual processes as well. Marxism-Leninism as an ideol­ogy has great consequences in Soviet foreign policy. It can be related to political goals and action in at least five ways.

First, it establishes the intellectual framework through which policy mak­ers observe reality. Messages and cues from the external environment are given meaning, or interpreted, within the categories, predictions, and definitions pro­vided by doctrines comprising the ideology. Soviet policy makers would interpret a foreign civil war as a manifestation of a class struggle (as during the Spanish civil war); they would see conflicts among "capitalist" states as a fight between their ruling classes over markets (as in the official Soviet interpretation of World War I); and they would regard any recession in a free-enterprise economy as evidence of Marx's predictions regarding the laws of economic development.

In its second function, the ideology prescribes for policy makers both national roles and an image of the future state of the world; it establishes the long-range goals of a state's external behavior, to be promoted through diplo­macy, propaganda, revolution, or force. Its relevance to day-to-day problem solving and to the development of specific actions in concrete situations, how­ever, may be only very slight. In these realms, a Communist government operates like any other.10

Third, the ideology serves as a rationalization and justification for the choice of more specific foreign-policy decisions. As in Western countries, where foreign policies are often justified in terms of such popular values as "preserving freedom," so in the Soviet Union or China, foreign-policy actions can be justified as being consistent with the general values inherent in the communist ideology.

Fourth, the set of doctrines in communism defines for policy makers the main stages in historical development within which specific foreign-policy strategies can be enunciated. For example, when the Soviet Union was weak and the only Socialist state in existence, Soviet theoreticians could define the epoch as one in which the "forces of imperialism" were vastly superior. Defining the world situation as a period of "capitalist encirclement" made certain objec­tives attractive—namely, building up Russian capabilities rather than concentrat­ing on promoting the "world revolution." But by 1956, Soviet theoreticians could explain that an entirely new epoch, involving a new "balance of forces," had developed, and that Soviet foreign and defense policies would have to change accordingly. Now that the Soviet Union was, they claimed, as strong as the imperialist bloc, it no longer had to fear capitalist encirclement; in the new epoch of "peaceful coexistence," victories could be gained by ideological prosely­tizing and revolutionary activities, particularly in developing countires. In short,

10 For a discussion of ideological influences in Soviet foreign policy, see Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 107-27.

326 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

the ideology of Marxism-Leninism provides general outlines for defining the basic characteristics of a given historical era. From these characteristics, Soviet officials can make certain deductions about appropriate foreign-policy goals.

Finally, the communist ideology posits a moral and ethical system that helps prescribe the correct attitudes and evaluative criteria for judging one's own actions and those of others. Communism is distinguished from other ideolo­gies primarily because it claims to be an objective and scientific ideology and moral system, rather than merely the preferred ideology of particular leaders. Communist theoreticians maintain that Marxism-Leninism is all-powerful be­cause it is correct, and, since only Marxist-Leninists are "armed with the truth," only they have a legitimate claim to power in the world. They are on the side of history, they maintain, and all other doctrines or economic systems are retro­grade. Good people are those who swim with the current of history, building communism and fighting imperialism and fascism, whereas bad people (or states) are those that are fighting history by clinging to outmoded (capitalist, feudal, and so on) economic systems and their colonies. Capitalism is immoral, according to the evaluative criteria of Marxist doctrines, because it is a barrier to human progress. Any technique used to fight capitalism or imperialism is ipso facto moral and justified, because it is in accord with the laws of historical development.11

In American foreign policy, liberal values and doctrines play a similar role, although they are much less evident as guides to social and political analysis. Many American foreign-policy actions are organized to promote liberal institu­tions and private enterprise abroad. When major threats to American economic or security interests are not involved, for instance, policy makers often undertake programs to encourage development of democratic political institutions and discourage authoritarian political practices. In Latin America in particular, Amer­ican diplomats and propaganda agencies have in recent years attempted to pro­mote free elections and observance of civil liberties.12 When military regimes have taken command, a frequent American response has been to withhold diplo­matic recognition and terminate foreign aid unless the government promised to establish a date for holding free elections in the future. On other occasions, the U.S. government has made a show of force or actually intervened militarily to prevent uprisings against legally constituted governments. However, in in-

11 The great discrepancies between images of reality in the Soviet Union and the West have led some social scientists to imply that most cold-war conflicts were caused by mcongruent images rather than by irreconcilable objectives. See, for example, Une Bronfenbrenner, "Allowing for Soviet Perceptions," in International Conflict and Behavioral Science, ed. Roger Fisher (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 161-78; and the critical discussion by Ralph K. White, "Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," in International Behavior, ed. Kelman, pp. 236-76.

12 See Theodore Wright, "Free Elections in the Latin American Policy of the United States," Political Science Quarterly, 74 (1959), 89-112. Active promotion of liberal values abroad was perhaps most pronounced in Woodrow Wilson's foreign policies. During his presidency, he frequently refused to recognize any Latin American regime that came into being through unconstitutional processes. In the case of Mexico, Wilson not only refused to recognize a revolutionary government, he took active steps to overthrow it by getting all major powers to withhold recognition.

327Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

stances where democratic political procedures led to corruption, increase in indigenous Communist or radical political strength, economic decay, or threats to American private interests, the United States has been equally prepared to support authoritarian regimes that could more effectively handle these "prob­lems." The promotion of liberal values is thus not an absolute or persistent objective in American foreign policy but is tempered by such other objectives and needs as defending security and economic interests and maintaining the solidarity of alliances. Similarly, when there is inconsistency between promoting purely communist objectives or fulfilling national roles derived from Leninist views of international solidarity on the one hand, and defending or promoting purely national objectives on the other, the latter usually prevail over the former. No Communist state has been willing to commit resources to "world revolution" if by so doing it would seriously endanger its own security or other more specific interests. It is one of the advantages of the flexibility of Marxism-Leninism that when such situations arise—and they do so frequently—some ideological princi­ple can be put forth to justify the choice of national over doctrinal imperatives.13

Analogies

We have all experienced attempts to clarify and understand a phenomenon by making analogies. The physiology instructor may make an analogy between the heart and a pump, the eye and a camera, or the brain and a computer. In each case, the object under study is analyzed not in terms of its own properties or characteristics, but with reference to some other object. Similarly, in formulat­ing policy goals and responses to conditions abroad, diplomats and government officials frequently characterize a situation and deduce appropriate actions to cope with it by reference to a different but analogous, set of historical circum­stances. The image of reality is based on, or compared to, a past situation, although of course current information must be available in order to suggest the comparison or analogy in the first place. For example, Prime Minister Eden of England found a close analogy between Hitler's foreign-policy objectives and diplomacy in 1938 and President Nasser's behavior in the Middle East in 1956. As a British foreign secretary during the late 1930s, Eden had questioned his government's appeasement policy against the Nazis. Convinced that Nasser presented a threat similar to that posed by Hitler, he deduced that the only way to handle the analogous situation was through a show of force. Even though the decision to invade Egypt in 1956 was formulated in the light of careful intelligence estimates (which were faulty in many ways), Eden did not consult most members of his government to see if they thought his image of the situation and the assumptions of his decision were correct.

During the Vietnam conflict in the 1960s, American policy makers fre­quently justified their actions and helped characterize the situation by citing

13 For an argument that ideology plays a subordinate role to interests, see Werner Levi, "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, 14 (1970), 1-31.

328 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

the appeasement analogy of the 1930s: If you let aggressors achieve their objec­tives, you only whet their appetite for more. Appeasement, they maintained, leads only to general war, usually fought at some disadvantage by the democra­cies; but a strong display of force and determination can discourage aggressors and save the peace in the long run. In what respects the situation in Southeast Asia in the 1960s was really analogous to Europe in the 1930s can be debated, but the analogy was an important part of the psychological environment in which policy makers formulated their goals and actions.14

To this point we have emphasized the role that perceptual and attitudinal characteristics of policy makers may play in the formulation and execution of policy. What about other aspects of personality? Personality, of course, is an elusive concept. For purposes of foreign-policy analysis, we can propose three separate meanings: (1) policy-making skills; (2) character traits that predispose individuals to behave in certain ways in given conditions; and (3) pathological traits. Each may have significant influences on types of actions chosen in policy-making situations.

That people have different skills or aptitudes for different kinds of jobs is obvious. In terms of foreign-policy analysis, what may make a difference is traits such as tolerance/intolerance for diverging views, capacity to memorize, ability to weed out the essential information from trivia, capacity to think clearly in conditions of high stress, and the like. It would require a separate book to explore the links between such skills and policy choices. In situations fraught with danger, we are more likely to admire the policy makers who are known to look carefully at alternatives and who remain "cool" rather than those who have a reputation for impulsive behavior, arrogance, and indifference to advice which does not coincide with their hunches. The assumption, of course, is that more successful and safer policy will result from the deliberations of the former than the latter. Yet, some world-historical figures like Adolph Hitler were famous for their impulsive behavior while achieving phenomenal foreign-policy suc­cesses—at least in the short run.

Recent research has suggested some intriguing relationships between certain personality traits and propensity to make certain types of decisions in foreign policy. Lloyd Etheredge's study of American government officials and former presidents and secretaries of state establishes reasonably well that some types of decisions reflect personality traits.15 In the case of the top-level policy makers, he found that those with personalities defined as "high dominance"

14 Taken together, all these components—attitudes, values, beliefs, ideologies, and analo­gies—can be termed the "operational code." The notion of operational code has been developed by Alexander George. See his "The Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, 13 (1969), 190-222. For an application of the approach, see Ole R. Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1970), 123-57.

