Помощничек
Главная | Обратная связь


Археология
Архитектура
Астрономия
Аудит
Биология
Ботаника
Бухгалтерский учёт
Войное дело
Генетика
География
Геология
Дизайн
Искусство
История
Кино
Кулинария
Культура
Литература
Математика
Медицина
Металлургия
Мифология
Музыка
Психология
Религия
Спорт
Строительство
Техника
Транспорт
Туризм
Усадьба
Физика
Фотография
Химия
Экология
Электричество
Электроника
Энергетика

COLLABORATION, SECURITY COMMUNITIES, AND PEACE



Collaboration in Western Europe takes place in all three contexts discussed in this chapter. Relations between Spain and Finland, for example, are of the inter­mittent bilateral type; cooperation on NATO problems takes place within an institution, but one with none of the attributes of supranationality; and collabora­tion within the European Community occurs primarily in a highly institutional­ized context with some supranational features. Western Europe includes, at once, a set of bilateral relationships, a multilateral pluralistic security community as far as most military and diplomatic problems are concerned, and an integrating

12 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, pp. 291, 490-91.

453 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

community with respect to economic, transportation, agricultural, and atomic-energy problems.

Most students of European integration would not yet predict that suc­cessful integration in economic and technical sectors will have much influence on the ways with which diplomatic and military problems are handled between the same governments. As Haas points out, integration forces have an impact on further integration, but not necessarily in integration of other types of political or economic activities such as development of common foreign or defense policies.13 Another student of the process of amalgamation, Amitai Etzioni, has hypothesized that different types of international or supranational organizations have different potentials for "spilling over" their cooperative patterns of behavior and unique methods of resolving conflicts into other areas.14 He suggests, for example, that international technical organizations such as postal services or systems of police cooperation between nations have little influence in promoting cooperation between governments on major political or economic issues. Inter­national organizations concerned with labor, health, or cultural problems have had somewhat more influence on the political sectors. Etzioni, like others, also points out that the military sector is highly autonomous; even if alliances involve integration of military forces, common military planning, and exchange of de­fense information, the habits of cooperation and conflict resolution in these organizations do not seem to "spill over" automatically or create any impetus for economic or political integration. It is economic integration, with its pervasive influence on all sectors and groups of society, that seems to have the highest potential for inducing political amalgamation and spilling over its patterns of decision making and bargaining into diplomatic relations between states.15

Whether or not Europe will eventually take steps toward political or defense amalgamation remains to be seen. From the point of view of collabora­tion and conflict, however, amalgamation is not critical. Western Europe today constitutes at least a pluralistic security community; the chances of again seeing a war within Western Europe seem remote at best. Consider what a dramatic change this represents over the past generation. In the 1920s, there were conflicts involving violence between Sweden and Finland, France and Germany, Poland and Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria, and Bulgaria and Greece. In the Locarno Treaties, England was committed militarily to come to the assistance of France, Belgium, or Germany, depending upon which was a victim of aggression. Some people in Norway and Sweden still spoke of the

13 Ernst Б. Haas, "International Integration: The European and Universal Process," Interna­tional Organization, 15 (1961), 372-74; see also Leon Lindberg, "Decision-Making and Integration in the European Community," International Organization, 19 (1965), 72-77. However, in the last fewyears the community has developed a common foreign-policy stance on some issues. The ten have formed a cohesive caucus at the meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

14 Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification," American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), 931-32.

15 However, see Deutsch, Political Community, p. 189, for a partly dissenting view.

454 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

possibility of war between them. By 1941, every state in Europe, with the excep­tion of Ireland, Sweden, Turkey, Spain, Switzerland, and Portugal, had been the victim of German, Russian, or Italian aggression.

Since 1945, there have been conflicts involving violence in Western Europe only between Yugoslavia and Italy over Trieste, and Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The military capabilities of Western European states are not aimed toward each other, nor are there expectations or plans for the use of violence. We would not predict that violence in this area could never occur, but only that, compared to the situation forty or fifty years ago, the probabilities have been vastly reduced.

