FOR ORGANIZING DEVICES

Some theorizing activity in the field is undertaken not for the purpose of con­structing a predictive theory of international relations (assuming that it can be done), but for creating ordering devices or approaches that help the investigator and student make some sense out of the great diversity of data and events in international relations. Whatever the name of that device, whether a "quasi-theory," "model," "conceptual framework," or, more simply, a framework for analysis, its purpose is to help create understanding by ordering facts and con­cepts into some meaningful pattern. Gathering of facts or descriptions of events creates understanding of those facts and events but otherwise has little broader application. Only when these facts and events are fitted against some framework of concepts can they be seen essentially as illustrations of general and recurring processes in international politics. But an organizing device does more than just relate facts to general propositions.

Historians use the organizing devices of time, place, and subject matter (for instance, German foreign policy toward Poland from 1934 to 1939) as a means of helping them select relevant data, relate the data to each other, and determine the boundaries of their topic. Without such organizing devices there

14 Approaches to the Study of International Politics

would be no place to begin, no limits to help research and description, and no way to determine what facts, conditions, or events are relevant to the subject.

Social scientists also use organizing devices; but because they are often interested in classes of social phenomena and processes rather than specific events bounded by time, place, and subject, their devices will be more abstract than those historians use. For instance, if we want to define the essence of international politics, we might say "power politics," in which case the boundaries of the subject would be determined largely by the definition we assign to those two words. But "power" and "politics" are very abstract concepts, more difficult to deal with than concepts relating to time and place. Yet, if we define interna­tional politics as "power politics" or "the quest for power," we have, however crude, some framework, approach, or quasi theory that provides the boundaries of the subject, establishes criteria of relevance, and helps fit some of the many facts of international life together. It designates key variables that help to explain the behavior of states in their external relations. In this case, power—how it is wielded and how much is available—is posited as the key explanatory variable to the understanding of a nation's foreign policies.

There are, of course, certain dangers in employing any approach, theory, model, or framework in social analysis. Although these devices help the investiga­tor select data and relate concepts and variables, they may also act as blinders to other significant facets of the subject. One example of a popular model of international politics will illustrate this point. The "power politics" approach, very popular during the late 1930s and still enjoying considerable repute, as­sumes that no matter what the long-range objectives of states, their immediate objective is power over other states. International politics is conceived as a struggle for power among all states, either for expansion or defense and protec­tion. Study focuses partly on the methods and techniques states use to maximize their power, but primarily on the "elements" of a state's power. Since it is assumed that states are successful to the extent that they have power, the ap­proach demands lengthy consideration and assessment of each nation's "power position," which includes its geography, natural resources, population, techno­logical level, available military resources, and national morale. In other words, because the approach emphasizes just one concept—power—it leads observers to try to discover what constitutes a state's power.

The power approach does explain some aspects of international politics, and it directs researchers to look for certain types of information that are useful to the student. But because of its undue emphasis on power and struggle, it conceals other important aspects of international politics. If some relations can be described as "struggle," surely Swedish-Norwegian relations are not, for the most part, adequately characterized by this term. As interesting as the elements of power may be, they do not determine how effective a state will be in its external relations. A state can be very well endowed with all the elements of power and still not achieve its objectives against even the weakest and smallest

15 Approaches to the Study of International Politics

states. Thus, while the approach does explain a limited range of phenomena and helps to emphasize the importance of one variable—power—in international politics, it is burdened with oversimplicity, unexamined assumptions, and its Hobbesian view of international relationships.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

One final problem concerning organizing devices needs to be discussed before the framework of analysis in this book is presented. What should we use as the major unit of analysis in international politics?⁵ Should we focus upon the actions and attitudes of individual policy makers? Or might we assume that all policy makers act essentially the same way once confronted with similar situations and therefore concentrate instead on the behavior of states ? Or could we remove ourselves even further from individuals and examine international politics from the perspective of entire systems of states? Each level of analysis—individual, state, or systemic—will make us look at different things, so the student must be aware of the differences among them. For example, the classical theory of balance of power is an attempt to explain the behavior of many states over a period of time. It proposes that states will form coalitions and countercoalitions to fend off hegemonic drives and that a "balancer" will intervene on behalf of the weaker side in order to redress the balance or restore the old equilibrium. The behavior of individual political units is thus explained in terms of the state of the whole system (balanced or imbalanced) and the presence or absence of one aggressive state and a balancer. This type of analysis makes no reference to personalities, domestic pressures, or ideologies within states. Foreign-policy behavior is conceived as a reaction to the external environment, the state of balance or imbalance among all the units in the system.

