COLLABORATION AND PROBLEM SOLVING BETWEEN OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON

The large volume of transactions across the Canadian-American boundary is bound to offer opportunities for both conflict and collaboration. In many areas, the interests of Americans and Canadians are similar, and cooperative ventures and policies can easily contribute to the advantages of both. In the economic realm, for instance, balanced trade between the two countries contributes mutu­ally to increased national wealth and fulfills critical economic needs. Americans export more products to Canada than to any other country in the world and have found in Canada a lucrative field for investment of private capital. Canadians look south not only for sources of import and export markets (which represent over 70 percent of Canada's foreign trade), but also for capital to help develop Canadian industry, and for investment of their own capital. Through collabora­tion and coordination of policies, Washington and Ottawa can gain important mutual benefits in flood control, pollution abatement, fisheries management, and tourism. Although of declining importance in the missile age, Canada's geographic location provides the United States with added protection from, and warning against, any attack emanating by air from the north. In the era of the long-distance bomber in particular, the United States would have been highly vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack unless early warning systems and interceptor fighter bases could be established on Canadian soil. The Canadian government, in defending its continued participation in the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), argues that a Canadian contribution to the invulnerability of the American retaliatory capacity protects its own interests, since a Soviet-American war could hardly leave Canada unaffected. In general

⁴ For a summary of various studies that seek to trace the causes of the development of pluralistic and amalgamated security communities, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organizations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

444 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

diplomacy, Canadian and American objectives have often been similar, so that collaboration, for example through NATO, results naturally. Canada's interest in the Commonwealth, its contributions to the United Nations through peace­keeping efforts, and its initiatives in disarmament negotiations have been either of little interest to the United States or usually consistent with American posi­tions.

Despite the many areas of collaboration, Canadian and American needs and interests are by no means identical in all issue areas. The Canadian approach to Communist nations has been different in many respects from that of the United States. Despite American displeasure, Ottawa has never broken diplo­matic relations with Cuba, nor has it stopped trading with that country. Similarly, Canada recognized the government of mainland China and supported its seating in the United Nations long before the United States adopted such positions. While not disagreeing with basic American objectives in Vietnam, the Canadian government occasionally expressed its disapproval of the bombing of North Vietnam and the reluctance of the United States to enter into peace negotiations. But differences of objectives or approaches to problems in the global sphere are not, perhaps, the most significant. Issues relating specifically to Canadian-American relations also raise controversy. The main problem, as seen from Ottawa, is the consequences for Canadian economic interests of policies designed in Washington to relieve specific American problems. Because the two economies are so intricately related, any American decision on matters such as regulation of foreign investment or exchange rates can have profoundly adverse effects on the Canadian economy. It is often not a question of American malevolence, but of decision making in Washington. In seeking to cope with its own economic problems, the American government often fails to consider adequately the conse­quences of its policies on the needs and interests of closely related state?.

Canadian policies have also threatened American interests. The exten­sion of Canadian sovereignty to the 12-mile limit deprived American fishermen of some traditional fishing grounds. Similarly, the U.S. government opposed the unilateral extension of Canadian shipping and antipollution controls to a 100-mile limit in the Arctic. The Canadian government does not allow Canadian advertisers to deduct as a business expense any ads placed on American border stations broadcasting into Canada. American broadcasters lose about $30 million in advertising revenue from this policy and have therefore asked the U.S. govern­ment to retaliate.

Perhaps the most contentious issue has centered around Canada's dwin­dling energy supplies. Americans had for years purchased Canadian oil and natural gas at low prices. As the Canadians began to appreciate the true value of these resources—and recognized that supplies will be exhausted in the foresee­able future—exports to the United States dropped dramatically, or, in the case of natural gas, prices were raised as much as 450 percent within a 12-month period. Canadian decisions on these matters were often taken without previous consultation with American officials. The American government strongly pro-

445 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

tested these actions, and some officials hinted at American economic retaliation. In these circumstances, protests from Washington could be expected.

Nevertheless, there is little question that Canada and the United States constitute a pluralistic security community. It is difficult to contemplate the two governments using violence against each other, planning military operations to the north or south, or targeting military capabilities toward each other. There is no likelihood of formal unification of the two countries either, but Ottawa and Washington have created some joint institutions to handle the problems that arise between them. Most of the collaboration and coordination, however, occur through normal government channels; bureaucrats at all levels and from all departments communicate and meet to initiate proposals, elicit responses, hammer out details, and draft treaties or establish the frameworks that will guide national policies or coordinated ventures. Finally, transactions occur to fulfill the agreements.

The vast majority of problems that impinge upon the interests of both states are handled in this manner. The negotiations often involve elements of opposition, but there is little likelihood of conflict leading to violence. Looking at the ladder of conflict actions outlined in Chapter 15, we see that Canadian and American diplomats and government officials seldom go beyond the use of warnings, protests, and occasional nonviolent threats.

