SELECTING THE TARGET: WHOSE ATTITUDES CAN BE CHANGED?

Soviet and Nazi efforts to institute foreign propaganda programs (they were the first systematic peacetime propaganda programs) were based on intuition, experiment, and revolutionary experience. Some aspects of the programs were self-defeating and, yet, few professional propagandists today could match the skills and insights of Trotsky, Lenin, and Goebbels. During the course of their revolutionary activities, these men developed propaganda techniques based on perceptive analyses of the psychological traits of human beings in their political roles. Soviet propagandists carefully selected targets and attempted to formulate messages that would appeal specifically to particular groups of people.⁴

Despite rapid development of communication media in the past century, only a relatively small number of people in any given society are likely targets of foreign-oriented information. Various studies consistently reveal that even in industrialized societies with high literacy rates and mass consumption of news,

⁴ The Soviets make an important distinction between propaganda and "agitation." To them, propaganda refers to the intensive instruction and elucidation of the tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy to a small audience. Agitation refers to the presentation of one or several ideas, usually slogans, to the masses of people. Thus, their definition of "propaganda" resembles our term indoctri­nation, while "agitation" resembles our definition of propaganda.

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only a small percentage are interested or involved in international affairs. In many developing countries, the average person's "world" is confined to a small national region or province. Unless a foreign-originated communication has some direct relevance to his or her private everyday life, it is unlikely to reach that person or make any impact.⁵ Among those who are potential targets, how effective are communications, and what personal and social characteristics predis­pose people to react favorably to foreign-sponsored messages?

Some psychologists and sociologists make a distinction between the "nu­clear" personality and the "social" personality. The former includes basic atti­tudes toward objects, ideas, and people, which are usually formed in infancy and reinforced during childhood. These attitudes may or may not relate to political phenomena. In some families, politics are not a matter of general discus­sion, so the child is left in later years to form his or her own opinions, based on his or her own experiences and social relationships outside the family. Still, any child develops general liberal or authoritarian attitudes, whether they have a political content or not. In other families, fundamental political attitudes— in addition to liberal or authoritarian predispositions—are instilled into the child to the extent that no amount of propaganda, or even experience, is likely to change them. Children born and raised in homes where the parents are vocally prejudiced against specific minorities normally grow up with the same prejudices and do not alter them until they move to a different environment. Some attitudes are so deeply ingrained that even a new environment will not prompt an examina­tion of them. The "nuclear" personality and the attitudes central to that personal­ity, thus, are not amenable to change simply by being subjected to propaganda. This is one reason that people who have been brought up in homes and schools where traditional liberal values were systematically inculcated are seldom con­verted to any totalitarian organization or faith. For the same reason, Western efforts to convert dedicated Communists who have lived their entire life in a Communist society are not likely to succeed unless these people have already become alienated from the Communist society or have suffered some traumatic experience.

Following the early childhood years, as individuals become a part of larger associations (school, Girl or Boy Scouts), they form attitudes on new ideas, objects, and people; often, these conform to the prevailing attitudes of peer groups. The strength of these group-established attitudes and opinions can be seen in experiments that failed to modify attitudes of individuals contrary to predominating views within the groups to which those individuals belonged. The significance of the "social" personality is that one's political attitudes tend to be functional to the groups to which one belongs. Or, as one of the consistent findings of voting-behavior studies indicates, an individual's political preferences are likely to be similar to those of his or her closest associates.

⁵ For a review of studies on the limited size of targets, see W. Phillips Davison,International Political Communication (New York: Praeger, 1965), Chap. 3.

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The implications of these findings are important for the propagandist. They suggest that it is easier to change the attitudes of small associational groups or categorical groups, such as classes, which already share similar attitudes, than of an entire national population, which does not constitute a likely target unless all the members of the national society are united strongly on some value such as the maintenance of national prestige or independence. It is the propagandist's job to find the key groups in society and determine what kinds of appeal will arouse the desired response in the selected targets. To summarize, (1) many people have deep-seated attitudes that have political implications and that become over the years fixed character traits, sometimes liberally disposed and sometimes radically disposed, and seldom amenable to change; (2) other attitudes are also a function of the group and can be changed most easily by altering group attitudes collectively; and (3) a person's attitudes may also be changed by moving into a new milieu or being subjected to a traumatic experi­ence.

