Kant's Cosmopolitan Peace

Prof. Dr. phil. Dr. h.c. mult. Hans Lenk.

Introduction

Cosmopolitanism is a concept that occurs throughout Kant's writings, most notably in his essays on political theory and on history. In one of the earliest of these essays, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, (1784) Kant maintains that a "cosmopolitan existence" is the "highest purpose of nature" and the goal toward which history is developing. ' Cosmopolitanism also appears in Kant's essay on Perpetual Peace (1795) as a form of right in one of the three Definitive Articles to which all states that would declare themselves to be partners in peace must agree. Kant also defines cosmopolitanism in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) as one of the three forms of public law that are necessary to produce a universal condition of right.².

Given the fundamental importance of cosmopolitan right in Kant's peace project, its place in a comprehensive system of law and its role in Kant's perspective on the development of history it is surprising that cosmopolitan right has not received much attention in the Kantian literature. The concept has even been dismissed at times as a minor principle at odds with Kant's presumed strong statism which would disallow the development of a body of law above the level of the state.

In this paper I will explicate the different contexts in which Kant analyzes cosmopolitanism, first as a part of public law, then as an article of perpetual peace and finally as a principle regulating historical development. I will argue that far from being an insignificant principle cosmopolitan right is essential to the rightful character of the Kantian federation and is the principle that regulates, through a process of historical development, approximation to the ideal of a republic of republics. I accept and build upon arguments that maintain that the voluntary federation is not a second best solution to the problem of peace and justice. Rather when placed within a cosmopolitan juridical order the voluntary federation approximates the ideal without the loss of freedom attendant upon the absorption of nations within a unified global state. Cosmopolitan right provides the juridical foundation for the federation of republics from which a body of public law can be developed allowing a plurality of states to co-exist in peace and freedom. This plurality in turn secures freedom for the individual as it permits self-determination to flow from a dynamic principle of association that operates on multiple levels without collapsing into the "soulless despotism" of a world state.

^! Immanuel Kant, "Idea For a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose" in Kant: Political

Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge" Cambridge University Press, 1970) p.

² Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss,

trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit, p. 136-7

Pauline Kleingeld, "Kant's Arguments for the League of States" in Kant's Perpetual Peace: New Interpretative Essays, ed. Luigi Caranti (Roma: Luiss University Press, 2006) Kleingeld defends the federation while also allowing that Kant's view is open to further development in the direction of world law. Ingeborg Maus, "Kant's Reasons against a Global State: Popular Sovereignty as a Principle of International Law" in Kant's Perpetual Peace: New Interpretative Essays, ed. Luigi Caranti, op. cit. Maus also defends the federation but her strong defense of popular sovereignty is less amenable to the idea of the world republic.

Cosmopolitan right as part of a system of public law: The Metaphysics of Morals

Let us begin with Kant's definition of cosmopolitan right in the Metaphysics of Morals. Here cosmopolitan right is one of the three forms of public right necessary to produce a universal condition of right. ⁴ Public right is a system of laws for a people or an aggregate of peoples made necessary by their ability to influence one another through their mutual interactions. As forms of right, no one form can exist independently of the other. The parts of this system are not independent and cannot attain a correct and stable form outside of the system as a whole.

The first tier of public right is political right regulating the relations between individuals within a particular state. Political right is also sometimes referred to as civil or domestic law. Political right is necessary to end the state of nature and secure to each individual a precisely defined sphere of external freedom. In addition to political right, because states also interact and thereby affect the freedom of their peoples, there must be a well- defined body of inter-state law also sometimes referred to as the law of nations or international law.

But Kant does not stop here. He claims that these two forms of Law necessarily lead to a third, international political or world law. Why is a third level of public law necessary for the "rightfulness" of the system as a whole? Why would not the addition of a law of nations to political right be sufficient to capture the set of interactions significant to freedom? Through the addition of cosmopolitan right Kant extends public law to cover interactions not only within and between states but between states and foreign individuals. In taking this step Kant is placing the individual rather than the state at the center of the system and is assuming a fundamental right to attempt association that belongs to the individual as an individual and does not end with the establishment of the individual's national identity. The significance of this third tier of public law has been troublesome to some interpreters since it is unclear how a body of law "above the state" could be implemented without limitation to traditional understandings of state sovereignty.

