Bureaucratic Needs, Values, and Traditions

Conditions abroad or personality characteristics and ideologies often seem to offer adequate explanations for the decisions and actions of governments. We could assume that the Soviet government would respond to a vast increase in American military spending by some increase in its own armed-forces programs. Deployment of Soviet missiles could be seen as essentially a response to American military initiatives. Yet, how large an increase in its defense budget and what types of weapons would be emphasized could be better explained or analyzed by investigation of bureaucratic and political processes within the Soviet Union.

Thus, in many instances, a full understanding of objectives, decisions, and actions must be based on a model of policy making that is more complicated than one that portrays policy makers as carefully fitting means to ends, gauging other states' intentions, and responding to certain conditions or events abroad. Choices are usually made in a bureaucratic-political context. Graham Allison reminds us that if we think of objectives, decisions, and actions as the result of bargaining between various government agencies, affected by organizational traditions and bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction, then important facts that may have been ignored in the "rational" model of decision making may emerge.²⁰ Policy makers, in other words, define the situation not only in terms of conditions abroad, but also in terms of what is feasible bureaucratically. They receive infor­mation from various government agencies, and the alternatives they consider are often alternatives that have been drafted and debated by lower officials of various government departments. In part, then, how top-level policy makers see a problem, and the alternatives they contemplate, are an amalgam of how bureaucrats have characterized the situation and what positions they have come up with, taking into consideration organizational rivalries and bureaucratic tradi­tions. Policy outputs, then, can be portrayed as the outcome of the pulling and hauling of bureaucratic politics.

The degree to which the bureaucratic characteristics affect the making of policy willvary from country to country, and in different circumstances. A policy developed over a period of time within the British government bureaucracy may differ significantly from a decision made by a few leaders of a small new state that barely has a foreign ministry. Henry Kissinger has suggested that there are three important styles of foreign policy making today: (1) charismatic-revolutionary, (2) ideological, and (3) bureaucratic-pragmatic.²¹

²⁰ Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 689-718. See also Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79.

²¹ Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 17-43.

332 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

In the first, long-range goals emphasizing the reconstruction of the inter­national system or of regional subsystems predominate. Purposes are aimed at construction of a new future, not merely at manipulating the environment. In the early stages of nationhood, these goals can be seen largely as an attempt to put into effect the dreams and aspirations of revolutionary leaders, supported by strong nationalist movements. Bureaucracies in these states are weak and undifferentiated, and lack tradition. Thus, objectives, decisions, and actions largely reflect the ideas and whims of single individuals, often leaders of national­ist revolutionary movements.

In the ideological mode of policy making, as illustrated by most of the socialist states today, policy reflects a constant tension between the bureaucratic elements, with their traditional ways of dealing with problems, and the older revolutionary traditions, which emphasize long-range goals and actions abroad involving high risks.

The bureaucratic-pragmatic style of policy making is characterized by (1) a passive attitude toward the environment, in which policy is made up primar­ily of responses to situations abroad, rather than initiatives to alter established power relations, (2) a mode of thought that assumes that all events raise "prob­lems" that can be solved by hard work and the give-and-take of diplomatic bargaining, and (3) a strong division of labor, emphasizing specialization. A "problem" is studied extensively by all sorts of bureaucratic experts, extensive data are gathered to illuminate the issue, and formal recommendations are made, reflecting the organizational traditions and biases of various government agen­cies. By the time objectives are defined and courses of action outlined, it is very difficult to see the imprint of any single individual on the project. According to Kissinger, "Outcomes depend more on the pressure or persuasiveness of the contending [bureaucratic] advocates than on a concept of overall purposes."²²

It is not difficult to cite cases of policy outcomes that emerged after lengthy bargaining between government agencies. The European Recovery Pro­gram (Marshall Plan) was a primary instrument designed to cope with economic reconstruction in Europe and with the possibility of Communist victories there. But not all who engaged in formulating the program saw the objectives in the same way, nor did those who were consulted agree on the appropriate means of coping with the "problem." The final program reflected congressional pres­sures and bargaining among government agencies; it was a synthesis representing diverse interests, objectives, and attitudes. To understand why this important foreign-policy program emerged as it did, an explanation only in terms of condi­tions in Europe or the predilections of President Truman or Secretary of State Marshall would be inadequate.

In the state characterized by a highly developed foreign-affairs bureau­cracy, there are also unlimited possibilities for foreign offices, military organiza­tions, or intelligence agencies to take actions formulated independently of the

²² Ibid., p. 40.

333 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

top political leadership. This may be a case where bureaucrats deliberately seek to impose their own solutions to problems and attempt to keep the top leadership uninformed of plans and actions. Of the many cases in modern history where policy was vitally affected by bureaucratic actions, perhaps none led to more fatal consequences than the occasion in 1914 when German military and diplo­matic officials took steps to goad Austria into war against Serbia and deliberately kept the kaiser uninformed of their own activities, to say nothing of several British diplomatic moves aimed at reducing tensions and preserving peace.