The next question is, How do individuals handle information and experi­ence that directly contradict their established attitudes? People are resourceful in resisting information that does not fit their own pictures of reality. Voting-behavior studies in the United States indicate that the more partisan voters are before the election, the less likely they are to subject themselves to the campaign appeals of the party for which they will not vote. Those who do subject themselves to information that contradicts their views may lose confidence in their opinions but will frequently go out of their way to seek any information that substantiates their original position. Others, when exposed to "unfriendly" information, may reject it or perhaps distort its meaning and significance. Or they might question the credibility of the information or its source and pass it off as mere "propaganda." Certainly, one's initial attitude toward the communi­cator will have an important bearing on one's reception of the information.⁶

We can see these mechanisms operating frequently when we are con­fronted with information emanating from a hostile country or political party. How often have we failed to read a speech made by a Palestinian leader simply because it came from a hostile source or because we assumed it was mere "propa­ganda"? Yet we will read carefully a speech by a prime minister of a friendly country or by the candidate of "our" political party because the substance of the speech is not embarrassing to our attitudes.

The presence of these and other mechanisms that insulate us from hostile propaganda would indicate that the propaganda instrument is not equally effec­tive against all types of targets. If there are such resistances, who is susceptible and what kinds of targets are most likely to respond in a desired fashion? The experience of government propagandists and the conclusions of the social sci­ences seem to point to some answers.

^s Percy H. Tannenbaum, "Initial Attitude toward Source and Content as Factors in Attitude Change through Communications," Public Opinion Quarterly, 20 (1956), 414.

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Studies reveal that under certain circumstances, communication can be effective in shaping attitudes, where no strong predisposition against the commu­nicator and the communicator's ideas already exists. They can form attitudes toward new objects; they can change attitudes that are weakly held, or, when several attitudes are fairly evenly balanced, they may be able to strengthen one of them (as is often the case with the "independent voter"). A finding of consider­able importance to government information officials is that information of some personal use to the target is the most likely to be effective. Information on Soviet economic output, provided by a Russian embassy official to a Canadian student writing an essay on the topic, is more likely to have an impact on the student than is an abstract Leninist tract.⁷ Propaganda may also successfully arouse or create desired attitudes and opinions if it is a major or sole source of information for a particular target. The propagandist has an advantage if he or she provides information on a new subject or issue, where public attitudes are not already crystalized and prior information was spotty. This conclusion has been explored in experimental situations, where audiences were subjected to very slanted infor­mation on a topic about which they knew very little or possessed few preconcep­tions. Even when the participants had access to other sources of information, they readily accepted as true the bias of the news media most easily accessible to them.⁸

Propaganda is also apt to be effective when directed toward people who share at least partially the attitudes of the communicator.⁹ It is more success­ful in strengthening existing attitudes or crystallizing predispositions than in con­verting those already hostile. Soviet foreign propaganda does not try to create more Marxist-Leninists all over the world. It seeks, rather, to elicit specific atti­tudes toward the Soviet Union and its policies—or toward vague symbols such as "peace" or complete disarmament—among people who are neither in a Com­munist party nor likely to join one as recruits but who, nevertheless, hold some favorable attitudes toward these symbols of Soviet policies.¹⁰ Similarly, the United States International Communications Agency spends more time and money try­ing to reinforce the pro-American attitudes of selected elites in friendly countries than attempting to convert those whose political leanings go in other directions. The External Service of the B.B.C. takes a slightly different approach. Regardless of the targets' political affiliations, it attempts to maximize its impact by creating a reputation for impartiality. Whereas most governments' foreign information

⁷ For a summary of findings on attitude formation and changes in international communica­tion, see Davison, International Political Communication, Chap. 3.

⁸ For one experiment that establishes this point, see A.D. Annis and Norman C. Meier, "The Induction of Opinion through Suggestion by Means of Planted Content," Journal of Social Psychology, 5 (1934), 65-81.

⁹ Thus, one of the standard ploys of propagandists sending messages to a hostile audience is not to reveal their own identity. Nazi propagandists frequently used this "black" propaganda, either by failing to mention the source altogether, or by creating some fictitious cover name that would seem legitimate to the audience.

¹⁰ Paul Kecskemeti, "The Soviet Approach to International Political Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly, 20 (1956), 304-5.

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programs have an identifiable "slant," the B.B.C. presents mostly factual news accounts and critiques of British policies at home and abroad. The purpose is to establish credibility for the information source while simultaneously providing a service for those who are regularly subjected to only official government news sources.

