Effects of Systemic Values

The external environment can also have a more subtle impact on a state's objec­tives, for any international system possesses certain values or doctrines that transcend purely local or national values. For example, in the eighteenth century, the doctrine of divine right and the values associated with royal authority were accepted by the European upper classes irrespective of nationality; hence, certain external objectives and actions relating to the preservation or extension of royal authority were highly valued. If dynastic prestige was a goal to which all monarchs aspired, then the various methods of achieving status, such as alliances and marriages, were also considered legitimate. Today, it would appear absurd if Great Britain made an alliance with Sweden in order to enhance the prestige of both countries' royal families. In the late nineteenth century, establishment of empires became a "legitimate" national objective, providing increased interna­tional influence, economic rewards, and considerable prestige. In the contempo­rary setting, one of the great transnational values is self-determination and politi­cal independence, while almost no value is placed on colonies. The predominant systemwide value today is economic development. A nation's status is closely related to the level of its technology, military forces, and industrialization, no longer to the personal prestige of dynasts, to colonies, or to royal palaces. Since all the major Western states have placed such high value on industrializa­tion and have achieved so many social goals (including international influence) through industrializing policies, it is little wonder that this objective would have a great impact on the values of newer states as well. Although there are some important indigenous pressures for economic development and modernization— as well as strong resistances—the objective of industrialization is adopted by many governments in part because other states have adopted it as their own goal.

RELATIONSHIPS

AMONG THE COMPONENTS

The analysis of policy makers' attitudes, values, beliefs, and personality needs implied that their relevance to a definition of a situation is related to factors of political role and various administrative procedures. In another section it was suggested that public opinion can impose restrictions on the options availa­ble to policy makers in a democratic political system, whereas public opinion in authoritarian political systems, no matter what the situation, plays little or no role in helping to shape foreign-policy objectives and actions. We also argued that organizational needs, values, and traditions are less important in influencing policy making during times of crisis than during consideration of routine prob­lems. All these statements are really hypotheses about relationships among the

352 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

various factors that may influence foreign-policy behavior. It may be useful to know that the state of domestic opinion, the structure of the system, and tradi­tional policies are important aspects, let us say, of the Danish foreign minister's view of a situation to which he must respond. But, ideally, we would also want to know under what conditions these are more important than organizational values or personality variables. Too often we assume that only one component of a definition of the situation can explain the behavior of states in their relations with other states.

The problem of assessing the relative importance of different compo­nents—and the relationship among them—is well illustrated in analyses of Soviet foreign policy. Some observers of Russian politics claim that ideological impera­tives are the paramount consideration in formation of Soviet foreign policy. They argue that the Soviet Union, like any other state, has certain core values and interests, such as national independence and territorial security; but all middle-range and long-range objectives and the diplomatic strategies used to achieve them are deduced from Marxism-Leninism. Others have emphasized the persistence of purely "national" themes in Soviet foreign policy; they claim that by virtue of its geographic position (which creates certain weaknesses and strengths from a military point of view), the Soviet Union is primarily continuing czarist foreign policies, albeit under Communist slogans. This type of analysis suggests that Soviet policy makers define their environment and perceive Russian needs and interests much as their predecessors did, except that they place more emphasis on doctrinaire justifications for actions. A third type of analysis of Soviet foreign policy emphasizes contemporary leadership qualities and role rather than ideology or traditional policies as the most important elements in Russia's external behavior. Diplomatic maneuvers and major policy decisions are thus seen not as tactics designed to implement some grandiose ideological plan, but as a means of establishing or safeguarding the position of the top leadership or a way of fulfilling certain psychological needs. Finally, another generalization explaining Soviet actions abroad claims that the leadership is increasingly concerned with fulfilling domestic needs and responding to con­sumer demands. Thus, domestic needs and expectations will loom as important components of any definition of a situation. Finally, Soviet foreign policy is often portrayed as changing according to the fortunes of various factions in the Communist party or of certain bureaucratic elements, such as the mili­tary.

Which of these interpretations is correct? All would seem at least partially valid, since ideology, traditional policies, personal and political needs, and do­mestic needs would probably be relevant to many policy-making situations. But this tells us very little about the relative importance of each component in differ­ent circumstances. We can use historical data to test our propositions and per­haps even make predictions for the future. For example, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy made in terms of the components listed in this chapter would

353 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

probably reveal that during the 1930s, the structure of the system (as interpreted in Marxist terms), national needs, traditional policies, and Stalin's personality and political role were the most important aspects of reality considered by Soviet policy makers in selecting goals and diplomatic strategies.

In the absence of systematic, comparative analyses of foreign policies in different countries, it is difficult to make verified statements concerning which phenomena might be considered relevant or significant under different circum­stances. Instead, we can suggest some hypotheses about which components are apt to constitute the most salient aspects of a definition of the situation, and under what conditions.