Another variation of policy as the outcome of bureaucratic bargaining or of secrecy is where a top leader formulates an objective or orders the imple­mentation of actions, only to have them sabotaged or forgotten in the bowels of officialdom. This is not to say that all such instances are "bad," because often, as in the case of American-Canadian relations, the bureaucrats of the two countries may have an implicit agreement to "keep down the heat" on a conflict that, were it handled by the top leadership, might lead to an open rupture between the two governments.

The relevant factors in a definition of a situation may become extraordi­narily complex and diverse because they involve the interests and attitudes of many competing government agencies. In the United States, for example, many external issues and foreign situations touch upon the interests and jurisdictions of the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury, in addi­tion to the Department of State. Before decisions can be made, all the people concerned have to be consulted and a policy must be designed to accommodate all those interests. In states deeply involved in the affairs of the system, recurrence of external problems that impinge upon the interests of many government agen­cies requires establishment of formal interdepartmental machinery, which may very well formulate and administer policies of which the top political leadership has only slight knowledge.²³ Another factor that may complicate the definition of objectives and implementation of policies is the rivalry and suspicion among personalities in different agencies, where some may not accept others' definition of a situation or resent the intrusion of other agencies in problems they feel to be within their exclusive competence.

Even where top policy makers are fully consulted about all major deci­sions, bureaucratic values will tend to impinge upon individual beliefs, attitudes, and images. Foreign ministers are restrained in their actions and prerogatives partly by constitutional and customary limitations, partly by their own general political position vis-a-vis other policy makers, and also by their expectations of what constitutes proper conduct for a foreign minister. No matter how strong

²³ There are more than 160 formal interdepartmental and interagency committees on foreign affairs in the U.S. government. Kenneth Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 124. For an argument that portrays the president as a virtual captive of the bureaucracy except during crises, see Donald Lampert. "Issues for Global Actors: the U.S.A." in Issues in Global Politics, eds. Gavin Boyd and Charles Pentland (New York: The Free Press, 1981), pp. 49-66.

334 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

the personality, the foreign minister will always be subjected to influences from the bureaucracy, whether the need to maintain policies consistent with traditional forms of behavior, reliance on organizational sources of information, or more specific resistance by lower-level policy makers against attempted procedural or substantive innovation by the foreign minister. Anyone who has worked in a large organization has learned that whatever one's personal views and beliefs, he or she faces strong pressures to conform with group norms.

Under what circumstances are administrative processes and organiza­tional values, needs, and traditions likely to have an important role in the defini­tion and implementation of objectives? First, where political leadership at the top is weak or unstable, the main administrative organs of the state may have to make policy in the light of their own needs, values, and traditions. Second, most noncritical transactions between states are carried out by the lower echelons of policy-making organizations, often without the explicit direction of a foreign minister or head of government. For routine problems, traditional departmental policies and standard operating procedures, rather than direction from above, serve as the main guidelines for action. The American State Department in any one day receives about 1,300 cables from American diplomatic and consular officials abroad providing information, requesting directions, or seeking permis­sion to make certain decisions in the field. But of that large number of communi­cations, the secretary of state will read only twenty to thirty—about 2 percent of the total. The State Department also sends out approximately 1,000 cables daily, many of which elucidate objectives and provide directions on policies designed to implement them; of these, the secretary of state may see only six, and the president will have only one or two of the most important communica­tions referred to his office.²⁴ The implication of this type of communications system is clear: On routine and nonvital matters (even if a bad decision made on these may result in a diplomatic crisis), the experts and lower officials of policy-making organizations define specific objectives in the light of their own values, needs, and traditions, often through informal alliances with bureaucrats in other countries. High officials are generally concerned only with suggesting the main outlines of objectives, not with their specifics nor with the detailed means by which to implement them. As Joseph Frankel points out, high-ranking officials within policy-making hierarchies are far removed from information that describes the external environment in detail.²⁵ They become captives of advisors, oversimplifications, and all the prejudices, established attitudes, and procedures of large bureaucratic organizations. It is little wonder that diplomatic history is replete with cases of top policy makers choosing disastrous courses of action because their images of reality and expectations were at odds with real conditions in the environment.

²⁴ Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk to a Senate subcommittee, reported in Time, 83, No. 4 (January 24, 1964), 19.

²⁵ Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 96.

335 Explanations of Foreign-Policy Outputs

In a crisis, where decisions of great consequence have to be made rapidly, the effect of bureaucratic processes may be reduced considerably. In these cir­cumstances a few key individuals at the highest level of responsibility and author­ity usually congregate to map strategy and responses to the problem or threat they are confronting. There is no time for detailed consultations, preparation of position papers, or thorough analysis of the situation and its background. Since urgency is the most salient aspect of the definition of the situation, decisions have to be made largely upon the basis of immediately available information, unverified rumors, and the views of upper-level advisers.²⁶ Under such condi­tions, individual attitudes, values, beliefs, and images of the highest policy makers become particularly important in defining the situation, choosing responses and goals, and implementing policies.

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