Third, propaganda is likely to be effective among youths and apathetic people. Youths are more vulnerable to suggestion and persuasion, because they are the least likely to hold rigid beliefs or attitudes. Results of research projects suggest that children are particularly open to persuasion between the ages of four and eight and that their suggestibility declines steadily with increasing age. Revolutionary parties that create youth groups, religious organizations, and man­ufacturers of clothing, cigarettes, and cars are all aware of this conclusion and design their propaganda programs accordingly. Apathetic people are also likely targets for the same reason: They do not hold rigid views and tend to be unsure of the political opinions they do adopt. Where such uncertainty persists, persua­sion is facilitated, although arousing interest may be difficult.

Finally, propaganda seems to be most effective when directed toward groups whose members share similar attitudes and toward crowds. We have already suggested that attitudes and beliefs are mechanisms that satisfy social adjustment. Individuals are not likely propaganda targets if the content of the propaganda conflicts strongly with the values and opinions that circulate among their closest social connections. We are all wary of adopting and articulating unpopular views—not just because they are unusual, but because we might face social ostracism for expressing them. Crowds, on the other hand, do not necessar­ily contain an effective network of personal contacts. They are particularly suscep­tible to propaganda appeals but, as the following statement by J.A.C. Brown suggests, only if there is already some shared attitude between the propagandist and target.

The study of crowd psychology . . . has shown that, although people do many things whilst in a crowd that they might not otherwise, . . . new attitudes spring . . . from the individual members of the crowd and not, as was formerly thought, from a mysterious entity described as the "crowd" mind. Because of. . . intensi­fication of emotion [in crowds] it is possible to cause disorganized masses of people to behave in other than their everyday manner, to stimulate and lead them more easily than an organized public which is prepared to listen to reason and discuss a problem. But it is not possible to make them do anything. Negro-lynching crowds exist because anti-Negro feelings already exist; the crowd inten­sifies the feeling to the point of action but does not create it.¹¹

It is not clear why people are more suggestible in the crowd, but many observers have noted that individual credulity tends to fall to a low level when emotions are raised in a large gathering. In their domestic propaganda, the Nazis were well aware of this characteristic and put on fantastic parades and party rallies

¹¹ Brown, Techniques of Persuasion, p. 68.

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to impress the people. There is some evidence that the arousal of any strong emotion may make the individual in the crowd more suggestible, sometimes even when that emotion is directed initially against the leader of the crowd.¹²

CREATING IMPACT

After the selection of appropriate targets, the second task of propagandists is to catch the attention of those to whom they will direct their message. Attention-getting may be a difficult endeavor, particularly among people apathetic or hostile to the communicator. Therefore, the devices used by propagandists tend to be spectacular, colorful, or unusual and may not be related to the substance of the message. When attention is elicited, propagandists then attempt to evoke and play on emotions. They cannot do this, obviously, by presenting a calm catalogue of facts (except where the facts "speak for themselves"). Rather, sym­bols are used to bring about an emotional response, from anxiety and guilt to hatred, which is probably the most potent of all unifying emotions. The common conception that propaganda is synonymous with lying probably arose from efforts of the Allies and Germans during World War I to create hatred toward the enemy by fabricating stories about atrocities and inhumane behavior. Propagan­dists frequently appeal to hatreds or try to create them, during times of great international tension and in the actual conduct of war, when a maximum number of people and allies have to be mobilized to support a government. In these circumstances, hatred of a national enemy becomes a virtue, while the emotions of love, anxiety, and guilt are seldom included in the various propaganda themes.

These emotions can be raised through almost any communication me­dium: Orators can inspire a crowd to violent acts simply by giving information; displays of military strength can create fear; and pictures of atrocities can create revulsion and, subsequently, hatred. Probably the most effective technique for foreign propaganda is the coordination of message content with the actual poli­cies and actions of the government.

The adage "actions speak louder than words" undoubtedly applies in international propaganda efforts. The images that foreign populations possess of other countries are usually based on news reports, movies, and cultural events rather than on direct experience. Since most people are uninformed about for­eign affairs, their conceptions and attitudes toward foreign countries are seldom detailed. Spectacular, newsmaking foreign-policy actions will be noticed by a relatively broad cross-section of a foreign population, whereas regular govern­ment information programs abroad will reach a much smaller audience. In short, people are apt to be more impressed with what governments do than with what propagandists say they do.

Where a great discrepancy between the words and actions of a govern-

¹² Ibid., p. 24.

