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CONTEXTS WITHIN WHICH COLLABORATION TAKES PLACE



Cooperation can take place in different contexts. Most collaborative transactions and interactions occur directly between two governments facing some problem or matter of common interest. Brazil and Japan, for example, annually negotiate a trade agreement; Pakistan and China arrange airline communications between Rawalpindi and Peking; or two African states agree to survey and demarcate their common boundary.

Other collaborative enterprises are undertaken within international orga­nizations and institutions. Some international organizations, such as the United Nations, are based on the sovereignty of each member; they cannot act without the consent of the parties involved in an issue, and agreements to collaborate are normally made only in accordance with the will of the least cooperative member. In other organizations, such as the European Community, collaboration takes on characteristics not often found in the United Nations or its regional counterparts, and behavior of the member states in fashioning cooperative enter­prises is in some ways significantly different. But whatever the differences be­tween international organizations and supranational organizations, collaboration within them has this in common: The formulation of common policies or coordi­nation of separate national policies is done on a multilateral basis, and often includes plans and proposals drafted not by national governments but by interna­tional civil servants. Moreover, these organizations offer facilities for continual negotiations and bargaining.

The number of multinational institutions designed to promote specific economic, technical, or diplomatic-military objectives or to manage common problems has grown from fewer than ten in 1870 to more than 270 in 1982. As the range of problems requiring multilateral management or solution grows exponentially, the numbers of organizations can be expected to increase at an ever-faster pace. The most prominent institutions include universal organizations dealing with problems of peace, security, trade, and development, such as the

440 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

United Nations, and a variety of organizations which fulfill the same functions but on a regional basis. These include the highly successful European Community and somewhat less prominent institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the socialist Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the Nordic Council which coordinates the Scandinavian states' eco­nomic and social policies, the Arab League which acts both as an anti-Israeli collaborative device and a mechanism to intervene in Arab feuds, and the Interna­tional Atomic Energy Agency, which inspects national nuclear facilities to see they are not employed to build weapons. NATO promotes defense policy coordi­nation and diplomatic collaboration of fifteen Western countries in their relations with the socialist bloc, while the North Pacific Halibut Commission establishes catch quotas for the member states' fishing fleets. From the mundane, technical institution to the global, high profile organization, these and many others provide some regularity and predictability to international politics.

Expanding technology and commercial activity create a plethora of prob­lems that outpace the capacity of governments to build regional or global institu­tions. Thus, many issues are addressed by ad hoc conferences and meetings designed to create new regimes, or rules and regulations that help manage the problems and allocate costs and rewards to all nations. Governments may spend considerable time and effort—the Law of the Sea Conference lasted more than seven years—bargaining and haggling over the rules and regulations, particularly where many private or security interests are involved. While much of the negotia­tion may be acrimonious, common recognition that even a poor regime is better than no regime compels the delegations to collaborate to the extent of develop­ing a minimally satisfying solution. Transnational organizations, such as interna­tional airlines, also become involved in regime creation; without some rules governing routes and fares, chaos involving wars of airlines against each other would ensue. While many regimes are weak and often ineffective, governments have been forced to spend an increasing amount of time negotiating them to avert catastrophic situations caused by unfettered economic and technological activity. The large and lengthy multilateral conference is thus becoming an in­creasingly visible forum for international collaboration.

In addition to the simple bilateral and intermittent collaboration between pairs of states and multilateral coordination of national policies or regime cre­ation within international or supranational institutions, there is the extensive noninstitutionalized collaboration that occurs within what Karl Deutsch has called "pluralistic security communities." In a pluralistic security community, two or more states have many transactions and almost constant interaction, but not necessarily formal organizations for cooperation. However, the distinguishing feature of the pluralistic security community is that all the relationships between the units are predictably peaceful, and when conflicts arise, they are normally resolved by compromise, avoidance, and awards rather than by threats, deter­rence, or force.

Deutsch has distinguished pluralistic security communities, where there

 

441 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

is no integration of political institutions or authority (Canada and the United States, for example), from amalgamated security communities, where two or more independent political units merge to create a larger entity with a common structure of political authority. Historical examples of the processes leading to amalgamated security communities would include creation of Italy out of a conglomeration of formerly warring city-states, papal holdings, and small king­doms on the Italian peninsula; establishment of federal authority and nationhood out of thirteen colonies in America; amalgamation of the former nations of Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and England into the United Kingdom by the early eighteenth century; and unification of Germany out of hundreds of principalities, semisovereign towns and cities, and dynastic states during the nineteenth cen­tury.