1. The more critical or urgent a situation is perceived to be, the fewer people will become directly involved in defining the situation, choosing responses, and selecting goals.

2. The fewer people making these decisions, the more likely that their actions will reflect personal idiosyncrasies, attitudes, beliefs, and personal political needs.⁵⁵

3. The more people involved in defining a situation, formulating goals, or choosing alternatives, the more the decisions will reflect group and organizational values, needs, and traditions, and the less they will reveal the attitudes, beliefs, or images of any single person.⁵⁶

4. The greater the threat perceived by the policy-making group, the more pressure for conformity and group consensus.⁵⁷

5. The structure of the system is likely to be the most pervasive limitation on the selection of goals or actions when (a) it is polarized, (b) expressions of public opinion or nationalist sentiment are weak, (c) the state has few capabilities and perceives a common threat with the bloc leader, and (d) the situation is generally noncritical.

6. Conversely, a government's foreign policy objectives are least likely to be influ­enced by system structure when (a) the international system has a diffuse struc­ture, (b) the situation is defined essentially by one man who can effectively control his domestic resources, including popular attitudes and opinions, (c) personal values, personality needs, or political needs can be achieved through foreign policies, (d) the state is neither a leader nor a member of an alliance or coalition, and (e) the situation is deemed critical.

7. Domestic needs will be salient aspects of a definition of a situation when (a) the state is dependent upon external sources of food and supply, (b) policy makers are responsive to expressions of domestic opinion, and (c) a territory is perceived to be highly vulnerable to attack from abroad.

8. Capabilities establish limits on objectives for all states, no matter what other internal or external conditions prevail.

9. Capabilities are a less important consideration for governments that subscribe to long-range, revolutionary objectives.

⁵⁵ See Snyder and Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea."

⁵⁶ Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality."

⁵⁷ See Irving Janis,Victims of Croupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), Chap. 1.

354 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

10. The availability of capabilities may be a less important component of a definition of the situation in crisis situations.⁵⁸

11. Doctrines and ideologies are more important in denning situations in political systems or governments (a) that subscribe to an official set of doctrines, (b) where the top leadership is not responsive to expressions of public opinion or domestic needs, (c) that are new or have undergone recent revolution, and (d) during noncritical situations. In conditions of crisis (such as attack or major threat), responses are seldom deduced from, or closely related to, doctrines or ideologies.

12. Bureaucratic influences will be important components of a definition of the situation (a) in long-established and stable states, (b) in noncritical circumstances, and (c) where the top leadership changes rapidly or is uninvolved in an issue area.

13. Except for size as measured by population, foreign-policy actions do not seem to be linked to other national attributes. No type of state is more or less likely to hold a monopoly on diplomatic sin or rectitude.

These hypotheses refer to most governments in a variety of situations. If we were to study many cases of foreign-policy making, we would expect them to be corroborated in most instances by empirical data. However, we can also use the various factors in a definition of the situation to explain the objectives, decisions, or actions of a single government in a particular set of circumstances. Suppose we wished to explain the British government's decision to intervene militarily in the Suez crisis of 1956. The story of that decision is lengthy and complex, but several conclusions emerge. First, the decision was made by very few people. Anthony Eden's position was paramount in policy making, and he let only a few cabinet colleagues into his plans. However, Eden had to act on the basis of information that was supplied to him by intelligence agents. Second, the perception of threat was high. Eden thought the closing of the Suez Canal and its nationalization by Egypt represented an intolerable threat to England's supply lines. Third, Eden's definition of the situation was highly colored by analogies drawn from his past diplomatic experience. He had been a foremost opponent of appeasement of Nazi Germany, and in the 1956 circumstances, he portrayed President Nasser as another Hitler, who had to be stopped early. The consequences of inaction, or further diplomacy, were in his opinion ex­tremely dangerous. Fourth, although Eden was undoubtedly aware that there would be considerable opposition to his scheme for Anglo-French intervention on behalf of the Israelis, he did not anticipate a public furor; more specifically, with a comfortable majority in the House of Commons, he knew he was not staking the fate of his government. Fifth, despite the polar power structure in the world and all the presumed opposition of the project from the United States and the Soviet Union, the perception of threat was so great that independent action (that is, without consulting the United States) had to be taken. Finally,

⁵⁸ Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War," in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, ed. James Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 469-82.

355 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

estimations of relative military capabilities revealed that the operation could be conducted easily: The Israeli-French-British forces could gain control of the canal at a relatively low cost. Thus, if we wanted to explain the decisions and actions and list the components in their relative importance, the following order might emerge:

1. Eden's perception of threat (conditions abroad) and his analysis of the conse­quences of inaction, heavily colored by the use of historical analogies.