What of the remainder of the world? North America, as we have pointed out, clearly falls in the category of a security community; Scandinavia and New Zealand-Australia would also be included. Other areas of the world are more difficult to classify. Some Latin American states still have military capabilities targeted toward each other, and warfare erupts occasionally in Central America. The United States continues to employ subversive techniques and occasional military intervention to maintain friendly regimes or to oust regimes it considers too radical. In other words, the limits of domestic and foreign policies for all Latin American states are implicitly set in Washington, not in the other national capitals; and if those limits are breached, any state must face the possibility of coercive activity, ranging from economic pressures, through subversion, to out­right intervention.

An analogous situation prevails in Eastern Europe. Many of the frontier disputes and minority problems that led to conflict between the Eastern Euro­pean states in the 1920s and 1930s have been muted by territorial adjustments during and after World War II and by the sense of ideological unity that has permeated this area. Most of the East European states have come to accept Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy and its unique experiments in socialism; among themselves, therefore, the likelihood of violence is low. However, as in Latin America, the region has to be considered also in terms of the intrusion of an extraregional power, in this case the Soviet Union. Its actions in crushing the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and the experiments of the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia twelve years later as well as unsubtle threats against Poland at the beginning of the 1980s, indicate clearly that developments within the Eastern European states will have to conform more or less to Soviet interests and values. Deviations from the Soviet interpretation of socialism face military extermination, just as "Communist" revolutions in Latin America and the Caribbean will con­front American hostility and occasional military intervention.

For the rest of the world, the record is also unfavorable, for there are few other areas that, using the criterion of the possibility of armed violence between independent political units, could be classified as genuine and well-established pluralistic security communities. With the possible exception of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), none of the non-European regional or federal organizations displays the degree of integration, ideological and cultural homogeneity, or bargaining patterns and procedures for resolving

455 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

conflicts found in Europe, North America, and Australia-New Zealand. Not only do important territorial and ethnic disputes occasionally mar the unity of these areas, but because of their political and economic instability, they make prime targets for domestic and foreign-inspired intrigues, subversion, and revolution.

In the future, most international crises will probably have as their source the civil wars, coups d'etat, and revolutions that will occur intermittently in devel­oping countries. These, in turn, will be exploited by the major powers for their own ends, or the domestic factions will appeal to outside powers to intervene on their behalf. Recent agendas of the United Nations indicate that the most serious diplomatic and military crises are related to the problems of building viable nations and establishing within those states regular procedures for trans­ferring political power. The Congo, Lebanon, Laos, Yemen, Cyprus, Dominican, Czechoslovakian, Angolan, and Afghanistan crises were originally domestic quar­rels in which one or more external powers intervened, thus turning them into international crises involving the possibility of war. It is these domestic-interna­tional conflicts that will probably be most difficult to resolve peacefully, because they involve the interests and values of at least four parties (the United States and China or the Soviet Union, as well as the two major domestic factions), whereas other international conflicts are essentially bilateral confrontations. This is one legacy of the cold war.

Governments will continue, as in the past, to seek their objectives and defend their interests against the demands and actions of others by the traditional means of offering rewards, threatening or implementing punishments, employing diplomatic bargaining, and using force. Within pluralistic and amalgamated secu­rity communities, the probabilities are low that conflicts will be resolved through violent threats, deterrence, or conquests. In these types of relationships, the "power" model of international politics—where states seek to increase their power at the expense of others—is a particularly inappropriate tool of analysis. Conflicts arise, but legal and ethical restraints, as well as habits of "getting along," are highly effective in keeping friction to a minimum and helping to provide for settlements by bargaining compromise, and awards.

Elsewhere, the paths to security, peace, and pacific settlement of conflicts will be dangerous and strewn with failures. With the problems most nations in the world face, including building viable states, coping with secessionist move­ments, and organizing minimally satisfactory economic systems, it may be a wonder that there has not been more international conflict in recent years. Various approaches to the goals of economic well-being and international peace have been, and continue to be, advanced by different observers of international politics. To some, world federalism is the answer; others argue that legal norms must be perfected before they can be expected to restrain effectively the actions of states when their objectives are incompatible. Many believe that international relationships will not improve until the new nations become "developed," a view that overlooks some of the horrendous social problems faced by populations in "developed" states. Still others, perpetuating a long history of simplistic thinking, assume that the only road to international stability is the one that

456 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

emphasizes perfection of national capacities to threaten and inflict violent punish­ment. Whatever the panacea, plan, or nostrum, none will work by itself, and .none can lead to the goal quickly.