If we look at international politics from the perspective of individual states, rather than from the state of the system in which they exist, quite different questions arise. We can attempt to explain the behavior of states by reference not just to the external environment (the system), but primarily to the domestic conditions that affect policy making. Wars, alliances, imperialism, diplomatic maneuvers, isolation, and the many goals of diplomatic action can be viewed as the results of domestic political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion, or economic and social needs. This level of analysis has much to commend it, for governments do not react just to the external environment or to some mythi­cal balance or imbalance. Their actions also express the needs and values of their own populations and political leaders.

⁵ J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in The Inter­national System: Theoretical Essays, eds. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 77-92; Kenneth W. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

16 Approaches to the Study of International Politics

Finally, we may study international politics and foreign policy by concen­trating on the actions and behavior of individual statesmen. This is the usual approach of diplomatic historians, based on the sound point that when we say that "states" behave, we really mean that policy makers are denning purposes, choosing among courses of action, and utilizing national capabilities to achieve objectives in the name of the state. This level of analysis focuses upon the ideologies, motivations, ideals, perceptions, values, or idiosyncrasies of those who are empowered to make decisions for the state.

Which level of analysis gives us the most useful perspective from which to explain or understand politics among nations? Each makes a contribution, but each fails to account for certain aspects of reality that must be considered. We cannot understand Soviet foreign policy adequately by studying only the attitudes and values of its foreign minister, nor is it sufficient to analyze Soviet social and economic needs. We must have some knowledge, as well, of ideological considerations and of the general configuration of power, influence, domination, and subordination throughout the world. The main characteristics of the external environment are no less important than those of the state's internal environment. Therefore, all three levels of analysis will be employed at different times, depend­ing upon the type of problem to be analyzed. The perspective of international systems is very broad, although not comprehensive, and provides the best ap­proach for delineating the main features and characteristics of international politi­cal processes over a relatively long period of time. One can describe the essence of the types of relations among Greek city-states without examining the character of each city-state or the motives, ideals, and goals of each statesman in each city-state. Today, the structure of alliances, of power, domination, dependence, and interdependence in the world sets limits upon the actions of states and policy makers, no matter what their ideological persuasion or individual ideals are, and no matter what the state of domestic opinion is. The next two chapters will concentrate on the description of historic international systems, with a view to illustrating the general nature of relationships among their component politi­cal units. At the same time, the analysis will illustrate how the main characteristics of an international system affect the behavior of individual states. The system is thus only one variable used to explain how and why states act and interact. Subsequently, the focus will shift to an explanation of foreign-policy behavior primarily by reference to domestic national needs and values and to individual variables.

The organizing concepts for this study derive from the three questions that have traditionally made up the core of inquiry about foreign policy and international politics: (1) How do states act? (2) How do we explain the various aspects of their foreign policies? and (3) What are the main characteristics of the interaction between states? The last question is a modernized version of the ancient preoccupation with the question of war and peace.

We will begin by focusing upon the various aspects of behavior associated

17 Approaches to the Study of International Politics

with the term foreign policy. Then, to provide historical depth and to illustrate how the environment influences state actions we will examine in Part II the types of international systems that have existed in the past as well as the main characteristics of the contemporary international system. The historical treat­ment also affords the opportunity to present a typology of international systems. (In Chapter 12, the typology is related to various explanations of foreign policy.)

Part III is primarily descriptive. We will be concerned with outlining the major outputs of states' foreign policies—what governments seek to achieve and how they go about it. These are denned, from the more general to the particular, as foreign-policy orientations (alliances, nonalignment, isolation), roles, objectives, and actions. Chapters 6 through 11 focus on the actions— the multifarious means of inducement governments use to achieve their objec­tives, fulfill national roles, and secure various orientations. We will start with simple techniques of diplomatic persuasion and end with a discussion of large-scale violence.