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ment exists, either people abroad become disillusioned or the credibility of the propagandist is compromised, thus making the target populations wary of incoming information. American propaganda toward Eastern Europe, which im­plied American support of anti-Communist uprisings, had less effect after the United States failed to intervene in Hungary. And the credibility of North Korean propaganda that claimed that the United States had used germ warfare was reduced (except among those who really wanted to believe the charges) after the Communists refused to admit an impartial Red Cross investigation. In these instances, all the emotions and expectations that had been raised and attitudes that had been crystallized through verbal and pictorial messages were compro­mised by the self-defeating actions of the governments that sent the propaganda.

TECHNIQUES

OF PROPAGANDISTS

So far, we have discussed the problem of selecting targets and some aspects of attitude formation and change. Now we can analyze specific propaganda strate­gies and techniques that have been used in foreign policy during the last several decades. One of the pruposes of external propaganda is to modify the loyalty of particular groups of citizens toward their own government—either to destroy it or to create it, if it did not previously exist. When the Nazis, and often the Soviet government, were attempting through ordinary diplomatic means to achieve their foreign-policy objectives, they simultaneously used propaganda for purposes of subversion. To "soften up" the foreign population, they identi­fied their governments as "cliques," "puppets," and "oppressors," made charges of corruption against them, and, in general, used any means to discredit the established authorities. If various groups' loyalties to their own government could be shaken or destroyed, it became an easier task to substitute another loyalty, such as to a Nazi party, or to create apathy. Those groups or individuals in a society that were already alienated from the government were, of course, a prime target for external propaganda and constituted the material out of which "fifth columns" and subversive elements developed. By playing upon their hatred or revulsion toward the legitimate government, the propagandist could lead them to take political action—riots, mass meetings, or boycotts— that created confusion and embarrassed the regime in power, thus furthering the interests of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia.

Another strategy exploits potential or actual divisions within a society, often leading to violent action in the form of pogroms, strikes, and riots. This violence damages the international prestige of the government, undermines local confidence in it, and may force it to take unpopular repressive measures. For example, the Nazis directed propaganda toward the Sudeten Germans, urg­ing them to violent action against the majority Czechs. When the Czech govern-

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ment sought to put down Nazi-inspired riots, German propagandists accused it of persecuting a minority. A number of influential Europeans, sympathetic to the position of the Sudeten Germans, consequently made little effort to protest the Munich settlement in 1938 and subsequent Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia.

A similar strategy attempts to split allies from each other. But instead of provoking class, religious, or ethnic hatreds within a society, this type of propaganda tries to unite the society by suggesting that a country's allies are unreliable, scheming, or ready to "sell out" the interests of friends. A frequent theme of Nazi propaganda during World War II held that while British soldiers were on the front lines, American troops were in England seducing their wives and girlfriends. Postwar American propaganda has also attempted to arouse Eastern European nationalism by arguing that the Soviet government was ex­ploiting the satellite economies for its own purposes.

Having established a target and appropriate strategy, propagandists then may use a variety of specific techniques in delivering the messages. Among the more prominent are.¹³

1. Name-Calling. The propagandist attaches an emotion-laden symbol to a person or country. Targets are expected to respond favorably, from the propagandist's point of view, to the label without examining any evidence. Propa­gandists relate their appeals to stereotypes that already exist in the audience. Thus, Communists become "reds," labor leaders become "union bosses," and constitutional governments become "capitalist cliques."

2. Glittering Generality. This is similar to the preceding technique but is used to describe an idea or policy rather than individuals. The term "free world" is a favorite generality of Western propagandists. "Socialist solidar­ity" is used in the Communist world to describe the complex relations among Communist states and parties, and "the African soul" is supposed to create a similar image of strength and unity.

3. Transfer. The propagandist attempts to identify one idea, person, country, or policy with another to make the target approve or disapprove it. One way to evoke a particularly hostile attitude among religious people against communism is to equate it with atheism. Communists regularly equate capitalism with decadence, and anti-Semites hope to create public support for their bigotry by associating Jews with Communists.

4. "Plain Folks." Any propagandist is aware that his problems are compounded if he appears to the audience as a "foreigner" or stranger. He

¹³ These categories are adapted from Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Bryant Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda: A Study of Father Coughhn's Speeches (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1939), pp. 22-25.

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seeks, therefore, to identify as closely as possible with the values and style of life of the targets by using local slang, accent, and idiom.