Though contrary to the view that Kant's philosophy of right is state-centered, this cosmopolitan individual right of association should not be surprising. It is individuals who form civic unions. The duty to form civic unions while fundamental is nonetheless "arbitrary" with respect to the exact scope of these unions, both in regard to the "people" and the "territory" of the particular civic union. Each union must be a determinate 'we' but the principle by which the multitude becomes a determinate union is universally applicable to all human beings. ⁵ As Selya Benhabib has recently argued, in every act of legislation there is also an act of political self-constitution. The idea of a social contract contains then both the moment of the constitution of law and the moment of the constitution of a people. This capacity of any people for self-determination is a universal property of humanity. It arises from freedom not from nature. Associations can be modified, transformed and extended in accordance with further acts of association.

⁴ Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss,
trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit, p. 136-7

⁵ Selya Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens ((Cambridge: Cambridge
Univesity Press, 2004) Benhabib argues that every act of self-legislation is also an act of self-
constitution and that democracy requires determinate borders that are both civic and territorial. P.
45

Recognizing the priority of the human right of association (and dissociation), Kant maintains that citizens always have the right of emigration and that every sovereign has the right to encourage immigration. ⁶ Benhabib has therefore concluded that a right to attempt to become a member of another society is itself a corollary of the right of association. Given a universal individual right of association public law must include juridical principles to regulate the possible interactions between individuals and states and between immigrants (aliens) and citizens. Kant did not work out a detailed code of these interactions .His principle of hospitality (the definition of cosmopolitan right that is given in Perpetual Peace) appears to operate only at the level of the offer of association. Specific terms of association must be contracted and Kant was sympathetic to denials of such offers when based on attempts at domination or exploitation. ⁷ But, Benhabib argues, there are some principles (ethnic or racial exclusions) that cannot be used to justify the denial of this offer because they are contrary to the idea of human right . ⁸ Thus while sovereigns are permitted to regulate the admission of immigrants by reasonable standards Benhabib argues it is unacceptable for the (Kantian) state to permanently deny admission to citizenship on discriminatory grounds.

This inclusion of cosmopolitan right within the system of public right has implications for the rightfulness of both national and international law, limiting these two principles to compliance with the basic rights of both individuals and communities. If Kant is correct concerning the significance of cosmopolitan right then ethnic nationalism cannot provide an adequate justification for the state because all rightful states have a cosmopolitan foundation in the universal right of individual association.⁹

While the obligation to enter into a juridical condition is universal Kant envisions a plurality of civil unions or states. The rightful character of this plurality is itself conditioned upon the production of a juridical condition among states. Because states are capable of interacting and influencing one another, a rightful condition for one people

⁶ Immanuel Kant, "Metaphysical Elements of Justice", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans

Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet op. cit, p. 160-161 It is interesting to note that citizenship here is

defined by birth not by blood and deprivation of citizenship, deportation or what came to called

denaturalization is according to Kant only allowable for crimes that make an individual a

"danger" to others not on the basis of one's "ethnicity".

' See Kant's remarks on the wisdom of the Chinese and Japanese regulation of trade with

Europeans. "Perpetual Peace" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet.

op. cit., pp. 106-07

⁸ Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, op. cit.,

pp. 138-39. The right of association is of course a human right but Benhabib further argues that

whatever the criteria for admission they must be such as could be (ideally) mutually agreed upon.

Ethnic exclusions cannot pass such a test.