2. Domestic needs. (Eden acted on the basis of his estimation of the consequences to Britain's economy and security if Nasser closed the canal to international shipping.)

3. The estimation of relative capabilities, including the participation of Israel and France.

4. Bureaucratic influences, in the sense that top military officers told Eden what was militarily feasible.

5. Structure of the system. This was mostly irrelevant in the decision stage, but in the execution of the plan, the vigorous opposition by the United States and the Soviet Union prevented its full realization.

6. Public opinion—in particular, Eden's anticipation of some criticism of the project by members of the Conservative party.

To summarize, making foreign-policy decisions and formulation of goals and objectives involves complex processes in which values, attitudes, and images mediate perceptions of reality provided by various sources of information. The resulting images or definitions of the situation form the reality and expectations upon which decisions are formulated. The components of any definition of a situation will vary with conditions in the system, internal political structure, degree of urgency in a situation, and political roles of policy makers; but most definitions of a situation include estimations of capabilities, domestic reactions, and immediate events or conditions abroad. How important each component may be in a given situation is difficult to predict, although some hypotheses have been presented. In the absence of a verified theory of foreign policy, these statements will have to remain as crude generalizations or untested hypotheses, subject always to qualifications and exceptions provided by new developments in international politics.

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Allison, Graham Т., and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Para­digm and Some Policy Implications,"in Theory and Policy in International Rela-

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Brace Jovanovich, 1950. Bauer, Raymond E., Ithiel Pool, and L.A. Dexter, American Business and Public

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University of Illinois Press, 1953. Christiansen, Bjorn, Attitudes toward Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality.

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Law

and World Opinion in Explanations of Foreign Policy

Up to this point, we have related foreign-policy outputs to system structures, national attributes, organizational variables, and personality factors. Orienta­tions, national roles, objectives, and actions have been explained by such diverse concepts or phenomena as the "images" in the heads of policy makers or the degree to which an international system is polarized or diffuse in its power structure. The opinions, beliefs, and values of attentive publics—and, in certain cases, of a national population as a whole—can be linked to some types of policy outputs. In Chapter 2, we pointed out that any international system can be characterized in part by the rules whereby it regulates transactions and actions. The world we know, in terms of its international relationships, would be barely recognizable if governments did not generally adhere to certain fundamental norms of behavior that we often take for granted. If the concepts of sovereignty or freedom of the seas did not exist, for example, contemporary foreign-policy orientations, roles, objectives, and actions, as well as international transactions, would be significantly different. No explanation of foreign policy can therefore be considered adequate unless some effort is made to examine how legal norms and less formal "rules of the game" enter into decision-making processes.

In discussing system structure, capabilities, and public opinion, we im­plied that orientations, roles, objectives, and actions are often limited by these variables. An isolationist orientation can be linked, for example, to weak capabili­ties; governments choose not to pursue goals that they calculate they cannot achieve, or they refrain from an action they fear might prompt unfavorable

360 Law and World Opinion in Explanations of Foreign Policy

public reaction, lack of support, or hostile responses abroad. Similarly, legal norms and traditions create restraints and obligations. Whether explicitly or implicitly, when making decisions, policy makers consider legal obligations and the consequences that their proposed courses of action would have on these obligations.

Any obligation is a limitation on a government's freedom of action. Some parts of international law define what states may or must do; others point out what states must not do; still others attempt to define the situation in which positive or negative obligations become operational. If, in their foreign-policy behavior, governments meet these obligations—even at the expense of their interests or efficient conduct of diplomacy or war—we can infer that legal consid­erations at least in part explain their decisions. If, in other circumstances, govern­ments interpret the rules in an arbitrary fashion or violate their permissive, positive, or negative obligations, we can conclude that other values, interests, or considerations were more important.

The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how legal norms enter into the making of foreign policy, particularly in the realm of decisions and actions. To what extent can we explain any particular decision or action by reference to legal obligations? In decision-making situations, are legal obligations more or less important than policy makers' concern over public opinion, ideological preferences, the situation abroad, or organizational traditions? Are some states more "law-abiding" than others? Considering that there is a vast network of commercial, diplomatic, and military treaties between states, as well as customary rules of law and tradition, how often are actions consistent with the obligations that arise from these sources?

Before exploring the relationship between law and foreign policy—how governments use law—we should establish the extent to which a legal system, or comprehensive network of traditional and treaty law binding all states in the world, really exists. In looking at legal factors in foreign-policy outputs, then, our first problem is to establish the existence, nature, and shortcomings of the legal system, then inquire into the situations in which governments are more or less likely to fashion their objectives and actions to accord with legal obligations.

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