5. Testimonial. Here, the propagandist uses an esteemed person or institution to endorse or criticize an idea or political entity. A variation of this is the "appeal to authority," where the target is asked to believe something simply because some "authority" says it is true.

6. Selection. Almost all propaganda, even when it uses the other tech­niques discussed above, relies on the selection of facts, although it is seldom very specific in its factual content. When a detailed presentation is given, the propagandist uses only those facts required to "prove" predetermined objec­tives.

7. Bandwagon. This technique plays on the audience's desire to "be-long"or be in accord with the crowd. It is similar to the testimonial, except that a mass of people, rather than a single esteemed person or institution, serves as the attraction. The messages of Communist propagandists frequently use such phrases as "the whole world knows that . . . ," "all peace-loving people recognize that . . . ," or "all progressive people demand that . . ." This tech­nique implies that the target is in a minority—if he or she opposes the substance of the message—and should join the majority. Or, if the target is sympathetic to the propagandist, this technique will reinforce one's attitudes by demonstrat­ing that one is on the "right" side, along with everyone else.

8. Frustration Scapegoat. One easy way to create hatred and relieve frustrations is to create a scapegoat. Revolutionary regimes faced with complex internal economic and social disorders and popular frustrations frequently create an internal or external "spook" to account for the people's miseries. The most famous example was the myth created by Hitler that Germany's internal and foreign problems were created by "the Jews"—who were often equated with Communists.

The reader will have noticed that these techniques are used not only in foreign propaganda but in all organized efforts to persuade, including political campaigns, and particularly in commercial advertising. Several of these tech­niques may be used simultaneously to create the maximum effect.

To this point, the discussion of propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy has been theoretical. To understand better some of the strategies, tech­niques, and problems that governments face in attempting to influence others, it will be useful to discuss in some detail recent American and Soviet foreign-information programs, even though these are by no means the only governments that use propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy.

AMERICAN PROPAGANDA

The theoretical discussion should not suggest that if the propagandists correctly gauge their audience, carefully select their target, and skillfully combine their techniques, they will always succeed in "winning minds." A review of American and Soviet propaganda policies indicates that, in both governments, there re­mains considerable uncertainty regarding the kinds of philosophies and tech­niques that should guide their foreign-information programs.

The American propaganda program is formulated by the International Communication Agency (ICA), an organization created in 1954 by President Eisenhower. The agency organizes the activities of more than 100 libraries and information service offices abroad; a world-wide radio service (the Voice of Amer­ica); television, film, and news services; and numerous special programs. The State Department handles student and cultural exchanges, which are an impor­tant aspect of the American propaganda effort. Until funds were cut off by Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency supplied the resources for Radio Liberty, beamed at the Soviet Union. In a more clandestine fashion, the CIA frequently supports foreign writers or newspaper editors who write favorably of the United States and its policies.¹⁴

The objectives of American propaganda have shifted over the years. At the beginning of the cold war, anti-Communist themes were prominent and, in a more positive vein, the ICA tried to promote the "truth" about American policies and American society. Exploitation of nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe has also been a prominent objective, along with efforts to show how American philosophies of economics and government have been instrumental in creating the nation with the highest standard of living in the world.

Perhaps the most serious difficulties have arisen in connection with the choice of targets and types of themes to be used for certain populations in developing countries. There have been instances, for example, where the themes of "democracy" and "private enterprise" were used among landless peasants, whose only experience with private enterprise was one of exploitation and degra­dation, and where "democracy" meant, at least in their own experience, corrupt rule by closed oligarchies. Similarly, to display visual evidence of the American standard of living—a frequent American propaganda technique—to uneducated and often illiterate peasants often creates either incredulity or outright antago­nism.

On the other hand, American propaganda programs have been successful in reinforcing the pro-American attitudes of certain segments of foreign popula­tions, including key economic, cultural, and political elites. People who already have a favorable predisposition toward the United States do visit ICA libraries,

¹⁴ Kenneth R. Sparks, "Selling Uncle Sam in the Seventies," in Martin, ed., Propaganda in International Affairs, p. 115.

206 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda

take free English language lessons, or avail themselves of the various recreational and educational programs offered by the agency. It is questionable, however, whether these programs extend to a large majority of the population or whether they make any impact, in the long run, on those who are anti-American or apathetic.