Kant states that the human beings who make up a nation can be represented as "analogous to descendants from a common ancestry (congeniti) even if this is not in fact the case." "The Metaphysics of Morals" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet. op. cit., p. 164. This representation is clearly treated as a useful fiction used to provide a sense of unity and equality. In any case nations are not states until the people are further represented in terms of a social contract. Here their freedom, equality and independence is viewed as deriving from their moral autonomy not their natural attributes. Kant further maintains that birth is not an "act" and so cannot create any inequality in one's legal position - this would seem to indicate that blood relations cannot provide a foundation for one's legal status. Ibid, p. 76

(which includes their collective property or national territory) will not be compatible with a rightful condition for another people unless both peoples exist within a mutual juridical condition or under a public law regulating interactions between states and making the possessions of each compatible with the possessions of all. Thus rightful national property requires a Law of Nations recognizing these territorial claims and forbidding war, conquest, annexation and other forms of coercive intervention. While traditionally international right focuses on the right of war, Kant maintains that such a conception is confused. Rights can only be pursued in a juridical condition. International right thus may begin in a condition of war but the so-called "rights of nations" must be pursued in such a manner as to make possible a voluntary exit from the state of nature. ¹⁰ The first stage of this exit requires a federation expressly committed to common defense. Such a federative league will not entail the dissolution of separate states but it does imply the need for public laws that are enforceable since aggression against a member of a defensive league would trigger a collective obligation of resistance.

Cosmopolitan right then operates on the assumption of a context of association that is rendered "peaceful" even if not exactly "amicable" by the federation. But cosmopolitan right goes beyond defensive relations. In fact, cosmopolitan right is made necessary because attempts to establish commerce (mutual influence which cannot be indefinitely avoided) are forms of intervention into another society which to be rightful have to be regulated first and foremost by a principle of right that establishes both the basis and the limits of such "contracts". The right of association generates the duties of hospitality. Thus Kant makes explicit the connection between cosmopolitan right and public law: "This right, in so far as it affords the prospect that all nations may unite for the purpose of creating certain universal laws to regulate the intercourse they may have with one another, may be termed d cosmopolitan (ius cosmopoliticum)."¹¹

Cosmopolitan right as a Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace.

Let us switch our attention now to the manner in which cosmopolitan right appears in Perpetual Peace. Perpetual Peace is Kant's attempt to outline his peace project. It is a complex essay consisting of different sections and supplements. I will be dealing only with the first two sections that outline the articles Kant proposes for inclusion in a future peace treaty intended to terminate not a particular war but to permanently end the condition of war. The first section contains six preliminary articles that function to guide states out of the state of nature but are merely preparatory for their acceptance of the three Definitive Articles which formally institute the state of peace. The preliminary articles include prohibitions on: reservations for a future war, the acquisition of a state by inheritance or purchase, standing armies, national debt for the purpose of pursuing war, interference in other states' internal affairs, and acts of hostility that preclude a future peace. The preliminary articles could be accepted by a purely defensive league but the

⁰ This is why in discussing rights in war Kant does not set out a set of conditions for a "just" war but rather states that: "The only possible solution would be to conduct the war in accordance with the principles which would still leave the states with the possibility of abandoning the state of nature in their external relations and of entering a state of right." "The Metaphysics of Moral" , in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet. op. cit, p. 168 ¹¹ Immanuel Kant," The Metaphysics of Morals", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit. p. 172

three Definitive Articles go beyond this defensive purpose and indicate that states taking this step, through acts of "formal institution", have entered into a juridical condition. Kant states: "Thus the state of peace must be formallv instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not itself a guarantee of peace." " These articles taken together establish a "cosmopolitan constitution" or a "cosmopolitan condition" without the imposition of world state. ¹³

The first Definitive Article requires that the constitution of every state be republican. Republicanism is the idea that law arises from the united will of the people. The legislative authority resides in the people as a whole expressed through their representatives. The united will must however always be "represented" since any attempt on the part of a legislator to also execute the law destroys its impartial character and renders such acts "despotic". Republicanism then requires that the legislative power be separate from and represented through the executive power. ^M

Because legislative authority arises from the "general will" republicanism minimally entails the legal equality of all citizens and their subjection to a common legislation. However this republican standard is compatible with variations in the "forms" of government (i.e. it would include a constitutional monarchy) and differences in the material content of the law and the material purposes a state might pursue. Any government that can claim to represent its people equally through a common legislation is republican in this sense.