Part IV is the most difficult, because it attempts to explain how systemic, national, and personality variables can be linked to foreign-policy outputs. In addition, there is the question of law and ethics. To what extent can foreign-policy outputs be explained as meeting the demands of international law or of ethical principles?

To illustrate the framework used in Part IV, a problem for analysis might be posed. Suppose that after describing Soviet policies toward Afghanistan 1979-1980, we were asked to explain the goals and actions of Soviet diplomacy and military policy. We could, first, emphasize a type of explanation relying on ideological and systemic characteristics, such as the following: The Soviet govern­ment has traditionally been concerned with promoting and protecting the ad­vance of socialism in a world formerly dominated by the "imperialists." Once the "revolution" in Afghanistan became threatened by counterrevolution the Soviet Union, for reasons of prestige, historical commitment, and internationalist solidarity, had an obligation to intervene militarily to "save" the revolution. In an essentially bipolar world, no great power can permit its main adversary (the United States) to make an important gain at its own expense. A successful counterrevolution in Afghanistan would represent a net increment to the power of the main adversary and would be a blow to the progressive forces of the world. An important feature of the contemporary international system—the growing might of the socialist camp—would be compromised by the defeat of the progressive forces in Afghanistan. Thus, the decision to intervene militarily can be understood primarily as a response to events which would have destabiliz­ing consequences for the international system and historical development as perceived in Moscow.

Another line of explanation would emphasize Soviet national needs. No great power can afford to have near its borders a government hostile to it. The counterrevolution in Afghanistan was not only antisocialist, but anti-Russian

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18 Approaches to the Study of International Politics

as well. Not to intervene would have been to invite future troubles. A counter­revolutionary regime of a Muslim theocratic character might appeal for solidarity with the Soviet Union's Muslim population, thus raising the possibility of foment­ing Soviet Muslim nationalism and possible secession. Such consequences would result in a direct threat to the national security and unity of the multiethnic Soviet federation. The intervention, then, was essentially a defensive move that any major power would have taken in similar circumstances. (What would be the reaction of the United States in the event of a socialist revolution in Mexico?)

A third type of explanation would concentrate on the personalities and perceptions of key Soviet decision makers and important groups in the Soviet policy hierarchy. Some commentators might point out that the Soviet military has assumed in recent years an important role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy and that in the circumstances surrounding Afghanistan in the autumn of 1979, the military leaders saw an opportunity to test Soviet troops, weapons, and tactics in a combat situation. Afghanistan, in brief, provided an arena for displaying to civilian policy makers the effectiveness of Soviet military might. Others might point out that the intervention represented simply an escala­tion of commitments, an irreversible process in which the Soviets, like the Ameri­cans in Vietnam, became incrementally involved in Afghanistan. Soviet military advisors first went to the country in 1978, and their role eventually increased to participation in Afghan army combat missions, in which increasing numbers of Russians were killed. As the situation deteriorated, top military leaders began to argue for an active intervention to save a situation being bungled by the Afghans. The top Soviet civilian leaders' perceptions of the situation were parallel to those of the military; hence, they accepted the latter's advice. Finally, others might argue that Brezhnev had staked his personal reputation on committing Soviet support to the success of the Afghan socialist regime and that a failure to take effective action against counterrevolution could lead to his personal demise as the top Soviet leader.

All of these explanations probably have some validity or plausibility. The point to emphasize is that each focuses on different types of explanatory variables: systemic, national, or personal and decision-making. Chapter 12 at­tempts to show under what conditions each of the types of explanations is most satisfactory. After having read that chapter, the reader might wish to take several cases in recent diplomatic history to see if he or she can "explain" the case in terms of the relative importance of these variables.

Part V shifts focus to the interactions of states. The problem of peace and war is certainly the most important in international policies, so we will examine the behavior associated with conflictual relationships and collaborative interactions.

The key concepts, to summarize, are the systems, or environments, in which state action occurs; foreign-policy outputs, ranging from orientations to actions; the factors that explain those outputs; and, finally, patterns of interaction between states as revealed in conflict and cooperation.

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