In developing areas of the world, anti-Communist propaganda is less likely to succeed. These areas are usually far removed from the Soviet Union and China, the people have seldom experienced unfavorable Soviet or Chinese policies directly, and communism does not seem a salient problem in their lives. Although some American propaganda in these areas is decidedly anti-Commu­nist, in its main themes—particularly when directed to local elites and property owners—it usually emphasizes that the objectives of American foreign policy are compatible with the interests of the developing country and that the United States can be helpful in assisting in the process of industrialization. Where such themes are coupled with displays of effective foreign-aid programs, the impact may be considerable. American propaganda in developing areas also argues that free enterprise and economic, social, and scientific advancement go together and that the aspirations of less fortunate people can be achieved within a frame­work of democratic reform rather than totalitarianism.

The ICA has used all the traditional propaganda techniques, but deliber­ate distortion has been avoided. In addition, instead of relying exclusively on the dissemination of ideas, symbols, information, and messages designed to create some unfavorable image of the Soviet Union or favorable image of the United States and its policies, the ICA has also found it effective to render services that have a direct and immediate benefit to the targets' personal or economic life. While the Voice of America uses all the traditional techniques of propaganda in its news analyses, it also provides free lessons in the English language and programs for Russian listeners who like, but cannot buy, records of Western jazz or rock music. The ICA Bulletin is a news-teletype production that reaches more than 100 countries and is available to local newspapers, political groups, educators, and individuals who request that it be sent to them. Through this service, the ICA disseminates full texts of important speeches by American public officials, so that foreign editors can draw their own conclusions and, in some cases, reprint entire sections of the speech at a very low cost. This service benefits both the propagandist and the target. For the United States, it means wide coverage of the speeches and news items it wants publicized around the world; for the foreign newspapers, it means inexpensive information and news copy. In addition to providing books, periodicals, films, and magazines in ICA libraries around the world, the agency also provides technical and information services to foreign businessmen, labor organizers, educators, and farmers. In other words, the agency seeks to provide information and assistance relevant to the activities of foreign groups and individuals. As one former ICA official has argued, if American propagandists can provide information that is useful to existing foreign organizations or can help new organizations to form, they are much more likely

207 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda

to have a significant political impact than if they focus their attention on influenc­ing isolated individuals.¹⁵

SOVIET PROPAGANDA

The long-range objectives of the Soviet Union were for many years closely associated with destruction of the contemporary international system and the substitution of a world of socialist states. Whereas the Soviet government has core and middle-range objectives similar to those of many other states, one long-range external purpose, as it often claimed, was that of promoting revolu­tion abroad. Clearly, the Soviet government cannot achieve its long-range objec­tives simply through diplomatic bargaining or deliberate aggression. Soviet gov­ernments from the time of the Bolshevik revolution have thus recognized that both the advocacy of revolution and the promotion of Russian middle-range objectives could be enhanced by formulating systematic propaganda programs that would bypass foreign governments and influence foreign populations in­stead. These populations, it was hoped, would in turn force their governments to act in a manner consistent with Soviet interests. Propaganda is thus both a technique to assist Soviet diplomats in conferences and bargaining sessions and a means of promoting revolutionary activity abroad.

Soviet propaganda still relies extensively on Marxist-Leninist terminol­ogy and traditional Russian demonology, but today it is infused with a pragma­tism that was lacking prior to 1953. The flexibility of Soviet propaganda is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the current emphasis on increasing face-to-face contacts. In addition to touring cultural and entertainment troupes, the Soviet government regularly sends abroad scientific, technical, and artistic dele­gates and willingly invites foreign tourists and delegates to visit some parts of the Soviet Union. Thousands of students from Africa, Asia, and Latin America attend Soviet institutions of higher learning, where the emphasis is on technical training, not the inculcation of Marxism-Leninism. Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University is devoted specifically to students from Africa. In all cases, generous scholarships are provided.

In addition, there are hundreds of "friendship societies" throughout the world. These are voluntary organizations—headed usually by prominent people in a foreign country—that maintain special contacts with counterparts in the Soviet Union. These organizations provide information about Soviet life and promote artistic, literary, and cultural exchanges. From the Soviet point of view, their purpose is to foster generally favorable attitudes abroad toward Russian life in general and Soviet foreign policies in particular. They also provide means of direct communication to key elites in foreign countries.

¹⁵ W. Phillips Davison, "Political Communication as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), 35.