The second Definitive Article states that the right of nations shall be based upon a federation of free nations. This federation differs from a state of nature in that its members are pledged to the maintenance of peace through the securing of the freedom of all. In other words the members of this league renounce war as the traditional means of pursuing their rights. They do not however renounce their sovereignty nor do they merge into one international state. Kant maintains that although individuals have a right to coerce one another to abandon the state of nature in order to establish their (political) rights, states already embody a form of right and thus have a moral status that does not permit coercion. To coerce a state is in effect to destroy its sovereignty and to return its people to a state of nature. To coerce a state is thus to introduce into historical development a moment of barbarism and moral regress. Kant is committed to a view of historical progress that does not permit the use of immoral (violent) means. This does not however entail that states may not voluntarily subject themselves to certain forms of public law only that they cannot be coerced into such a commitment. Clearly the commitment not to pursue one's security through war or preparations for war when made in the context of a defensive federation would be a transformative commitment because it

" lmmanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 98

³ Ibid, see footnote, p. 98 Kant states that there can be 3 types of constitution based on three types of right. The civil constitution that creates the state is then not the only type of ''constitution" or juridical condition. If in fact all three of these types of right exist then all three types of constitution must be co-possible. It must be possible then for each constitution to limit the other without dissolving it.

¹⁴ Republicanism need not be democratic in the sense of direct democracy. In so far as direct democracy does not permit the separation of legislative and executive functions it is according to Kant "despotic". Despotism is the direct contrary of republicanism. Ibid, pp. 100-01

would transform the environment within which states pursue their rights. The federation stands prepared to defend the freedom of each member and thus provides a guarantee that eliminates the rationale within the federation for the traditional "offensive" behaviors. The third Definitive Article requires all states to respect the principle of cosmopolitan

right limited to the conditions of universal hospitality. The right of hospitality is here defined as the right of every individual to attempt association with others grounded upon the right to traverse the earth's surface that the human species holds in common.¹⁶ The right of hospitality generates the universal duty to respect this right not to be treated with hostility. The principle of hospitality in effect establishes a base line for toleration, respect and decent treatment in mutual interactions. While it permits exploration and offers of trade, it would forbid practices such as conquest, colonization and slavery. If decent treatment is to be universally afforded, the third Definitive Article requires that cosmopolitan right be given status within the domestic law of members of the federation of free states. It also requires that the right of nations be limited to compliance with cosmopolitan right. In light of these requirements Angela Tarborrelli argues that "The Right of nations forces every state to perform only one act -That act is the inclusion of cosmopolitan right into their own constitutions". ^] This inclusion of cosmopolitan right into the constitution of every state that becomes a signatory to a pacific league commits each state to treat all individuals as if they were citizens of the world. In this manner it becomes possible for all persons to have basic rights without the tangible existence of a world state.

But if public right requires that every state respect basic human rights, then when states violate or fail to support basic human rights whether of their own citizens or of those aliens who reside within their territory, such acts constitute a violation of public law that cannot but be a concern of all other states. Cosmopolitan right would then seem to open up all member states to possible internal interference despite the prohibition on such interference stated in preliminary article #5 of Perpetual Peace. However as one of the Definitive Articles in Perpetual Peace formally instituting a juridical condition cosmopolitan right would appear to super-cede the preliminary articles whose application is merely preparatory for entrance into the federation of free states. It can then be argued that entrance into such a federation though voluntary would carry with it subjection to cosmopolitan right as a form of public (international political) law. Recent commentators, such as Alyssa Bernstein have recognized a "intermediate stage" in which states become subject to public law between the state of nature and an (ideal) republic of republics.¹⁸ Daniel Archibugi claims that cosmopolitan law is "a body of public law with

¹⁵ Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 105

' This right is not a form of collective property. Rather it is a "community of reciprocal action" which leaves the possibility of interaction permanently open. This right is recognized in international law in the form of international air space and international waters. See "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 172