One of the first conclusions we can make about relations in a security community, then, is that conflict in issue area A does not affect collaboration in issue area B, as would happen when two states' relations were typified by something less than harmony and trust. For example, if some incident or crisis develops between the Soviet Union and the United States, the whole range of re­lations between the two countries is affected. When the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan, all sorts of Soviet-American undertakings were linked together and frozen. The American administration refused to submit the SALT II treaty for approval by the Senate (other reasons were involved as well); technology ex­ports were restricted; sports contacts were terminated; and trade relations were disrupted. Conflict in one domain generated conflict in all others.

When conflicts arise between Ottawa and Washington, how are they typically treated? Certain assumptions and traditions about the appropriate ways of dealing with contentious issues, found in both Ottawa and Washington, help to explain why the two governments seldom carry their behavior beyond the expressions of regret, sending protests, and making mild warnings or threats. First, American and Canadian diplomats and government officials tend to ap­proach problems from a common intellectual starting point: They agree that economic progress is desirable (which makes them sensitive to each other's economic needs), that technology can overcome most problems, and that out­comes must be based on technical criteria and evidence, not emotional responses. Both agree that conflicts of interest and diplomatic irritations are essentially problems to be solved rather than major confrontations to be won at all costs through campaigns and stratagems of diplomacy and threats. Provided that tact,

446 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

diplomacy, and technical evidence are employed, they assume that few issues are irreconcilable. In addition, they commonly recognize that the benefits of overall cordial relations are not to be sacrificed for the sake of short-run gains in a single policy sector. Hence, both perceive definite limits beyond which they should not press their claims. The great difference in military power between Canada and Washington is largely irrelevant in all negotiations except those involving military matters. The outcome of a series of negotiations will probably reflect the needs of the two parties and their ability to persuade through docu­mentation and evidence, not their military strength.

The results of most disagreements between Washington and Ottawa are typically compromises. In addition, avoidance and passive settlements are frequently observed. Officials in both capitals undoubtedly refuse to take some initiatives for fear of a strong negative response from the neighbor. In other cases, one side will propose a new policy or a particular solution to a problem, only to have the other reject it out of hand. At this point, the proposal is shelved, or the two governments will explain their respective points of view on an issue, acknowledge an unbridgeable difference between these views, and then learn to live with the situation.

What factors can help explain the extensive collaboration between the two countries, the lack of conflict behavior (beyond the occasional warning or protest), and the absence of spillover of conflict from one area into another? In large part, of course, the explanation is the complementary nature of the interests and needs of the two countries. Both sides recognize the advantages to be gained through cooperative efforts, through consultations before major policy decisions are made, and through maintaining a sensitivity toward each other's interests. In addition, certain characteristics of the bureaucracies of the two countries help account for the nature of their mutual relations. Communica­tions are an important factor. The volume of government transactions between Ottawa and Washington is immense. It cannot be handled only between the Department of External Affairs and the State Department. Hence, most bureau­crats in Ottawa correspond directly with their counterparts in Washington, and often simply use the telephone. Common language and slang reduce the possibil­ities of misunderstandings, and in many cases help significantly to create personal friendships. Bureaucrats represent the interests of their countries, but their close bonds help create alliances against those who might disrupt their special interests and traditions. For instance, if American top-level officials begin discussions on new policies toward Canada, the lower-level officials of the two countries might agree among themselves to resist changes. In particular, when a confronta­tion is likely to develop, the instinct of the lower-level officials is to handle the problem themselves, quietly, before it becomes "politicized." Finally, both governments exchange a great amount of information. Most of it is done unoffi­cially, but formal consultations and joint institutions are employed widely also.

One consequence of the vast amount of communication is that needs are known and actions are predictable. Many conflicts develop between Washing-

447 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

ton and Ottawa precisely when the consultative machinery is not used. But overall, mutual knowledge leads to empathy, predictability, and mutual expecta­tions of "responsible" behavior. Each knows generally what policies and actions to expect from the other, and which types of issues are most sensitive. If there are proposed policy changes, they are usually discussed extensively before final decisions are made. Both governments appear reluctant to initiate certain self-serving actions because the shortrun gains do not measure up to the damage of the overall relationships.

But occasionally, policies are changed anyway. Particularly during the past few years, both governments have adopted nationalist economic policies that have had unfavorable consequences on each other's society. As the range of economic incompatibilities has grown, the habits of extensive consultation and policy coordination, at least in the economic realm, have been replaced by more unilateral initiatives, more threats of retaliation, and more extensive use of public accusations. Yet, even in these circumstances, in the long run both governments are inclined to suffer each others' unfavorable policies with equanimity. And of course, in many other issue areas, where collaboration and consultation remain the norm, the occasional conflicts between Washington and Ottawa seem to have little impact.⁵

COLLABORATION

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