208 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda

Finally, there are numerous Soviet "front organizations," such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union of Students. Ostensibly voluntary associations cross­ing national frontiers, in reality they have been sponsored and are in part funded by Soviet party agencies. The "policies" or resolutions adopted by the organiza­tions often reflect official Soviet foreign policy, and they generally have a strident anti-West tone. If these organizations can mobilize enough popular support within a country on a particular line, they can have some impact on governments. Such was the case when the French section of the World Peace Movement launched a massive campaign in the late 1940s against the formation of NATO and in the 1950s against inclusion of West Germany into the alliance. Using nationalist and anti-American symbols, the movement made a definite impact on domestic French opinion, although it did not achieve its goal of preventing the French government from joining NATO.¹⁶

Former premier Khrushchev emphasized at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 that Russian propaganda must not be con­cerned too much with inculcating abstract principles of communism but must become increasingly practical. Whereas Stalin conceived of the world as divided into two rigid and unalterably hostile camps—the socialist and capitalist—the present Soviet leadership has recognized the opportunities available for cultivat­ing developing countries through appeals to nationalism and anticolonialism. As Soviet propagandists appeal to broader and more diverse targets abroad, they have replaced the old cliches of Marxism-Leninism with newer slogans. Instead of using such terms as "proletariat" and "working class," which elicited desired attitudes and behavior among only a limited segment of any society, Soviet slogans today include the terms "masses," "all peace-loving people," and, most broadly, simply "the people." Instead of "violent revolution," "class struggle," "imperialist hyenas," and "bloodsuckers of the people," they talk of the "national interest," the "interests of peace-loving peoples," and "aggres­sive circles."¹⁷

Aside from propaganda directed at the problems of particular "tar­gets"—that is, information that is relevant to only particular groups of people within a country, in recent years the Soviet government has emphasized three general themes: (1) nationalism (or anti-imperialism), (2) modernization, and (3) peace.¹⁸

Most of the propaganda that exploits nationalism is not couched in the orthodox phraseology of Marxism-Leninism, for one of the most difficult tasks of Communist theoreticians has been to reconcile Marx's disdain for "bour-

¹⁶ For a discussion of Soviet-sponsored "front organizations" and the World Peace Move­ment, see Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­sity Press, 1963), pp. 80-103, 199-221.

¹⁷ John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley, 1962), p. 79.

¹⁸ Detailed discussion of these themes is in Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), Chaps. 3-6.

209 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda

geois nationalism" with the obvious importance of nationalism in the contempo­rary world. Thus, while in intrabloc propaganda the Soviet government decries manifestations of Eastern European nationalism (although it promotes Russian "patriotism"), propaganda directed to developing areas fully supports policies expressing nationalist attitudes, whether they take the form of territorial claims (such as Soviet support for Indonesia's claim to West Irian in the 1960s), wars of "national liberation," expropriation of Western property, or elimination of Western military bases. Soviet propaganda to Asia, Africa, and the Middle East also emphasizes that any ties with the "imperialists" will jeopardize the indepen­dence of the new states and subject them to "neocolonialism."¹⁹ If successful, these appeals based on symbols of nationalism will promote the decline of West­ern influence and, presumably, simultaneously create good will for the Soviet Union.²⁰ For European targets, the theme of nationalism is usually put in the form of anti-Americanism, suggesting that America's decadent culture is invading Europe and that the United States supports NATO militarily only to protect itself and maintain domination over weaker NATO members.

Since Soviet leaders have recently argued that other societies, especially the developing countries, will adopt the Communist example if they see the impressive achievements of Soviet science, welfare, and technology, it is natural that Soviet propagandists would use the theme of modernization. This theme is also effective in creating prestige for the Soviet Union. A steady stream of statements, charts, diagrams, and statistics goes via the radio and various publica­tions to the newer countries. These figures emphasize that the Soviet Union has achieved the status of a major power in less than 60 years and that it is winning the "battle of growth rates" over the United States. Soviet space achieve­ments are also acknowledged to be the result of the superiority of communism. Accomplishments of Russian writers and artists and the level of interest in cul­tural affairs among the Russian people in general are frequently compared with the salacious literature that seems to be so popular in Western countries.²¹

Soviet propaganda in developing countries also places special emphasis on modernization of the Soviet Union's Asiatic areas, particularly Uzbekistan, where natural and economic conditions are in many respects similar to those in other Asian areas. Articles, pictures, and news reports describe the difference between the Central Asian republics during the tsarist period, when indigenous populations lived in ignorance and poverty, and today, when there has been spectacular technological, educational, and cultural progress. The relative reli­gious freedom of Moslems in the area is heavily emphasized in Soviet information directed to the Middle Eastern countries. In propaganda of this sort, the Soviet government is careful to point out that the problems it has faced in building

¹⁹ Note that this idea is almost the same as the American propaganda theme that claims that diplomatic, commercial, and foreign-aid ties with the Soviet Union or Communist China will lead to the subversion of nonaligned states.