¹⁷ Angela Taraborrelli, The Significance of Kant's 3^rd Definitive Article, in Kant's Perpetual
Peace: New Interpretative Essays", ed. Luigi Caranti (Roma: Luiss University Press, 2006) p. 155

¹⁸ Alyssa R. Bernstein, "Kant on Rights and Coercion in International Law: Implications for
Humanitarian Military Intervention", in Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik, edited by Byrd,

the same dignity of state law and international law" ¹⁹. He maintains that cosmopolitan law is a channel that opens states up to "interference" in the sense that it subjects them to rightful criticism of their behaviors based upon their common cosmopolitan constitution. As citizens of the world, all individuals have the duty to subject all agents, including states, to criticism for the violation of basic rights. Thus Kant states in Perpetual Peace that under the principle of hospitality (cosmopolitan right): "The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained: it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right transforming it into a universal right of humanity." ²⁰

Archibugi argues further that the inclusion of cosmopolitan right among the Definitive Articles is evidence that contrary to democratic peace theorists and other interpreters stressing Kant's purported statism, Kant did not believe that republicanism alone would be sufficient to achieve lasting peace. Kant was well aware that republican states were not necessarily inclined to treat foreigners according to the values they had developed domestically. ²¹ Rather, lasting peace would require "the development of a consistent body of law above the state" ² that would require all states to treat all individuals with respect and would guarantee the basic rights of individuals everywhere. Archibugi argues that given the tendency of republicans to overstate their own "piety" while engaging in international misconduct, the only effective guarantee that a particular state is republican in the true sense "is to be traced to its recognition of and respect for cosmopolitan rights both at home and abroad". This reading of the relation of peace to cosmopolitan right suggests that defensive leagues formed prior to the establishment of the universal federation of republics need not and perhaps ought not to exclude non-republican governments who are willing to accept the principle of cosmopolitan right and afford basic human rights to their citizens as well as respect the basic rights of non-citizens. This broader basis for the league can promote peace which in turn can promote the internal reform of non- republican governments and lead states to adopt republican constitutions. Perhaps equally important, respect for cosmopolitan values can bolster

Hruschka, and Joerden. p. 42. Following Kleingeld, Bernstein argues that the federation of republics could not arise except after a long process of gradual political reform which the preliminary articles are intended to facilitate. The federation then is a stage intermediary between the prior state of nature and the ideal republic of republic and in this intermediate stage one can argue that international right has transformed the state of nature and that member states are now subject to public law.

¹⁹ Daniel Archibugi, "Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law, and Peace", in Kant's Perpetual Peace: New Interpretative Essays, ed. Luigi Caranti, op. cit., p. 98

'° Immanuel Kant, "'Perpetual Peace" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit., p. 107-108

¹ This was true of European colonialism, the American institution of slavery, Napoleonic expansionism, etc.

²² Daniel Archibugi, "Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law, and Peace", op. cit., p. 97

²³ Ibid, p. 129

republican national law against internal corruption and decay. Peace it can be argued is a product of cosmopolitan and not merely republican values.²⁴

Through cosmopolitan right individuals become juridical persons (citizens of the world) and are guaranteed the right to have rights without recourse to a world state. But what institutional mechanisms are appropriate to the implementation of these rights? Does cosmopolitan right go beyond public criticism and open up the possibility of military interventions into the internal affairs of states which would seem to be prohibited not merely by preliminary article #5 but also by the defensive purpose of the league which is to secure the freedom of each state? Given a commitment to cosmopolitan right would the internal violation of human rights on the part of one state authorize the military intervention of other states? Would such a "pre-authorized" intervention count against the prohibition on interference?