Despite their failures, international organizations have made great contri­butions to peace in what is, historically, a wisp of time. But this has been possible only because of changing public attitudes toward war and violence. One has only to compare the bellicose views of statesmen, politicians, and publics at the turn of the century with their attitudes today. Then, war was commonly regarded as a positive good, a means of steeling national character and weeding out the poor and weak from the strong and wealthy. It was a game to vindicate honor and prestige, and opportunity to demonstrate the latest toy of destruction. After two world wars, such views seem ludicrous to most people. Today, interna­tional violence is mostly seen as a tragedy. Without such views, it is unlikely that security communities could grow, international organizations flourish, or stability develop. Underlying any improvements in the techniques and practices of resolving international conflicts peacefully are the attitudes and ethical princi­ples of those who wield power and those in the general public who support or criticize their leaders. Without the proper values and attitudes, including willingness to experiment in international programs, concede short-run national disadvantages for common long-range advantages, and exercise great caution in the use of military power, mere institutions, laws, plans, and proposals will be inadequate to the task.

What about collaboration in issue contexts other than security? One trend that has become commonly recognized is the multilateralization of nonse-curity issues. Most governments acknowledge today that the fact of interdepen­dence—where the actions of most states have serious consequences on others— requires them to join together to attack problems such as ocean pollution, dwin­dling natural resources, inadequate food supplies among many developing coun­tries, and possibly regulation of the activities of nonstate actors such as multina­tional corporations. Individual government action in these realms is simply insufficient and, in many cases, can be harmful. If, for instance, seabed mining corporations begin operating in the open sea, without any international regula­tion, there may be a mad scramble for the most productive areas, intense pollu­tion of the oceans, and undercutting of the developing countries' incomes from export of raw materials. The consequences of unfettered individual action are not difficult to predict; but this does not always make solutions easier. Govern­ments and nonstate actors are often pressed, unfortunately, to seek maximum gains in a minimum amount of time, so they believe they must protect national advantages even if, in so doing, they diminish the chances of truly collaborative enterprises that could increase everyone's advantage. In other cases, govern­ments are not willing to make short-run sacrifices because they anticipate that the international community will not develop norms or institutions in time to protect everyone's interests.

Reconciling the diverging interests of 150 or more states is by no means

457 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

easy, even when the necessity of collaboration is commonly recognized. And even if new universal treaties and institutions are created to regulate and attack some of these global problems, it may be a long time before the norms of cooperation and bargaining found, for example, in the European Community will develop in them. One hundred fifty states with conflicting interests, repre­senting different cultural, political, economic, and social systems, will find it much more difficult to develop the procedures of a "security community" than was the case in Europe or North America. This is not to say, however, that the need is any less acute.

CONCLUSIONS

The first chapter of this book made the point that contemporary studies of international politics seek generalizations. That is, they are primarily concerned with looking at state actions, processes, and the settings (systems) within which these actions and processes occur; they are less interested in analyzing events except insofar as those events illustrate general types of actions or processes. In addition, it was pointed out that some phenomena are not unique to interna­tional politics; hence, we can learn from the insights of anthropologists, sociolo­gists, and psychologists. Some of the attitudes among policy makers facing an international crisis are certainly comparable to those that people face in some interpersonal situations, for example. Finally, the introduction alerted the reader to the differences among description, explanation, and normative prescription in the study of international politics. Most of this book has been descriptive, but in Chapters 12 through 14 and in the present chapter, where we analyzed why violent conflicts are improbable in a security community, the discussion was explanatory. In some cases, the evidence allowed us to generalize with confidence. In other cases, the evidence leads only to educated guesses.