²⁰ Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, p. 162.

²¹ Ibid, Chap. 6.

210 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda

up the Central Asian republics are similar to the problems faced by the people in developing areas today. It creates an impact by being applicable to the con­cerns of the target populations.²²

Another typical technique is to invite foreign Islamic leaders in the arts, literature, history, and religion to a conference sponsored by the "Muslim Spiri­tual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan." Foreign delegates are provided with tours of mosques and one of the few remaining Koranic institutes. But in addition to attending a cultural conference, delegates are asked to pass political— usually anti-Western—resolutions, thus implying a transnational Muslim coali­tion committed to Soviet foreign-policy objectives.²³

Peace themes are among the most prominent in Soviet propaganda. These, too, are effective because they play upon rational fears and well-estab­lished and widespread attitudes against war. Moreover, these themes appeal to broad groups of people in almost any country, although somewhat different emphasis must be given for each specific target. For Communists and their supporters, classical Leninist strictures about the rapacity and aggressiveness of "imperialists" will be used, while for audiences in nonaligned and pro-Western states, the slogans of peaceful coexistence and "normalization of relations" are more prominent. In either case the objective is to create the assumption that Soviet diplomatic programs are motivated by a sincere desire to create peace. Setbacks and delays are usually attributed to the intransigence of Western gov­ernments in general or to Western groups, such as the "military-industrial com­plex," in particular.

The Soviet government has at its disposal all the modern communication media to disseminate propaganda themes. Face-to-face contacts are emphasized increasingly to supplement the traditional media of books, pamphlets, magazines, and radio. Soviet films, once of such a thoroughly ideological character that no one outside—and few inside—the Soviet Union would pay to watch them, are rated today among the world's artistic achievements. Trade fairs, exhibits, visiting sports teams, circuses, ballets, and technological displays create generally favorable attitudes among a wide variety of people toward the Soviet Union and its economic and cultural achievements.

Emphasis on sports has been particularly notable. Massive programs mobilizing millions of Soviet youth have raised the level of athletic achievement to the world's best in almost all sports. The Russians have even made significant progress in downhill and slalom skiing, once denounced in the Soviet Union as "decadent bourgeois" sports. The growing number of Soviet and East Euro­pean medals and their total domination of the 1980 Moscow Olympics has one major purpose: to demonstrate to the world the superiority of socialism.

But the largest amount of money is still spent on radio and books. Radio Moscow broadcasts to every area of the world in native languages and

²² Alexander Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962), p. 104.

²³ For elaboration and cases, see Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," Problems of Communism (March-April 1980), 38-51.

211 The Instruments of Policy: Propaganda

possesses the most powerful transmitting equipment available. Even though the estimated audience of this service is smaller than that of either the Voice of America or the British Broadcasting Corporation's External Service, it can shift attention rapidly to areas suitable for exploitation and can broadcast mes­sages that would not be acceptable for domestic Russian consumption.²⁴ Soviet propagandists do not have to be concerned with irate legislators or voluntary associations that do not fully agree with the themes or messages being dissemi­nated. The Soviets also publish, at subsidized prices, thousands of foreign-lan­guage books and hundreds of magazines and journals. These range from inex­pensive editions of Russian literary classics to inflammatory propaganda appeals; every publication is directed toward a particular market. Soviet information offi­cials abroad request local newspapers to reprint or, simply, to sell space in their publications for Soviet articles, news, and photographs.

Among the clandestine means, the best known are the many radio sta­tions broadcasting from unknown headquarters, ostensibly as the "voice" of some liberation movement. Among these are "Radio Peace and Progress," en­gaged mostly in beaming vitriolic attacks against the United States to Indian audiences. Clandestine radio stations in East Germany have been active in broad­casting to West Germany and, particularly, to Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. China supplies transmitter time to the "Patriotic Youth Front Radio" for Burma and similar facilities for Malaysia and the Philippines. Vast increases in Chinese and Soviet broadcasting to Africa are also notable, particularly since they use each other, as well as the "imperialists," as targets for criticism.

THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF PROPAGANDA

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