One way to deal with this question is to appeal to Kant's definition of autonomy as popular self-determination. If Kant's argument against internal interference derives from his bottom up definition of autonomy as self-determination (popular sovereignty) it can be argued that a state that violates the basic rights of its people does not reflect the will of that people. In extreme cases where members of the society are denied juridical status altogether (usually then followed by extreme abuse) it can be argued that the government has instituted a state of internal war or state of nature in which there can be no duties of obedience on the part of those denied legal status. Given the existence of a league committed to cosmopolitan right, extreme internal conditions may open up a right of interference not unlike that permitted in a condition of civil war. On this basis, Bernstein supports the enforceability of cosmopolitan public law by arguing that for states who remain signatories to the cosmopolitan league but also engage in the violation of the basic rights of their citizens, interventions to end such violations are not external aggression but simply "law enforcement". ²⁵

Perhaps the most thorny issue arises from those states whose publicly expressed policies are hostile to cosmopolitan values and international law of any kind and who refuse to join any peace oriented league. Applying a notion developed by Georg Cavallar, Bernstein takes her argument for the enforcement of public law further stating that openly hostile states stand in a relation to international right as that of an "unjust enemy". ² This is I believe an interesting distinction which draws our attention to the fact that such an enemy could only be recognized and defined from inside the condition of international right (from the perspective of a pacific federation) and not from the traditional assumption of a state of nature between nations wherein each state is necessarily judge in its own case. An unjust enemy is one who stands against a peaceable federation of states in open defiance of its end. Should such a "rogue" state simply be isolated and left alone? What if such a state engages in violence against its subjects?

²⁴ Kleingeld makes a similar point in her argument that a voluntary league by providing an
environment for cultural exchange and a forum for the adjudication of conflict can prepare states
to want to submit to a stronger version of the federation. See "Kant's Arguments for the League
of States", op. cit.

²⁵ Alyssa R. Bernstein, "Kant on Rights and Coercion in International Law: Implications for
Humanitarian Military Intervention", in Jahrbuchfuer Recht und Ethik, edited by Byrd,
Hruschka, and Joerden

²⁶ Ibid

Should that be viewed as simply internal discord? It can be argued that the refusal to recognize rights internally on the part of states that reject international law can be taken as a sign that this state cannot be trusted to respect the peace and can therefore be treated as an imminent threat to all. ²⁷When faced with an "unjust enemy" Kant argues that other states are permitted to deprive the unjust state of its power "to act in a similar way again". While Kant does not discuss the full range of permissible means of redress against such a state he does mention the institution of constitutional change (but not dissolution of the civil union of the people) which presumably would be designed to eliminate the despotic qualities of the constitution responsible for the aggressive tendencies of the state. Without the assumption that the aggressive tendencies of such a state indicate a general disposition against the peace, externally initiated constitutional change would clearly violate the strictures of non-intervention. Of the unjust enemy Kant states: "For they are a threat to their freedom and a challenge to them to unite against such misconduct and to deprive the culprit of the power to act in a similar way again." ²⁸

Short of responding to the rogue state, the defensive league remains committed to respect for the freedom and self-determination of its members. Although initially limited to the principle of hospitality such a league may also commit itself to various international rules facilitating intercultural and economic exchanges. In so far as the growing community of interaction can be expected to result in a further development of both national and interstate law, cosmopolitan law will be a "necessary supplement" bringing these laws into compliance with cosmopolitan right. International law at this level while voluntarily negotiated will require the development of legal expertise and courts for the exercise of judgments, independent of the states that may be a party to particular disputes, concerning just implementation of its rules. These legal decisions cannot be considered interferences with the sovereignty or freedom of states who are in this manner "associated". Much of this international political law will shape how states articulate the rights of individuals who enter into these exchanges and thereby influence the formation of domestic law as well. The pull of cosmopolitan values will be in the direction of republican freedoms without the requirement that an individual republic take on the task of "exporting" republican values.

Certainly as Kant projected in Idea For a Universal History such associations will go through many transformations before all states are able to perfect their internal civil constitutions and commit themselves to the 1^st Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace but if cosmopolitan right is accepted in the early instantiations of the defensive league it will have laid the groundwork for the stable and universal institution of republicanism and it will be unnecessary for individual republics to make war to save the peace.