15 Lloyd Etheredge, A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).

329 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

and "introvert" were significantly more likely to advocate "hard-line policies in international crises than those characterized as "low dominance" and "extro­vert."

On a more impressionistic level, some have suggested that at least the style of decision making and sometimes the actions ordered reflected Lyndon Johnson's deep-felt insecurities. His inability to adjust policies in Vietnam in light of negative information was due, in part, to his personalization of the war. It was his war, with his boys getting killed, by his personal enemy, Ho Chi Minh.16 In short, strong ego-involvement tends to reduce consideration of alternatives and condems the policy maker to stick to a fixed course no matter how ineffective. We might also suggest that certain personality types are more prone to take risks than others.

Finally, writers of psychobiography have suggested that in certain circum­stances, policy choices may reflect deep personal needs, which are then rational­ized in terms of the national interest. Most experts agree that Stalin was afflicted by paranoia and pathological insecurity. Some of his foreign-policy behavior— his unwillingness to countenance the possibility of a Nazi invasion of Russia despite overwhelming information that it would happen—can perhaps best be understood as a manifestation of personality disorder. (Stalin's responsibility for the mass killings of the 1930s and his propensity to see plots everywhere were obviously related to pathological conditions.) Similarly, certain aspects of Hitler's behavior can be understood best in terms of psychopathological syndromes.17

But what of the prime minister of present-day Sweden, or the foreign minister of Japan, or the defense minister of Belgium? Can we best understand and explain the main patterns of those countries' foreign and defense policies today in terms of the personality characteristics of their key decision makers? Clearly the answer is no. The examples cited above are almost invariably taken from persons in unrestricted positions of authority over great powers in crisis situations. Where the policy problem relates to a less threat-laden issue, where it results from considerable bureaucratic discussion, and where it reflects the national needs of a relatively small country, then other types of explanations would be more powerful. We have discussed a variety of personality characteris­tics (including perceptual variables), because in certain situations, as hypothe­sized later, they provide a compelling explanation of foreign-policy objectives or actions.

1. Idiosyncratic variables are most likely to provide a significant part of an explana­tion where (a) policy is made by one or a few key leaders, (b) bureaucracies

16 David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).

17 Among the prominent attempts at this kind of analysis are Alexander andjuliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956); Arnold Rogow,

James Forreslal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1963); and Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968).

330 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

are uninvolved, (c) public opinion plays traditionally an insignificant role in limiting the executive's options, (d) compelling national needs are not involved, and (e) in a relatively diffuse international system.

2. "Aggressive" foreign-policy decisions and actions are more likely to be taken and ordered by those with the following character traits: (a) introversion/domi­nance, (b) high propensity to take risks, (c) a tendency to dichotomize foreign-policy actors as good/bad, trustworthy/untrustworthy, and the like, (d) personal insecurity combined with conditions such as sexual frustration, and (e) high need for esteem. Those with opposite characteristics are presumably more likely to be "doves."

The reader may wish to develop further hypotheses. The important point to remember is that no matter how emotionally satisfying it may be to attribute policy to a single person, other factors may be involved as well and may perhaps offer an even more comprehensive explanation. We consider next the political needs of key policy makers.

Press analysts and armchair observers often offer explanations of foreign policy which emphasize the domestic political needs of a president, commisar, or prime minister. This is the case where a leader undertakes a particular foreign-policy venture for the sake of augmenting domestic popularity or increasing his or her influence with a legislature. In the United States, at least, studies suggest that any foreign-policy move—a new initiative, a foreign tour, a dramatic announcement, or the like—is likely to increase the number of those who say the president is doing a good job.18 In the spring of 1981, the popularity of Menachem Begin's Likud coalition in Israel increased dramatically after the prime minister took a hard line against the emplacement of Syrian SAM missiles in Lebanon, capable of shooting down Israeli reconnaissance flights. (This is not to argue that Begin's only concern was his domestic political problems—that would be another monocausal explanation.) While foreign-policy issues seldom determine the outcome of a country's elections—issues closer to the pocketbook are usually more salient—there is little doubt that some key foreign-policy deci­sions are timed to create maximum domestic impact and in some cases are taken primarily with a view to improving the leadership's sagging political fortunes.19

18 John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973).

19 This situation raises serious problems for historians. Policy makers may give as reasons for their actions the state of public opinion, conditions abroad, or commitments that have to be fulfilled, whereas privately the most important consideration or component of a definition of the situation is their concern for their own political prestige and reputation. Since such considerations are seldom confessed even in memoirs, it is difficult to establish with certainty the relevance of private motives to public policies. There is also the problem of leaders' giving different reasons for their actions to different audiences at different times. For example, Mussolini emphasized on different occasions at least three reasons—his personal prestige, anticommunism, and strategic advan­tages—for his decision to intervene in the Spanish civil war. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (London: Eyre & Spotiswoode, 1961), pp. 226-27. See also Franklin Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries," World Politics, 24 (April 1972), 356-81.

 




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