The distinguishing feature of a security community, as compared to ordinary diplomatic dyads, is achievement of "integration," which Deutsch de­fines as a "sense" of community, and development of diplomatic-political-military practices that ensure "for a long time" the expectation of only peaceful relations among the populations.1 Deutsch claims that the two main indicators of the existence of a security community are revealed in situations (1) where the policy makers of two or more political units, and their societies in general, cease to contemplate the possibility of mutual warfare; and (2) where the two or more states cease to allocate resources for building military capabilities aimed at each other.2

Of course, it may not be easy to state at what particular point in history a security community has emerged. The Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1819 demilitarized the Canadian-American frontier, and there were few official government plans after 1865 indicating any expectation of war between the two countries. Yet there were several instances during the late nineteenth century when some Cana­dians and Americans expected or planned to use violence against each other. In terms of public attitudes, a true security community between the two countries probably dates only from the early twentieth century. Similarly, there have been no Swedish and Norwegian military forces "targeted" toward each other since the breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905, but segments of the population in each country did consider the possibility of warfare against the other until the end of World War I. Another problem of identification arises when two states continue to make routine preparations for defending their bor­ders against each other, even though the societies and governments concerned

1 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5. Another political scientist, Ernst Haas, argues that true integration and community can develop only where supranational, federal, or confederal institutions exist with powers to direct the policies of the units that are amalgamating. Haas states that while avoidance of force can be achieved outside the context of such institutions, the creation and perpetuation of a new national consciousness cannot be expected to develop unless central political authorities and institutions are established. See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 7.

2 Deutsch et al., Political Community, pp. 31-33.

442 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

would not have any expectation of using or threatening force against the neighbor.3

A third indicator of the existence of a security community could be mutual acceptance and rigorous observance of certain rules of international law and bilateral treaties when collective objectives of the units are not in har­mony. These would include, as well as avoidance of military threats, meeting treaty obligations (except in emergencies, where prior consultation would pave the way for special dispensations), avoidance of interference in the other unit's internal affairs, and observance of normal diplomatic protocol and etiquette in all transactions and negotiations. If behavior conforms to these three indica­tors—no "targeted" military forces, no public expectations of war, and full obser­vance of treaties—we can say that a security community exists between the two or more independent political units, or within an area where the political units are formally amalgamating.

One might object that in such relationships, the essential collective objec­tives and values of the political units are so similar that serious conflicts never arise anyway. The indicators of a security community are obvious characteristics of any relationship where goals and values are compatible to begin with. The concept is thus a tautology. But this criticism fails to acknowledge that some very serious differences have arisen among states in security communities, and that some special characteristics of these relationships have prevented the quar­reling governments from adopting forms of behavior typical in conflicts involving threat or use of force. For example, relations between France and the United States since World War II have often been strained by diverging collective inter­ests and different long-range goals or concepts regarding the future organization of Europe. Throughout the 1950s, the Algerian rebellion caused considerable mutual recrimination and lack of understanding between the French and Ameri­can governments; in 1966, President de Gaulle asked the United States and Canada to remove their troops and facilities from French soil and announced his plans to withdraw French commanders from NATO headquarters; ever since the organization of NATO in 1949, there have been unbridgeable differences of view on appropriate military strategies for alliance forces, control over the strategic deterrent held by the United States, and development of independent nuclear capabilities in certain NATO countries. Throughout the 1970s, France and the United States held often incompatible views on trade and economic issues. In each case, the French and American governments sought to change the behavior of each other to conform to their own interests through normal techniques of persuasion, by offering rewards, attempting to persuade by citing common advantages, and in some cases, making nonviolent threats of depriva­tions or punishments. But in no instance did one party conceive of, or threaten to, employ force against the other; no military capabilities were mobilized to

3 Deutsch et al., Pohtical Community, pp. 115-16. For example, the Canadian general staff still had in its files as late as 1931 plans for military expeditions into Washington, Idaho, Montana, Minnesota, and New York, should an American thrust into Ontario occur.

443 The Interaction of States: Collaboration

signify total commitment to an objective, and communication between Paris and Washington did not break down. The question arises: Why were characteris­tics associated with violent conflicts not displayed in conflicts occurring within security communities?4

What conditions ameliorate conflict within pluralistic security communi­ties and in international organizations? How are problems typically handled when they arise between states in these two contexts? What are the main forms of collaboration? We will explore these questions by looking at collaboration in two contexts: the Canadian-American relationship (an example of a pluralistic security community with low institutionalization) and diplomacy in the European Community (an example of a security community characterized by joint institu­tions).

 




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