Cosmopolitan right as a principle regulating historical development

It was clearly the connection between genocide and Hitler's war of European domination that motivated the UN Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent treaties internationalizing genocide as a crime against humanity. See my argument to this effect in Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (University of Wales Press, 2001)

²⁸ Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals" in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit, p. 170

Although all three of the Definitive Articles must be embraced for the complete institutionalization of perpetual peace it is clear that once states have entered into any form of association, cosmopolitan right must lead the way. It is through adherence to the principle of hospitality that nations will interact sufficiently to desire a pacific league. It is through cosmopolitan respect for the equality and autonomy of peoples that internal reforms will become possible. It is only after a long period of external interactions and internal reformations that states will be in a position to accept the Definitive Articles and institute a cosmopolitan constitution.

Kant states that only under the condition of cosmopolitan right " can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace."²⁹ Why is cosmopolitism the necessary condition for perpetual peace? Here we must remind ourselves that peace as a duty is a collective task. Peace, Kant tells us, is not just a part of the theory of right "but it's entire purpose." ³⁰ It can therefore only be pursued in association with others and on the grounds of our communal existence. Thus we must look to the development of our cultural capacities to find the way to peace. The development of the capacities of the species is the theme of Kant's Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose. While much has been made of the "teleological" perspective of this essay which appears to make nature the agent of the development of our capacities, the context for such developments are legal institutions, specifically the state and a law governed association of nations. It is only through these legal institutions that genuine freedom becomes possible. Progress in freedom under law is clearly for Kant the way that mankind breaks its tutelage under nature and bootstraps itself into autonomy. Given that the development of freedom is a collective task, cultural association is a fundamental driving force of human development bringing with it both dangers and opportunities.

However, because the public that reason must address is cosmopolitan, enlightenment depends upon increased cultural exchange. ³¹ Only under conditions of cosmopolitan right can cultural exchange increase in a lawful manner. This intercultural exchange improves the internal culture of each state. Kant states: "as culture grows and men gradually move toward greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace"³² While differences in culture can lead to misunderstandings and provide pretexts for wars, the attempt to impose a unification on the basis of a dominant culture or ideology can only stifle enlightenment and lead to despotism. Unification by force is always "premature". In Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History, Kant has even argued that as long as culture remains immature war is preferable to an enforced peace. He states: "only when culture has reached its full development...will perpetual peace become possible and of benefit to us." ³³

¹⁹ Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Kant: Political Writings, op. cit, p. 108 ■° Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit, p. 174

¹ Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit p.57

■² Immanuel 1 Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit, p. 114

'³ Immanuel Kant, "Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit p. 232

To attain this end, humanity must undergo a process of cultural evolution regulated by the principle of cosmopolitan right. Greater agreement on principles can prepare the genuine acceptance of cosmopolitan public law as states and peoples come to perceive the benefits of mutual interactions that are subjected to juridical institutions with public authority and force. Cosmopolitan right, although not extending in principle beyond the attempt to enter into relations with foreign peoples, facilitates peaceful interactions and therewith the development of public law. Kant states: " In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution."³⁴

Clearly public law is not antithetical to the principle of cosmopolitan right and must grow out of it. The full development of international right then goes well beyond and replaces the traditional understanding of an unlimited right to war with the right to pursue a guarantee of peace. Cosmopolitan right is a necessary condition of that guarantee. The full guarantee is the cosmopolitan constitution or condition.

If my interpretation is correct, that this cosmopolitan constitution is completed by the adoption of the three Definitive Articles within the federation then it is unclear in what sense a world state can add anything to Kant's peace project. If the main function of a world state is to produce a system of public law that could guarantee to each a specific sphere of freedom, adjudicate conflict and avoid war then we need not envision this system as the product of the coercive imposition of a state of law from the top-down. Given the collective acceptance of the duty to strive toward the end of peace with all of its moral constraints and barring the catastrophic destruction of the species, a cosmopolitan system of law can emerge from the bottom-up process of historical development under the principle of cosmopolitan right.

Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace", in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, op. cit, p. 106

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