What about prescription? The analysis has generally avoided prescribing what governments should do (some parts of Chapter 11 and the last section of this chapter are obvious exceptions). And it has avoided detailed discussion of some contemporary international issues. To some, this omission may appear to indicate indifference toward human suffering; to others, the book evades the real-world excitement of current affairs. Underdevelopment, creation of an equitable world trade system, inadequate food supplies, pollution, seabed min­ing, the arms race, and direct broadcasting from television satellites—all present immense difficulties. The agenda of international politics is changing—or, per­haps more accurately, new items are being added to it before some of the old items have been resolved. And within five years, still other problems will arise. All will be of important consequence, and broad public understanding of the many issues in each problem may help governments come to satisfactory solu­tions. But the actions and processes of international politics will remain essen­tially the same: Governments will continue to develop various types of objectives,

458 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

roles, and orientations. Alliances and coalitions will not disappear just because some aspects of the cold war are subsiding. Diplomatic bargaining, economic pressures, propaganda, and the many overt and covert uses of organized violence will not change in their fundamental characteristics. Knowledge of the various sources of external actions, ranging from personality characteristics of policy makers to national needs and aspects of the international system, can help us to understand how governments will cope with the new problems. We can hope that ethical norms will play an increasingly important role in policy making. As James Eayrs has put it, policy makers should go beyond asking, "Will it work?" and in each situation, compromise their narrower interests to the ques­tion, "Will it help alleviate human suffering?"16 There is not much evidence that ethical priorities are changing, but before one can begin discussing how governments should behave, we should know first how they do behave.

Although the amount of international collaboration is impressive, as the role of nonstate actors continues to grow in importance, and as new issues appear on the global agenda, we still face the perennial question of organized violence between nation-states. This remains the most fundamental problem of international politics. My position remains that before one can attack this one overriding problem successfully, or even intelligently, it is necessary to understand the sources and characteristics of foreign policy in general and con­flict behavior in particular. To the extent that this book has helped the reader understand this fundamental issue and to distinguish the unique event from recurring actions and processes in international politics, it has achieved its pur­pose.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alting von Geusau, Frans A.M., European Organizations and Foreign Relations of States: A Comparative Analysis of Decision-Making. Leiden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1964.

Axline, Andrew W., "Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World," International Organization, 31 (1977), 83-105.

Deutsch, Karl W., Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954.

--------, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, N J.: Prince­ton University Press, 1957.

Etzioni, Amitai, Political Unification. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.

Feld, Werner J., The European Community in World Affairs. Sherman Oaks, Calif.: Alfred Publishers, 1976.

16James Eayrs. Right and Wrong in Foreign Pohcy (Toronto: Toronto University Press. 1966). 40.

459 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

Finlay, David J., and Thomas Hovet, Jr., 7304: International Relations on the Planet Earth. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.

Galtung, Johan, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making. London: Allen & Unwin, 1973.

Haas, Ernst В., Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964.

______, "International Integration: The European and Universal Process," Inter­national Organization, 15 (1961), 366-92.

______, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957.

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968.

______, and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of

Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," Interna­tional Organization, 18 (1964), 705-37.

Hansen, Roger D., "Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoreti­cal Efforts," World Politics, 21 (1969), 242-71.

Jacob, Philip E., and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communi­ties. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964.

Lindberg, Leon, "Decision-Making and Integration in the European Commu­nity," International Organization, 19 (1965), 50-80.

______, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford, Calif.:

Stanford University Press, 1963.

and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change

in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970. Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations.

Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. Pentland, Charles, International Theory and European Integration. New York: Free

Press, 1973. Pinder, John, "Issues for Global Actors: The European Community," in Issues

in Global Politics, eds. Gaving Boyd and Charles Pentland. New York: The

Free Press, 1981. Scott, Andrew, The Dynamics of Interdependence. Chapel Hill, North Carolina:

University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

Spinelli, Altiero, The Eurocrats: Conflict and Crisis in the European Community. Balti­more, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Wallace, Helen, William Wallace, and Carole Webb, eds., Policy-Making in

the European Communities. London: John Wiley, 1977.

 




Поиск по сайту:

©2015-2020 studopedya.ru Все права принадлежат авторам размещенных материалов.